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ABSTRACT 
This thesis focuses on the root causes of conflict in South Asia that have created the 
environment in the Afghan–Pakistan border areas, which nurtures insurgency. The causes 
are rooted in the decisions, made by the British Empire in the 19th and 20th centuries, to 
perpetuate her rule in the Indian subcontinent.  A disregard for the history and its impact 
on the current events has lead to prolonging of U.S. war in Afghanistan. The conclusion 
is that colonial history of South Asia has shaped current conflicts in Afghanistan, India, 
and Pakistan. These conflicts have manifested in spawning of terrorism from the region.   
 Ever since the partition of India in 1947 by the British, India and Pakistan remain 
locked in an enduring conflict over Kashmir. This conflict is tied to destabilization of 
South Asia, including competition between India and Pakistan over influence in 
Afghanistan. Thus, the U.S. focus on elimination of al Qaeda is short sighted, as it 
ignores the reasons for al Qaeda’s survival in South Asia.  Without Pakistan’s support for 
the Afghan Taliban and associated terrorist organizations, al Qaeda would not have a 
sanctuary in South Asia.  
 Without a resolution of the conflict between India and Pakistan, the terrorism 
problem emanating from South Asia remains a potential threat. Therefore, it is imperative 
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I. HISTORY AS THE ARCHITECT OF THE PRESENT: WHAT 
MADE KASHMIR THE NUCLEUS OF SOUTH ASIA TERRORISM? 
INDIA–PAKISTAN CONFLICT AND ITS IMPACT ON U.S. 
HOMELAND SECURITY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The last ten years have seen an increasing body of available literature and 
scholarly analysis of the status of Pakistan as an unreliable ally of the United States 
(U.S.) in the so called “war on terrorism.”  Furthermore, the realization that India and 
Pakistan rivalry has impacted U.S. mission in Afghanistan is steadily being brought to 
light (Ganguly, 2010; Jones, 2007; Jones, 2011). However, specific analyses that reach 
down to specific colonial roots of the conflict, which has embroiled the U.S. military in 
South Asia for the last ten years, are few and have yet to enter the mainstream debate. 
There is limited debate and the body of knowledge available regarding how the conflict 
between India and Pakistan, specifically over Kashmir, has resulted in terrorist attacks 
plotted and launched against the United States and its allies (Kapur, 2009; Siddiqa, 2011; 
Usher, 2009). There is a paucity of analysis of how colonial decisions and historical 
conflicts in the Indian subcontinent contributed to the extant terrorism problem 
emanating from Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. It is important to determine whether 
the regional conflicts in South Asia have and are directly responsible for terrorist threats 
to the United States. The critical question of why the Pakistani military, specifically The 
Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), have been assisting and harboring the 
Taliban and the terrorists who plot attacks against the U.S. Army in Afghanistan and 
targets within the United States can be explained by the historical events that resulted in 
the partition of British India and territorial conflicts between India and Pakistan. In order 
to make better decisions in Afghanistan, it is imperative to analyze the historical roots of 
South Asian regional conflicts and establish their relationship with current instability and 
terrorism in South Asia. 
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It is a fact that the United States has relentlessly focused on al Qaeda and the 
Taliban insurgents and engaged in neutralization of many insurgents through drone 
attacks and military strikes. However, despite the weakening of al Qaeda, and despite 
killing of Osama bin Laden,—depriving al Qaeda of its primary brand symbol, the 
regional conflicts that allowed the exporters of terrorism to operate in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan have not yet been resolved (Dutta, 2011; Strindberg & Warn, 2011, Staniland, 
2011). The disregard for the historical context has not only proven to be a drain on U.S. 
economy, it has unnecessarily prolonged the U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. By fiscal year 
2010, the U.S. government had expended approximately $444 billion in Afghanistan for 
war operations and accessory operations (Belasco, 2011). And although President Obama 
has initiated an accelerated troop drawdown, the approximate cost of operations in 
Afghanistan would be over $110 billion dollars the next fiscal year. However, our efforts 
for the past ten years have not made a serious dent into the causal factors that have 
impacted our homeland security. A resolution of the issues that perpetuate destabilization 
in South Asia is of critical importance to United States and its allies; however, these 
issues continue to destabilize South Asia because of our lack of focus on the conflict 
between India and Pakistan (Bose, 2003; Ganguly, 2002; Ganguly & Howenstein, 2009; 
Usher, 2009). 
This thesis focuses on the root causes of conflict in South Asia that have created 
the environment in the Afghan-Pakistan border areas, which nurture insurgency. The 
causes are rooted in the decisions made by the British Empire in the 19th and 20th 
centuries, to perpetuate her rule in the Indian subcontinent. Ignorance of history and its 
impact on the current events has lead to the prolonging of the U.S. war in Afghanistan 
without a clear-cut end in sight. The thesis would recommend policy actions that lead 
towards a resolution of historical conflict in South Asia, and, consequently, elimination 
of the terrorist training camps in the region. 
The Pakistan–Afghanistan border area has been described as the most dangerous 
frontier on earth and the most challenging for the United States' national security interests 
(Johnson & Mason, 2008). Despite expending vast amounts of money and investment in 
military, counter-terrorism efforts, diplomatic initiatives, and support for the American-
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supported Afghan government, situation in Afghanistan has not yet stabilized. The 
Afghanistan-Pakistan border continues to harbor actors who support and harbor al Qaeda, 
engage in attacks against the Afghanistan and Pakistan governments, support and train 
the Taliban, and plot terrorist attacks against western targets (Chadbourne, 2009; Fair, 
2009; Fair, 2011; Haqqani, 2005; Jones, 2007; Jones 2011). The inability of the United 
States and the coalition forces to win or to stabilize Afghanistan for the last ten years, 
despite pumping enormous resources in one of the weakest and poorest nations in the 
world, clearly suggests that U.S. policies and strategies have been fundamentally flawed 
since their inception in 2001 and need a reassessment.  
It is evident that our homeland security depends upon a successful resolution of 
war in Afghanistan. The border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan has been a 
terrorist training factory for radicalized and disaffected Muslims from around the world. 
Homegrown terrorists in the United States have received spiritual guidance and practical 
training from al Qaeda remnants and other Jihadist elements entrenched in Afghanistan-
Pakistan border area. Furthermore, Pakistan, despite being a U.S. ally, and despite being 
provided with financial and military aid, continues to work at cross-purposes with the 
United States. Pakistan is considered by many to be the most dangerous foreign policy 
problem facing the United States, as it has been termed an unstable, radicalized, and 
nuclear capable country (Fair, 2009; Goodson, 2009; Jones, 2007). The currently 
prevailing conclusion in the literature considers Pakistan to be the world’s most active 
sponsor of terrorism, with the possible exception of Iran (Byman, 2005; Vira & 
Cordesman, 2011). Several high-profile terrorist incidents, including the September 11, 
2001 attacks, July 7, 2005 subway bombings in London, and the November 2008 attack 
on Mumbai had direct or peripheral connections to individuals and groups operating from 
Pakistan (Ganguly & Kapur, 2010; Riedel, 2011). Pakistan stands as a unique nation, as it 
is a major victim and a major sponsor of terrorism at the same time. However, it 
continues, according to a variety of experts, as a sponsor of terrorism, to advance its 
national security interests using proxies and jihadi elements (Haqqani, 2005; Rashid, 
2008; Riedel, 2008; Vira & Cordesman, 2011; Waldman, 2010). 
  4
Peace and stability in South Asia is a prerequisite for striking at the root of 
terrorism emanating from the Afghanistan–Pakistan border region. This thesis suggests 
that the United States’ inability to control and win in the region was due to a focus on 
short-term goals and ignorance, coupled with a disregard of South Asia’s history. There 
are historical reasons why India and Pakistan have been locked up in a pathological 
relationship, making them existential enemies ever since their creation by the departing 
British in 1947. These historical reasons also offer explanations why India and Pakistan 
have used Afghanistan as a pawn in their power play. Without consideration of these 
historical factors, any policy to stabilize Afghanistan and eliminate terrorist threats from 
the region can guarantees but only a short-term success (Barfield, 2007; Tomsen, 2011). 
An analysis of the history indicates that decisions made by the British empire in 
late 19th and early 20th centuries contributed to intractable conflicts in South Asia, 
leading to regional wars, arms race, including nuclear arms race, and the use of Islamic 
militants and asymmetric warfare (terrorism) by Pakistan to achieve her primary 
irredentist objectives in Kashmir and secondary territorial objectives in Afghanistan.  
Short-term interests of the British empire were translated into expedient decision 
making that eventually lead to a partition of colonial India by the British in 1947, leading 
to a horrendous blood bath and a massive forced population transfer. The partition of 
India created a poisonous relationship between the two nascent nations and the 
unresolved issues between India and Pakistan metastasized, eventually turning Pakistan 
into a state that invested systemically into use of Jihadi fighters and terrorism as state 
policy (Ali, 2002; Bose, 2003; Ganguly, 2001; Ganguly, 2002; Haqqani, 2005; Jafferlot, 
2002).  
The primary reason for lack of resolution of the ongoing South Asian conflict and 
consociate terrorism, despite the world’s sole superpower employing the world’s most 
powerful military and full power of her treasury, is American policymaker’s persistent 
disregard for the history of the region (Ahmad, 1973; Haqqani, 2005; Rashid, 2008; 
Tomsen, 2011; Wirsing, 1994). The colonial history of South Asia has shaped the current 
conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. The United States finds herself entangled in 
these historical forces; however, the U.S. policymakers have refused to take lessons from 
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the history of the region and formulate suitable policies. This disregard for history has 
allowed the conflict in South Asia to continue for almost a decade where the world’s 
strongest nation finds itself expending enormous resources, while earning the ire of 
people it claims to be helping. All the military and counterterrorism efforts in the region, 
and all the economic and military aid to Pakistan, have not translated into tangible actions 
by Pakistan to disengage from supporting and nurturing terrorism in Afghanistan and 
elsewhere. Consequently, despite sustained efforts, the U.S. finds itself in a stalemate in 
South Asia, without having completely disarmed or eliminated the forces that continue to 
plot attacks in United States. 
While there does exist a body of knowledge regarding the impact of the conflict in 
South Asia on the terrorist threats that we face, the focus on Pakistan’s role as the 
incubator of terrorist outfits with aims to attack the United States is a relatively recent 
phenomenon, especially as Pakistan has been generally considered an ally of the United 
States since the early 1950s (Riedel, 2011). Furthermore, there is a paucity of analysis of 
how colonial decisions and historical conflicts in the Indian subcontinent have 
contributed to the extant terrorism problem emanating from Afghanistan–Pakistan border 
region. It is important to determine whether regional conflicts in South Asia have and are 
directly responsible for terrorist threats to the United States. Furthermore, in order to 
make better decisions with broader outcomes in the Afghanistan war, it is imperative to 
analyze the historical roots of regional conflicts and establish their relationship with 
current instability and terrorism in South Asia.  
This thesis focuses on the root cause of conflict in South Asia that created an 
environment in the Afghan–Pakistan border areas that nurtures insurgency. The cause is 
rooted in expedient decisions made by the British Empire in the 19th and 20th centuries 
to perpetuate her rule in the Indian subcontinent. Besides analyzing the historical context 
of South Asia terrorism, this thesis focuses on India and Pakistan’s role in exacerbation 
of the situation in Afghanistan and the consequent contribution to terrorism and war in 
the region. The thesis recommends policy options that may lead towards a resolution of 
historical conflict in South Asia, and, consequently, reduction and possible elimination of 
terrorism in the region. 
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The White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group’s Report on U.S. Policy toward 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, released in 2009, reiterated the U.S. security goal to “disrupt, 
dismantle and defeat al Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, and to prevent their return 
to Afghanistan...”1  The White Paper proposed a new strategy, emphasizing five 
objectives focusing on security and governance for both Afghanistan and Pakistan as well 
as a role for the international community. These are 1) disrupting terrorist networks in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan; 2) promoting a more capable, accountable and effective 
government in Afghanistan; 3) developing increasingly self-reliant Afghan security 
forces; 4) enhancing civilian control and economic development in Pakistan and; 5) 
involving the international community in achieving these objectives, with a leadership 
role for the United Nations.  
The National Strategy for Counterterrorism (2011) states, “The preeminent 
security threat to the United States continues to be from al-Qa‘ida and its affiliates and 
adherents.”  The Strategy also discusses the elimination of safe-havens for al Qaida:  
Al-Qa‘ida and its affiliates and adherents rely on the physical sanctuary of 
ungoverned or poorly governed territories, where the absence of state 
control permits terrorists to travel, train, and engage in plotting. In close 
coordination with foreign partners, the United States will continue to 
contest and diminish al-Qa‘ida’s operating space through mutually 
reinforcing efforts designed to prevent al-Qa‘ida from taking advantage of 
these ungoverned spaces. We will also build the will and capacity of states 
whose weaknesses al-Qa‘ida exploits. Persistent insecurity and chaos in 
some regions can undermine efforts to increase political engagement and 
build capacity and provide assistance, thereby exacerbating chaos and 
insecurity. Our challenge is to break this cycle of state failure to constrict 
the space available to terrorist networks. 
The 2009 White Paper and the National Strategy For Counterterrorism fails to focus on 
two historical and interconnected key factors that continue to perpetuate pathological 
politics in South Asia—conflict between India and Pakistan over the territory of Kashmir, 
and conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan over the status of the Durand Line (Dutta, 
2010; Haqqani, 2005; Paul, 2005; Tomsen, 2011; Usher, 2009). Without accommodating 
                                                 
1 White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and 
Pakistan.  http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Afghanistan-Pakistan_White_Paper.pdf.  (Last 
accessed October 27, 2010.) 
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the interests of India and Pakistan as they related to Kashmir and Pashtun populations 
divided across Afghanistan-Pakistan border, and without reconciliation between India 
and Pakistan, the U.S. strategy cannot achieve full victory in Afghanistan. Focusing on 
counterterrorism, drone attacks in the tribal areas in Pakistan and relying on Pakistani 
military as an ally in the fight against the Taliban or al Qaeda remnants, or to prevent 
hatching of terrorist plots in South Asia, also may not result in lasting success. It is 
surprising that most analysts have typically ignored the impact of outstanding regional 
disputes and politics on the war in Afghanistan. 
A resolution of the issues that perpetuate destabilization in South Asia is of 
critical importance to United States and its allies, as it is this destabilized region from 
which major and minor terrorist plots have been launched against the United States and 
other nations (Barfield, 2007; Jones, 2011). Our homeland security is clearly impacted if 
conflicts in South Asia are allowed to fester. Furthermore, due to the nuclear rivalry 
between India and Pakistan, and the status of Pakistan as an unstable and troubled nation 
with profound internecine military, civil, ethnic, and cultural conflicts, the region poses a 
serious risk to world safety. 
This thesis focuses on the historical root cause of the conflict in Afghanistan, 
connects the past to the present, and proposes concrete policy actions to facilitate a 
lasting resolution of the conflict and elimination of the factors that act as nurturing agents 
for terrorism in the region.  
B. THE HYPOTHESIS 
The current conflict in Afghanistan is related to the partition of British India in 
1947, and the creation of the Durand Line in 1893 also contributed to the conflict. The 
Partition resulted from the deliberate efforts of the British to divide the majority Hindu 
and the minority Muslim communities against each other in order to fragment 
nationalistic agitation for self-rule by the Indians, and to perpetuate their colonial rule 
(Hasan, 1994; Page, 1999; Singh, 1997). Actions by the British to play Muslim elite 
against the Indian National Congress leaders created deep animosities, which 
subsequently transformed into irreconcilable conflicts between Hindu and Muslim 
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communities. The support provided by the British to the Muslim League allowed a select 
group of Muslim elite, who wanted to preserve Muslim rights under a forthcoming Hindu 
majority rule after the British departure, to demand a separate nation for the Muslims in 
India. It has also been argued that the demand for Pakistan was a strategy by the Muslim 
League to guarantee Muslim rights in a free India under a Hindu majority without any 
intention of India’s division (Jalal, 1985). Jalal argued that agitation for Pakistan was 
meant as a bargaining tool for the Muslim League leader, Jinnah and not the eventual 
goal. Within a short period of seven years, between 1940, when the demand for 
autonomous areas for Indian Muslims, and 1947, when the British India was carved up 
into a Hindu-majority India and a Muslim-majority Pakistan, two separate nations were 
created by imposing boundaries by a colonial power, which had lost the power to hold on 
to her prized colony. Two years before the partition, it was still unclear whether India 
would be divided or not or if it were divided, what would be the shape and boundary of 
the new nations (Hasan, 2002; Hasan, 2005; Gilmartin, 1998). 
The jockeying for power by the Muslim League and Congress, while the British 
continued to lose the will and power to control and hold on to India after being weakened 
by World War II, turned bitter and violent, and, when the British finally partitioned the 
country, causing a bloody holocaust between the Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs. The 
ensuing violence resulted in the massacre of  one to two million Hindus, Muslims and 
Sikhs and expulsion of more than 12 million people from their homes (Ahmad, 2002; 
Brass, 2003; Butalia, 2000; Gilmartin, 1998; Cohen, 2004; Khosla, 1950; Tan & 
Kudaisya, 2002).  
Founded on a matrix of hatred and immense violence, the Partition brought two 
poisoned nations in existence. Pakistan felt short changed by not getting Kashmir, which 
was a Muslim-majority state. As soon as Pakistan was created, a war between India and 
Pakistan broke out over who should rule Kashmir (Bose 1999; Bose 2003; Ganguly, 
2002). That perpetual war has been the source of terrorism in South Asia and its impact 
has been felt around the world. Ever since the Partition, the Pakistani military, which has 
had an iron-grip over the nation, has remained obsessed over Kashmir and has continued 
a war of attrition against India in order to win Kashmir. Furthermore, the reason for 
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creation of Pakistan was to be a haven for South Asia’s Muslims. That national identity 
had to be forged artificially to unite South Asia’s incredibly diverse Muslim populations, 
which had deep sect, linguistic, cultural, regional, and historical divisions. This identity 
was manufactured by creating an adversarial identity against the majority Hindu 
population of colonial India. This adversarial identity creation also hardened the conflict 
over Kashmir, since Kashmir had a Muslim majority and for Pakistan to not get Kashmir 
was taken by the elite as denial of its foundational identity, and thus, its reason for 
existence. Conversely, the secular identity created by the Indian republic after the 
partition made it similarly difficult for India to cede Kashmir or make even the slightest 
accommodation over Kashmir as it would attack India’s secular credentials to accept that 
Muslims are not equal citizens in India. This has created a durable conflict between India 
and Pakistan (Ganguly, 2001; Racine, 2002; Nasr, 2005; Shafique, 2011; Tajbakhsh, 
2011).  
Since Pakistan was militarily weak and unable to win Kashmir in a direct war, it 
engaged in a war of attrition in Kashmir by initially supporting irregulars and later jihadi 
militants. Fundamentalists in the Pakistani military created the Taliban, supported and 
harbored al-Qaida, possibly even protecting and providing sanctuary to Osama bin Laden 
(Haqqani, 2005; Hussain, 2007; Rashid, 2008).  
Since the Partition, India and Pakistan have engaged in a war of varying intensity 
in Kashmir (Wirsing, 1994). The conflict in Afghanistan has been an extension of the 
conflict in Kashmir. If this hypothesis were true, the American war or counterinsurgency 
efforts in Afghanistan would not end the Taliban insurgency or eradicate al Qaeda. Even 
efforts for economic uplift or winning of the Afghan hearts, or negotiations with the 
Taliban leadership will not guarantee success. A solution to Afghanistan turmoil requires 
a settlement of the Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan. Furthermore, a resolution 
of the Pashtun population’s alienation would also assist in permanent stabilization of the 
region. 
A successful test of the hypothesis requires a historical analysis of the region and 
the events that shaped the region. Three interrelated historical streams are analyzed: 
British actions in colonial India that caused alienation between the Hindu and the Muslim 
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populations, partition of India in 1947, and the British actions in Afghanistan that laid the 
foundation of conflict between colonial India and Afghanistan as related to division of 
the Pashtun population. The first two streams should connect the current India-Pakistan 
rivalry that has lead to three major wars between the two neighboring countries and 
provide an insight into how the two rivals have destabilized each other over the status of 
Kashmir and also entangled Afghanistan in their rivalry. The third historical stream 
provides an insight into the tenacity and resiliency of the Taliban and al Qaeda in South 
Asia and exposes how the Pakistan government has been manipulating the Taliban with 
the aim of overthrowing the Afghan regime and replacing the present Afghan regime 
with a favorable government. The first two streams should also reveal how the past and 
current Pakistani governments have utilized/exploited Islamic militants and the name of 
Islam to win Kashmir during the last six decades.  
The testing of my hypothesis should address several pertinent questions, including 
whether the current situation in South Asia evolved as a result of the colonial decisions 
made by the British Empire in early 20th century?  If so, does the history provide any 
lessons to shape the current U.S. policy in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India?  
Furthermore, have we considered the current dynamics between Afghanistan, India, and 
Pakistan while shaping and executing our war in Afghanistan?  Is the conflict between 
India and Pakistan destabilizing Afghanistan and perpetuating the war(s) in the region?  
Has the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir caused Pakistan to rely on 
exploitation of Islam and train “Jihadi” warriors to fight against India and Afghanistan?  
Why is the Pakistani military, specifically the ISI, assisting and harboring the Taliban and 
the terrorists who plot attacks against the U.S. Army in Afghanistan and targets within 
the United States?  Would a resolution of conflict between India and Pakistan lead to a 
reduction in South Asia terrorism and elimination of terrorist training camps in Pakistan?  
Would the U.S. homeland security situation improve if India and Pakistan resolve their 
differences over Kashmir?  Answers to these questions should provide important 
information to help shape the U.S. policies in South Asia.  
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C. METHODOLOGY 
Any analysis of a complex security-related issue, involving multiple geopolitical 
interests and inter-state rivalries is essentially limited due to the inherent qualitative 
nature of the enterprise. Recognizing this limitation, the primary methodology for this 
thesis relied on a wide contextual analysis of literature covering current events and 
historical data of the relevant region. The analytical approach of this thesis thus relied 
upon historical scholarship and data documenting the history of the South Asian region, 
with particular focus on critical events and decisions made by the British rulers in 
colonial India and Afghanistan. Declassified documents from the British India Office 
provide valuable insight into the colonial decision-making. Furthermore, the factors 
shaping conflicting relationships between Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan, since 1947, 
also provided material for deductive analysis. The analytical framework also relied upon 
inductive analysis of strategic and logistical response of the regional powers and the 
United States as related to military conflict and counterterrorism activities in South Asia. 
The historical framework is critical to understanding the nature of the ongoing conflict, 
insurgency, religious extremism, terrorism, and their impact upon homeland security. 
Historical frameworks are also essential as they provide the context to ongoing conflicts 
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II. CRITICAL EVENTS IN COLONIAL INDIA  THAT SHAPED 
SOUTH ASIA 
While we hold onto India, we are a first rate power. If we lose India, we 
will decline to a third rate power. This is the value of India.  
Viceroy Curzon, 1905. 
We have not been elected or placed in power by the people, but we are 
here through our moral superiority, by the force of circumstances, by the 
will of Providence. This alone constitutes our charter to govern India. In 
doing the best we can for the people, we are bound by OUR conscience, 
not theirs. 
John Lawrence, Viceroy of India, 1864–9. 
The British Empire took root in the Indian subcontinent in 1757 and lasted nearly 
200 years. Beginning in mid eighteenth century, the region encompassing present-day 
India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh was brought under British control, first by the British 
East India Company and then directly under the British Crown. British India consisted of 
territories governed by Her Majesty through the Governor-General of India; the 
remaining areas, ruled by hereditary kings were classified as the “princely states” 
(Schofield, 2000; Wirsing, 1994). 
India, the centerpiece of the British Empire, was called the crown jewel of the 
British Empire. India held such value to the British Empire that it shaped major policy 
decisions in Britain, resulting in long-lasting effects on world history (Green & Deasey 
1985). One such long lasting and devastating effect of the British Empire’s policies is 
directly connected to current destabilization of Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan, which is 
directly connected to Pakistan’s support for insurgents responsible for attacking the U.S. 
troops in Afghanistan and plotting terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. This chapter showcases 
British imperial policies that resulted in the crisis that South Asia is in the 21st century. 
The chapter sketches out critical steps taken by the British in the Indian Subcontinent that 
laid down the foundation for conflict in the region, almost two centuries after some of the 
decisions were taken for perpetuation of the Empire. 
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A. 1857 REBELLION 
In May of 1857, in Meerut, where the Bengal army was headquartered, native 
soldiers in the employ of the British mutinied. The Revolt was fuelled by a combination 
of political grievances and religiously motivated hostility. On May 11, the mutineers 
reached Delhi, spreading the revolt and massacring many British residents. The Mughal 
King of India, Bahadur Shah II, who possessed only nominal power, with real power 
vested in the British resident at Delhi was designated the leader of the rebellion 
(Dalrymple, 2007). The naming of the Mughal king as the leader and massing of the 
rebels in Delhi provided the impetus for other revolts, which subsequently broke out 
across north and central India. Although the rebellion started as army revolt, it 
transformed into a popular uprising as peasants, local notables and urban groups, joined 
together to fight the British rule. Most notable of the collaboration was naming the 
Muslim king as the revolt’s leader by Hindu soldiers and close alliance between Muslim 
and Hindu soldiers against the foreign rule. British authority was re-established with 
ruthless force, and, by the end of 1858, British had managed to overwhelm the resistance 
in all parts of north and central India. The British colonial rule in India was finally 
consolidated over the entire subcontinent after the rebellion (Lahiri, 2003). 
In 1857, the British East India Company was in control of over 1.6 million square 
miles of territory, having annexed Sindh and Punjab. To control vast swaths of land, the 
British employed a large military force, which was divided into three separate 
components centered around Madras, Bombay, and Bengal. A year before the rebellion, 
the native troops in British Indian army numbered 280,000, making it the largest 
mercenary army in the world which was used worldwide extensively and ceaselessly for 
British world dominance (Streets, 2001). The uprising by the Bengal Army units against 
their British masters was a complex affair. Many reasons are postulated for the rebellion: 
perceptions of exploitation, discriminatory treatment, racism, and, most significantly, a 
perception that the Christian officers were deliberately engaging in acts to defile the 




The Rebellion (depending upon the sources, the event is alternatively known as the 
Indian Mutiny, First War of Independence, Muslim Conspiracy, Sepoy Mutiny, et al.) 
was a watershed event in the history of British India. It was the largest and most 
widespread threat to the British rule in India in the nineteenth century. As a consequence 
of the rebellion, the East India Company was removed and the control of India was 
transferred to the British Crown (Fremont-Barnes, 2007).  
After the successful suppression of the mutiny, a devastating purge was 
undertaken by the British, including indiscriminate mass slaughter, burning of villages, 
and collective punishment (Habib, 1998; Mukherjee, 1998; Streets, 2001). The last 
Mughal emperor was humiliatingly treated, imprisoned and exiled. Thousands of people 
were hanged and vast areas of Delhi, a primary cultural center of the subcontinent and the 
seat of the Mogul empire, were obliterated. With the fall of Delhi, the once grand Moghul 
empire, which had ruled the subcontinent for three centuries, the British rule in India 
became unchallenged and was formally taken over by the British crown. It also signified 
a destruction of the Muslim political and cultural domain in the subcontinent (Dalrymple, 
2007).  
Many structural changes in the British military and Indian soldiers in the British 
employ occurred after the rebellion. The Rebellion dramatically increased racial 
antagonisms between Britons and Indians. On the British side, the rebellion was 
portrayed as savage attacks on British women and children, who were allegedly being 
raped and murdered by fanatic soldiers, causing great public outrage over the violation of 
‘innocent’ British by subhuman Indians (Brantlinger, 1988; Mukherjee, 1988; Sharpe, 
1991). On the Indian side, widespread slaughter, mass hangings, and atrocities 
perpetrated on both the soldiers and innocent Indian civilians by vengeful British, and 
wanton destruction and leveling of Delhi by eventually victorious British left little doubt 
that British notions of justice and due process did not apply to colonial subjects. The 
barbarous violence of colonial rule in India was nakedly exposed during the Rebellion 
(Streets, 2001). 
The short-term impact transformation of the rebellion was a humiliating defeat 
and demise of the Moghul Empire in India and an absolute control over the subcontinent 
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by the British, as the British East India Company rule in India was replaced by the British 
crown. Additionally, the reprisals and wholesale slaughter of the rebels and civilians in 
Delhi purged the Muslim aristocracy and drove majority of the Muslim residents of Delhi 
outside (Lahiri, 2003). A racial divide evolved between Europeans and Indians, and was 
institutionalized in a series of discriminatory laws. Resentment against such 
discrimination was the impetus behind Indian nationalism, which arose later. Until 1857, 
Indian nationalism was nonexistent (McCully, 1935; Solangi, 1990). 
However, the crushing of rebellion had wider and longer-lasting impacts. It was 
obvious that a reliance on military force alone to control the subcontinent was not 
sufficient and shifting alliances were required to maintain British colonial domination by 
playing native associates against the rebellious ones, mastering the art of divide and rule. 
And, though the defeat of the rebellion resulted in sowing the seed for Indian nationalism, 
even more consequential ramification was etching of Muslim and Hindu identities in the 
subcontinent against the British and Indian Muslim identity against the Hindus. These 
developments were to have major impacts during decolonization nine decades later and 
continue their impacts on South Asian politics. As Dalrymple describes “The defeat 
indirectly damaged the syncretic, tolerant, and sophisticated culture and composite 
Hindu-Muslim Indo-Islamic civilization that the Mughal court under the last emperor had 
fostered. The Indian Muslim became a pariah in the British eyes. In the period following 
the rebellion, profoundly contemptible attitudes against Muslims and Mughal culture 
were openly expressed by the British; these attitudes were absorbed by the now ascendant 
Hindus” (Dalrymple, 2007).  
The most significant strategy employed by the British to defeat the Revolt of 1857 
was by taking advantage of internal rivalries amongst the Indians. According to one 
estimate, the bulk of the British mercenary forces that reconquered the rebellious region 
were composed of Sikhs, Afghans and Nepali mercenaries. The mercenary motivation 
was not to help the British save their empire but to plunder from the crumbling Mughal 
Empire. Besides looting, the Sikhs were also guided by a desire to avenge humiliation 
they had suffered at the hands of Mughal rulers (Mahadevan, 2011; Spilsbury, 2007). The 
successful strategy of divide and rule paid dividends to the Empire and perpetuated 
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British rule in India for 90 more years. However, the strategy was to prove disastrously 
costly in the long term, not only to the Subcontinent, but also to the rest of the world.   
As the British East India Company put the rebellion down, one of the pressing 
matters for the British was to prevent future rebellions, lest their empire in India crumble.  
One of the most consequential decisions taken by the British was to change patterns of 
recruitment for their Indian Army. This changing pattern of recruitment can be connected 
to eventual breakup of Pakistan in 1971 and consequential hardening of its Islamic 
identity. 
The British Indian Army was a mercenary army employed by the British Raj to 
quell internal disturbances and also for imperial outreach. However, the mutiny of the 
Bengal army in 1857 shook British confidence and led to drastic reorganization of the 
army. The British East India Company administered India until 1858, through three 
Presidencies each with its own army: Bengal, Madras and Bombay. These armies 
consisted of British and Indian regiments commanded by British officers. The Bengal 
Army was the largest of the three.  Prior to the mutiny, Bengal army recruitment focused 
on high caste Hindus, mainly from central and eastern India. After the rebellion, the 
British made a shift and began to seek recruits from Punjab and North Western regions of 
India (from present day Pakistan) at the expense of other regions, especially Bengal.  The 
Punjab region provided a reservoir of ready soldiers with a large bank of illiterate 
villagers, desperate for jobs, and unlikely to engage in agitation for independence—
unlike the caste-Hindu soldiers of the Bengal army. This era also heralded the colonial 
theory of divide and rule on the basis of the so-called ‘martial races,’ with the British 
officers suggesting that people from Punjab belonged to “martial races,” implying that 
they were superior and therefore made better warriors (Ali, 1983; Soherwordi, 2010; Tan 
& Kudaisya, 2000). The shift in recruitment was so radical that by1929, 62% of the 
whole Indian Army was Punjabi, even though Punjab constituted only ten percent of 
British Indian population. The selective recruitment is reflected in that Bengal, 
population 45 million, was allowed only 7,117 recruits to the Indian army, whereas 
Punjab, with a population of 20 million, provided 349,689 soldiers to the Indian army.  
Even within Punjab, only a select group, comprising of Muslims and Sikhs, was highly 
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favored and the rest were discouraged from joining the army.  During the Second World 
War alone, Punjab provided over 800,000 soldiers for the British war efforts 
(Soherwordi, 2010). 
Punjab and the northern regions were favored by the British for recruitment, as 
these regions were backward, agrarian, and the peasant populations mostly uneducated, 
facing acute poverty.  
Recruiting from this group provided not only dedicated soldiers; the illiterate 
village-dweller soldiers were presumed to be immune to nationalism.  One long-term 
impact of the British chauvinistic and vengeful attitude towards the Bengalis, who were 
described variously as untrustworthy, disloyal, and effeminate, was that such prejudiced 
attitude pervaded in the Indian army.  Punjabi soldiers imbibed their colonial master’s 
attitudes and looked down upon Bengalis and considered them untrustworthy (Ali, 1983). 
When British India was divided into Pakistan and India, the western part of 
Punjab became West Pakistan and Bengal province in the east was partitioned to create 
East Pakistan. Due to the circumstances of its creation, Pakistan came to be dominated by 
its military, with West Pakistan retaining its military-rural elite complex (Racine, 2002).  
East Pakistan comprised 56 percent of Pakistan’s population; however, the Punjabi-
dominated military continued the racist colonial pattern of recruitment by excluding 
Bengalis from Pakistani military. The Punjabi-controlled military, with its historical 
chauvinistic attitude towards Bengalis, not only excluded Bengali Muslims from joining 
the army, but also looked down upon Bengalis as untrustworthy.  Discrimination against 
Bengalis resulted in less than 7 percent of Bengalis serving in Pakistan army in 1960s.  
The racial myths of the British were assumed and propagated by Pakistani officers, 
maintaining that Bengalis were short and dark; they could not fight well; they were 
nature’s cowards.  Consequent to such attitude that pervaded in the military-bureaucratic 
elite of the newly emergent Pakistan, Bengali-Muslims not only faced discrimination, 
resources of East Pakistan were exploited by the Punjabi elite based in the West.  The 




Pakistan.  The resentment of Bengali-Muslims peaked in 1970 when Awami League, 
based in East Pakistan, won elections but was denied by the Punjabi military and elite 
from taking power (Sisson & Rose, 1992).  
Eventually, the repression of the Bengali Pakistan culminated in a horrendous 
bloodbath in 1971 when, in response to Bengali-Muslims struggle for their rights; 
Punjabi soldiers massacred over 300,000 innocent Bengalis and raped tens of thousands 
of women (Jahan, 1997; Sisson & Rose, 1992). Ironically, West Pakistan soldiers, 
butchering their East Pakistan citizens, were told that Bengalis were an inferior race, 
short, dark, and weak (Ali, 1983).2  It is remarkable that the prejudices and hatred 
maintained by the British officers were reflected in the attitudes of the successor army in 
Pakistan.  It is also remarkable that Pakistan, a nation created for South Asia’s Muslims, 
brutalized its own Muslim citizens, leading to a genocidal event, culminating in the 
breakup of the nation state 24 years after its creation. 
The result of this civil war was eventual secession of East Pakistan, with Indian 
help, to form Bangladesh, in 1971. The consequence of Pakistan’s fragmentation was 
even deeper entrenchment of Punjabi dominance over Pakistan’s military.  Additionally, 
since the army had employed Islamic rhetoric to assert its superiority over Bengali 
Muslims, who were belittled as cowardly converted Hindus, the Islamic chauvinism 
employed by Punjabi army acted as a catalyst to radicalize Pakistan (Haqqani, 2005).  
The only unifying theme left for Pakistan after its eastern half’s secession was Islam.  
This theme was later played too well with disastrous results in Pakistan’s relations with 
India, Afghanistan, and even its ally, the United States. 
Horrendous violence during the partition of India in 1947 can also be linked to the 
after-effect of the 1857 rebellion.  Vast majority of the violence occurred in Punjab, the 
land where the British had focused their military recruitment after the 1857 rebellion.  
Remarkably, of the two provinces partitioned, Punjab and Bengal, to create Pakistan, no 
violence occurred in Bengal.  A significant contributor to the violence was the large 
number of demobilized soldiers, who, after the Second World War, were localized in 
Punjab.  
                                                 
2 The number of people killed is disputed, with the estimates ranging from 300,000 to 2 million. 
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B. THE DURAND LINE 
The border between Afghanistan and Pakistan has been one of the most important 
borders in the world since September 11, 2001. It is a contested border, the boundaries of 
which have not been accepted by the successive Afghan governments since 1947, when 
Pakistan was created. Prior to 1947, this border existed between British India and 
Afghanistan. The bilateral border dispute transformed into an issue with international 
dimension when the U.S. military militarily removed the Taliban government in 
Afghanistan in 2001, and the insurgents fled across to Pakistan to seek safe havens and 
bases to launch cross-border attacks against the United States and allied forces. Parts of 
the boundary region, especially the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), in 
Pakistan have served as a haven for al Qaeda leaders and a base for the Taliban (Barfield, 
2007; Jones, 2011; Rashid, 2008; Siddiqi, 2011). The history of the disputed border 
reveals how British colonial decisions shaped the region as a disputed and lawless region 
between British India and Afghanistan, later becoming a national security issue for the 
United States, and a source of terrorism and destabilization, due to the competition 
between India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. 
The border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, Durand Line, is about 1,640 miles 
long. Prior to 1947, when there was no state of Pakistan in existence, this was the loosely 
defined border between British India and Afghanistan. Large parts of the frontier include 
forbidding topography, including narrow valleys, desert plains, inaccessible mountainous 
terrain and difficult rocky regions, making it a difficult border to police. Furthermore, due 
to geopolitical considerations, from colonial to present times, authorities avoided 
enforcing border-crossing rules, and, at times, aided problematic cross-border traffic. 
During the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, insurgents mastered the art of 
crossing the border without detection by authorities; there was a mimetic assimilation of 
this art by the Taliban and al Qaeda members as they battled the U.S. forces post-
September 2001 (Ghufran, 2009; Isby, 2010; Emadi, 1990; Tomsen, 2011).  
The Durand Line, though it exists on printed maps, is ignored by local 
populations living on both sides of the boundary who have never paid much attention to 
it, and people cross the border at will without treating it as a boundary. The boundary is 
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either not demarcated or poorly demarcated in most places. State authority has always 
been weak to nonexistent in the area of the line. Both Afghanistan and British India 
instead used indirect forms of rule that relied on tribal elders to settle problems and to 
ensure security by means of armed local militias (Lieberman, 1980; Barfield, 2007). 
Practically, the border does not exist for the majority of Pashtun tribes inhabiting 
the frontier in eastern and southern Afghanistan. Pashtuns frequently traverse the border 
without any regard for the boundary line (Siddiqi, 2011). Pashtuns, the largest tribal 
group in the world, constitute the overwhelming majority of this region. The region has 
been a haven to al Qaeda network, the Taliban, and other militants who have engaged in 
violent confrontations with U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Indian forces in Kashmir. The 
Taliban operating on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border are predominantly 
Pashtuns (Barfield, 2007).  
Any discussion of the strategic importance and history of Afghanistan necessitates 
a comment on the "Great Game" played between Russia and England for supremacy in 
Central Asia. The strategic importance of the region now called Afghanistan arose in the 
mid-nineteenth century as the British Empire was extending and consolidating its power 
in the Indian subcontinent and the Russia was looking to expand eastward (Lieberman, 
1980; Nawid, 1997). In the nineteenth century, Britain viewed India as the “jewel in the 
crown” of its colonial possessions and took an aggressive stance toward any perceived 
threat toward their control of India. Possession of India was considered a key to the 
wealth of the British Empire. Fear of Russian encroachment made the tribal areas 
between Afghanistan and India important territory for the British. Afghanistan was 
treated by the British as a dependency, and, until the 1919 border war in which 
Afghanistan won complete sovereignty; Afghan foreign relations were directed by British 
India. However, lacking sufficient military power and financial resources required to 
assert a complete control over the tribal areas bordering India, the British opted to follow 
a flexible governance policy in tribal areas while keeping Afghanistan as a buffer against 
Russian expansion eastward and southward (Ghufran, 2009; Isby, 2010).  
During mid-to late 19th century, several warring tribes and minor mountain states 
constituted Afghanistan. The British and the Russian Empires competed for influence by 
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backing rival groups. The British intent to exercise direct military control of the Hindu 
Kush region and its eastern and southern flanks, called "forward policy," failed due to 
tough native resistance, was abandoned, and was followed by "masterly inactivity," a 
policy of nonintervention, with the aim of creating an Afghan buffer state between British 
India and Russia. Following their successful imperial formula of using native allies to 
exercise control in colonies, the British supported Amir Abdurrahman (1880–1901) who 
was encouraged to unify the country and promised a free hand in his internal policies, as 
long as British strategic interests were met (Lieberman, 1980).  
The Durand Line formalized annexation of Afghan territory, including Peshawar, 
which was Afghanistan’s old winter capital and taken over by the Sikhs in 1834. The 
Durand Agreement afforded the British strategic control of border passes and established 
an international boundary for Afghanistan and annexed regions, including what is now 
called Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly known as the Northwest Frontier Province). The 
British mapped out administrative territories, depending upon their governability. 
Moving westward from Peshawar, the British paid less attention to the territories more 
distant from Peshawar and thus those territories each had proportionately less colonial 
control. The British assumed control of easier to manage ‘settled zones’ and the 
neighboring difficult to rule tribal zones were kept under British sovereignty but left to 
govern themselves. The Durand Line indicated the outermost limit of British control on 
its India-Afghanistan borders (Barfield, 2007).  
C. IMPACT OF DURAND LINE ON BRITISH EMPIRE 
The reason for creation of the Durand Line was expedient imperial necessity—not 
topographic or cartographic requirement. The British Empire, due to the challenges it 
perceived from Russian interest in South Asia, feared that their monopoly control in India 
might be challenged by Russia. The British also believed that Russia had designs over 
Afghanistan as a conduit to warm water port access in South Asia, which would have 
enhanced economic power of Russia, creating a strong colonial challenger to the British. 
Afghanistan separated the two imperial powers and by default became a buffer state 
between the two. In effect, creation of the Durand Line provided two benefits to the 
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British interests: convenient administrative areas were delineated for the British and a 
buffer zone was created against a perceived Russian incursion in Indian subcontinent. 
However, this came with a heavy price for the economic, political, and cultural integrity 
of the still evolving Afghan state (Emadi, 1990; Isby, 2010; Lieberman, 1980). 
Isby has argued that the frontiers of Afghanistan were created by imperial Britain 
without any intention to make Afghanistan cohesive or self-supporting. This led to 
Afghanistan eventually ending up as a pawn in other nations’ conflicts, Britain and 
Russia a century ago, India, Pakistan, and United States now. Isby claims that even 
though the tools of the British Empire—force and legitimacy—created the frontier in 
1893, the Pashtun ethnicity and Islam as factors were not, and could not be, divided by 
the boundary line on a map (Isby, 2010). 
The imposition of the Durand Line as the border between British India and 
Afghanistan was unacceptable to the local Pashtuns, who treated it with contempt. They 
considered the boundary as artificial and imaginary. Portions of the border, delineated by 
the Durand Line were so arbitrary that they even split villages into two. Due to the 
imperial imposition of the Durand Line with disregard to ground realities, the status of 
the Durand Line remained unclear. Unlike Afghanistan’s international boundaries with 
Russia in the north or Iran in the west that were recognized as such by all parties at the 
time, natives on the British-India Afghanistan border refused to recognize the existence 
of the frontier. This resulted because the British negotiations with the Afghans was 
considered an internal colonial issue rather than as an international one. Delineation of 
Afghan eastern borders was not a goal of Britain; the aim was to reorganization of British 
administration of the area in the Northwest Frontier Province (Ewans, 2005; Johnson & 
Mason, 2008; Siddiqi, 2011). 
Because of long-established political, cultural, and economic connections among 
the various regional Pashtun tribes, the Afghans viewed their division by the Durand Line 
as illegitimate. Furthermore, Durand Line also divided the Baloch population between 
Afghanistan and British India, dividing communities and creating resentment. The line on 
the map dividing the Pashtun and Baloch populations was construed by the natives as 
illegitimate effort of a colonial power. Due to the history and topography of the boundary 
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area, the division was also unenforceable, which further delegitimized the boundary 
creation. Since the division was made with the goal of creating buffer areas, the needs, 
identities, and realities of the communities were disregarded by the imperial policy 
makers; however, as the British ability to enforce control was nonexistent in the new 
frontier that was created, the lack of interest in governance created issues that became 
apparent a century later, including distrust of foreign entities and central or federal 
government structure (Emadi, 2005; Johnson & Mason, 2008). 
1. Durand Line and Conflict Between Afghanistan and Pakistan 
When Afghanistan became fully independent in 1919, it accepted the Durand Line 
as its de facto border with British India. But, Kabul revived its earlier and more 
fundamental objections to the Line’s legitimacy in 1947 when Pakistan became an 
independent state when British India was partitioned. Pakistan declared the Durand Line 
its international border with Afghanistan. However, the Afghanistan government claimed 
that the border created by the departing colonialists was not valid as the treaty was signed 
under duress and staked a claim for the Pashtun region across the Durand Line. Afghan 
government put forth a demand for Pashtunistan and proposed that the Pashtuns and 
Pashto-speaking tribes in northwestern Pakistan should have an option to "opt out" of 
Pakistan and set up an autonomous state (Emadi, 1990; Hasan, 1962; Johnson & Mason, 
2008; Shahrani, 2002). 
Afghanistan’s proposition was that during the partition of British India, the 
Pashtun regions should have been offered the additional options of becoming an 
independent state or joining with Afghanistan. Furthermore, Afghans contented that 
various agreements between British India and Afghanistan, including the Durand Line, 
lapsed when the British left South Asia. The implication was that imperial agreements 
could not be transferable to the new state of Pakistan as successor state of British India. 
Afghans argued that Durand Line remained illegitimate because they had been coerced 
by the British into accepting the agreement. Since that time, successive Afghan regimes 
in Kabul have all refused to recognize their existing border with Pakistan. The 
antagonism between Afghan and Pakistan government caused Afghanistan to be the only 
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nation that opposed entry of Pakistan in United Nations in 1947. Most Afghan maps still 
show the territory across the border as Pashtunistan, with the Pakistan boundary 
beginning at Punjab (Barfield, 2007). 
In 1949, a loya jirga in Afghanistan declared that the Durand Line was invalid. In 
the succeeding decades, Afghan governments put forth the idea of Pashtunistan, an 
independent state for Pashtun people. The Awami National Party (ANP) of Afghanistan 
also agitated for the creation of a new Pashtun province, which would incorporate 
majority Pashtun areas from the Pakistan side of the border. The idea was considered an 
existential challenge by the Pakistan, a state formed solely on the basis of religion as 
common identity while all the other identities of its citizens were smothered by the nation 
state in order to coalesce various centrifugal linguistic, ethnic, and cultural identities. One 
of the major conflicts between such identities had resulted in division of Pakistan in 1971 
into Pakistan and Bangladesh (Johnson & Mason, 2008).  
By contrast, Pakistan considers the Durand Line its formal international boundary 
as a successor state to the British India. Pakistan, though (just like the British) it never 
succeeded in establishing direct state administrative authority in the old Tribal Agencies, 
the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA), does not consider the issue open to 
negotiation. Pakistan has also been concerned of Afghan exploitation of separatists in 
Baluchistan and the NWFP, since disaffected individuals Balochis and Pashtuns in those 
regions, since the creation of Pakistan, have argued that Baluchistan and the NWFP have 
been colonies of Pakistan, as they were of British India. Pakistan was created as a nation 
for Muslims; as such, the existing state system, relying on Islam alone, has been weak, as 
evidenced by the secession of eastern Pakistan in 1971, which resulted in loss of half of 
Pakistan’s territory and population (Sisson & Rose, 1990; Tan and Kudaisya, 2002)). 
Therefore, Pakistan, despite being a nuclear-armed state, considers a weak state of 
Afghanistan as a threat, even though it has failed to exercise governmental control in 
FATA and its frontier bordering Afghanistan. 
The disputed Afghanistan-Pakistan frontier makes the boundary question difficult 
to solve. The Durand Line created an expedient machination for imperial Britain where 
even though the people on the eastern side of the Line were absorbed into British Indian 
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Empire, they retained an unusual stateless status. The British could exploit easy to govern 
revenue generating regions and ignore difficult to govern and expensive to police tribal 
areas. British control was exercised indirectly by appointing of local clan leaders and by 
harsh Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) of 1901, which included vicious punishments, 
including burning of houses and group punishments without right of appeal. Even though 
it is a part of Pakistan now, the FATA is still ruled by colonial-era FCR regulations. For 
almost six decades, no serious attempts were made to assimilate the region into Pakistan. 
It could be argued that Pakistan continued the colonial policy of keeping the area 
ungoverned, marginalizing the population, and exploiting the Pashtuns when it suited the 
state’s purpose. National Pakistani law does not apply in these territories and the central 
government has only indirect control over its people. A paradoxical situation exists in the 
border region across the Durand Line, as historically both the British Empire and 
Pakistan state refused to exercise full control over parts of the territory, creating a 
situation where an international boundary exist, but the state claiming the territory does 
not or cannot exercise authority over the people who live there (Barfield, 2007; Fayyaz, 
2007).  
2. Durand Line and Its Impact on South Asia Terrorism 
After the departure of the British, the Pakistan government left the frontier area in 
FATA as a lawless region where laws of Pakistan were not enforced. Beginning with 
1948, Pakistan recruited Pashtun armed group in the region across the Durand Line to 
fight the Indians in Kashmir. Furthermore, during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 
Directorate for Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s spy agency, created a network 
of camps on both sides of the Durand Line to manufacture and support insurgency against 
the Soviets (Coll, 2004; Haqqani, 2005). In the 1980s, ISI brought in militants to the area 
who were engaged in terrorist actions in Kashmir. The two sides of the Line were used by 
the ISI for terrorist and insurgent-support networks providing safe houses, logistics, 
communications, and transportation, and a supportive population, something described as 
“the privatization of terror” by Pakistani intelligence (Isby, 2010). This network was later 
expanded in 1990s with Pakistan’s support of the Taliban and other militant organizations 
like Harkat-ul-Mujahedin (HM), Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-
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Mohammad (JeM), Hizb-ul-Mujahideen(HuM), and others3. Coupled with these facts, the 
Taliban’s ideology, which was based on a belief that the Durand Line should not be a 
barrier to the Pashtuns it divided, has made the region across the Durand Line a hotbed of 
insurgency and terrorism. 
Until the Soviets were in Afghanistan, the insurgent networks created by Pakistan 
across the Durand Line were tacitly supported by the United States. The terrorist 
networks and camps being used to train insurgents to wage war in Kashmir were 
generally ignored (Barfield, 2007). This situation changed dramatically in 2001 when the 
United States military removed the Taliban government in Afghanistan. As the Islamist 
groups fled into their Pakistan, the United States pressed upon Pakistan the need to end 
FATA and Baluchistan’s ability to serve as the base for the Taliban and Islamic radicals. 
With American troops based in Afghanistan’s border areas, the question of where the 
border was and Pakistan’s responsibilities for maintaining order in its own territories has 
acquired international significance. The old colonial era based expediencies that left the 
frontier region ungoverned by Pakistan’s national government have facilitated the 
emergence of violent jihadists that sought to topple governments in both Kabul and 
Islamabad (Ghufran, 2009; Rubin & Siddique, 2006; Siddiqi, 2009). 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
The borderline demarcating Afghanistan-Pakistan border has been contentious 
and used as a bargaining tool by the Afghan governments since 1947. Currently, the 
porous nature of the Durand Line, and the quasi- and virtual-autonomous status of the 
region on both sides of the Line, has had a serious impact on the U.S.-led operations 
against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan due to the ability of the insurgents to 
launch attacks in Afghanistan and regroup in safe havens on the Pakistan side. The Line 
was created for British Empire’s expediency—the “imperial necessity,” without any 
consideration of the impact on populations inhabiting the region. The disregard for the 
native population’s tribes, ethnicities, cultural and ethnic affiliation, and historic 
                                                 
3 For additional information and detailed analysis, see Clarke, 2010; Fair, 2011 (a); Fair, 2011 (b); 
Howenstein, 2008; Jones, 2007; Jones, 2011, & Rashid, 2008. 
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association resulted in a border that divided the Pashtun and Baloch populations in two 
separate nation states. Not only did the border region that was created have an 
unenforceable boundary, colonial prerogatives allowed the frontier region to remain 
ungoverned, creating an autonomous area where the tribes refused to accept any federal 
authority. The British kept the tribal areas under their jurisdiction in check with 
oppressive and abusive FCR, making the frontier population highly alienated from the 
governments imposed from without. This alienation and distrust of government persisted 
after the departure of the British, as the Pakistan government continued the oppressive 
and alienating British colonial model in FATA. Furthermore, since the Durand Line was 
considered an artificial construct by the inhabitants of the frontier region, a latent and 
sometimes politically created demand for reunification of the Pashtuns further 
complicated the relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan since 1947. 
Asking for a reunification of the Pashtuns under a “Pashtunistan and the demand 
for the return of Pashtun and Baloch areas annexed by the British in the 19th century, 
creates an existential fear for Pakistan.  
The legacy of the conflict in areas demarcated by the Durand Line is a legacy of 
colonial decisions that were made more than a century ago in British India. Without 
addressing the underlying issues, the Pashtun-based Taliban movement cannot be 
permanently defeated. Durand Line is not a boundary dispute between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan; it is an indicator for a set of unresolved social, economic, and historical 
relationships that impact Afghan- Pakistan relations, and, by extension, South Asia and 
the rest of the world. 
E. IMPERIAL NECESSITY: EXPLOITATION OF HINDU–MUSLIM 
DIFFERENCES 
1. History of Hindu-Muslim Syncretism and Differences in the 
Subcontinent 
The motives of the British Empire in the Indian subcontinent included economic 
exploitation, use of India as a strategic military base to defend profitable trade routes in 
Asia, defeat competitors, and strengthen the Empire. The main strategy to achieve these 
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missions was force. However, to use military to rule over a vast territory, home to 
hundreds of millions of inhabitants, six-month’s voyage away on a ship, was 
prohibitively expensive. Therefore, the British approach to achieve colonial goals in India 
included expedient strategies, including getting the consent of the native ruling class to 
prevent military actions, and preserving caste, class, and linguistic divisions. For 
administrative expediency, colonial bureaucracy also created groupings that lumped 
together disparate groups within single religious entities, which, combined with divide 
and rule strategies, later led to serious communal problems. The British actions 
eventually ended up promoting a severe new split in India based upon religious 
differences; this split was their key to perpetuation of colonial rule, especially between 
the inter-war years. This divide-and-rule strategy has been blamed for communal 
violence in India, estranged relations between the Hindus, Sikhs and the Muslims, which 
continues to destabilize the region decades after the British departure from the 
subcontinent (Ahmad, 2002; Bayly, 1985; Green & Deasey, 1985; Pennington, 2004; 
Pandey, 2004, 2006; Sarilla, 2005). 
Using cross-national statistical methods, a study explored the impact of 
colonialism on extant communal conflicts and wars. In an analysis of the colonial 
heritage of 160 countries, conducted to explore whether a history of colonialism was a 
predictor of inter-communal conflicts, political rebellion, and civil war, specifically 
between the years 1960–1999, Lange and Dawson did not find evidence that colonialism 
was a universal cause of civil violence. However, their research specifically supported 
the assertion that inter-communal violence is a common legacy of colonialism, especially 
of British colonialism (Lange & Dawson, 2009). Others have suggested that British 
colonialism can be directly connected to wars and contemporary terrorism in case of the 
Indian subcontinent (Dutta, 2010; Dutta, 2010; Haqqani, 2005; Rashid, 2008; Riedel, 
2011).  
Historians have claimed that in the Indian subcontinent, British colonialism 
contributed to postcolonial violence by construction of oppositional identities 
(specifically between the majority Hindus and the minority Muslims, but also class-based 
distinctions), exacerbation of communal differences to perpetuate the imperial rule, and 
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imposition of arbitrary political borders (division of the subcontinent into India and 
Pakistan). Furthermore, it is also suggested that reification of Hinduism was largely in 
response to dynamic patron-client relationships forged and transformed between the 
Hindus, British, Muslims, and other groups, based upon imperial necessities (Hassan, 
1997, Hasan, 2005; Nandy, 1983; Pennington, 2004; Page 1999). My thesis agrees 
partially with scholars who have proposed various versions of the divide and rule theory: 
that the British raised Muslim communalism4 as a counter-weight to emerging Indian 
nationalism. 
Another school of thought has attempted to explain the antagonistic split between 
Hinduism and Islam in India to opening of new arenas of local power, due to shifting 
power structures (decline of the Mogul Emperor as a result of rise of the British East 
India Company, and changing patron-client relationship with shifting imperial dynamics) 
in which local social conflicts could be played out (Freitag, 1990). However, even when 
scholars have pointed towards the existence of conflict between Hindus and Muslims or 
Muslims and Sikhs, prior to consolidation of the British rule in the subcontinent, 
significant fissures existed within these communities that prevented any uniform 
solidarity; therefore one could not affirm that there existed a unified Hindu or a unified 
Muslim identity in colonial times. The disputes between the communities were related to 
disputes over symbols, rites and precedents, a group's social, economic and political life, 
and a jockeying for power, and not as a result of any unified religious identity or 
affiliation. Bayly (1985) questioned whether any broader or homogeneous Hindu or 
Muslim or Sikh 'consciousness' existed in the colonial time, and if it did exist, it is 
unknown the extent to which such a consciousness provided an impetus to conflict 
between these groups. 
Precolonial and colonial periods in India were marked by widespread Hindu-
Muslim symbiosis and the culture was predominantly syncretic (Dalrymple, 2007). Even 
though a syncretic culture does not preclude religious conflicts, the necessity for the 
                                                 
4 The term “communalism” is widely used across South Asia to describe the systematic misuse of 
religion, including manufacturing prejudice, tension, and conflict between communities for political 
purposes.  
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Muslim emperors to employ Hindu generals and for Hindu kings to hire Muslim 
mercenaries was an established practice in colonial and precolonial periods (Bayly, 1985; 
Freitag, 1990). Sacred incorporation had been common to Hindu kingdoms that predated 
the Moghul Empire and also to Muslim rulers since the time of Akbar. Also, unlike the 
British imperium in India, where the British governed India as a distant dependency with 
disregard for its culture, earlier Muslim invaders of Hindustan had settled in the 
subcontinent, married Hindu women, and adopted the customs of the country (Bayly, 
1985; Green & Deasey, 1985).  
In the Islam of the Indian subcontinent, although the notion of brotherhood was 
stressed conceptually, there was a disconnect between several Muslim communities. 
Through its history, India had been invaded and occupied by waves of invaders from the 
west. Arabs, Turks, Afghans and the Mughals had invaded India during various periods 
of the subcontinent’s history and established their dominion over the subcontinent at 
different times. However, these Muslim rulers arriving from the west generally ignored 
the local masses that converted to Islam and held the converts, most of them low-caste 
locals, in low esteem. The descendants of the foreign aristocracy, the elite Muslims, 
began to stress the fact of Muslim brotherhood only after the British had fully established 
themselves as the predominant power in the subcontinent after replacing Muslim power. 
The elite needed the local Muslim support to assert their political strength in the new 
world of British domination and devolution of Mughal and Muslim dominion. Thus, the 
reason for jointure, reflecting in a new principle of brotherhood was not religious but 
predominantly the result of socio-political compulsions. Therefore, majority of the 
historical analysis reveals that Hindu–Muslim animosity, as observed and reflected in 
great acts of violence between 1946–47, was not an extant force during most of colonial 
times (Ahmad, 1991; Freitag, 1990; Hasan, 2002; Haynes, 1991; Robinson, 1998; Talbot, 
1995). 
The British aided communal nationalism by identifying subjects under religious 
categories, such as Hindus, Sikhs, Christians and Muslims, providing a sense of unity in 
heretofore fragmented religious identities that were more shaped by regions, class, caste, 
sub-castes, linguistic, and ethnic divisions. The administrative classification together of 
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high and low castes by the British created a new single monolithic grouping of Hinduism. 
Similarly, the elite Muslims and the local Muslims, who were poor native converts to 
Islam, were pigeonholed together to create a monolith of Islam in the subcontinent. Such 
groupings ignored cultural, ethnic, linguistic, and regional differences between the co-
religionists, which were stronger than the bond of same religion. 
A vast amount of scholarly literature exists, providing evidence of deliberate 
colonial efforts that orchestrated the construction of identities. It is suggested that the 
identities constructed during the colonial era resulted in divisive and violent communal 
politics after independence. In case of India, there is a general agreement that the colonial 
construction of identity was utilized specifically to weaken opposition to colonial British 
rule. This strategy, termed "divide-and-rule," allegedly strengthened communal identities, 
to pit indigenous groups (Hindus and Muslims, higher caste Hindus against lower caste 
Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims, et al.) to prevent broad-based opposition to British rule. In 
fact, King, Nandy, and Thapar have claimed that British promoted the concept of a 
unified Hindu religion and that Hinduism did not exist as a unified construct prior to the 
British colonial rule. Baber and Breuilly have suggested that British colonial power, by 
unequal treatment and construction of a system of communal representation, reified 
oppositional Hindu and Muslim identities and such construction of oppositional identities 
have been at the core of ethnic conflicts in colonial and postcolonial India. In the case of 
India, the violence began before the independence and became worse after the 
independence. (Baber, 2004; Breuilly, 1993; Dirks, 2001; Gilmartin, 1998; Gilmartin & 
Lawrence, 2000; King, 1999; Nandy, 1983). It has been acknowledged that economic and 
social conflicts between the Hindu and Muslim elite were extant prior to the British 
arrival in the subcontinent; whether such conflicts would have evolved to a level that 
contributed to the division of the subcontinent at the end of the British Empire is, 
however, not a given (Gilmartin, 1998). 
Eqbal Ahmad asserted that the British divided India along communal lines, 
especially between 1757 and 1920. "When Muslims would resist British rule, as they did 
between 1757 and 1857, they were discriminated against in favor of bringing up Hindus. 
When Congress became organized (in the late nineteenth century), more Hindu 
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nationalist figures were there than Muslim ones. Then they favored Muslims against the 
Congress. So there was a whole set of divide-and-rule policies that the British followed 
for two centuries."  (Ahmad quoted in Barsamian, 2000). Divide and rule was attributed 
to the success of the British Empire and related to nurturing of local hatred. Carroll 
relates Hindu-Muslim hatred in the Indian subcontinent, Catholic-Protestant hatred in 
Ireland, and Arab-Jew hatred in Israel to the British Empire's policy of divide and rule 
(Carroll, 2001). 
2. The Dynamics of Institutionalizing Religious Differences 
At the turn of the nineteenth century, the Muslim elite in the central part of India 
had seen their status being reduced as the power of the Hindus rose. As the aristocratic 
inheritors of the Mughal Empire, Muslims had earned the mistrust of the British when 
they took part in the Indian Mutiny in 1857 (Jafferlot, 2002; Pandey, 2006; Rawat, 2007). 
Furthermore, the Muslim elite were concerned that in case of decolonization leading to 
democracy, their minority status would lead to loss in status and political power. The 
British skillfully exploited these fears with their well-honed strategy of divide and rule in 
order to perpetuate their imperial rule in India (Hasan, 2005; Jafferlot, 2002). The 
Muslim League was a creation of Muslim conservatives and was founded in 1906 with 
the blessing of the British viceroy in India, Lord Minto. A delegation of Muslim nobles 
and landed gentry had met Lord Minto in 1906, pledging loyalty to the empire, 
demanding job quotas and separate electorates for Muslims. The underlying reason for 
Muslim League’s creation was the fear that the Muslim aristocrats and large landowners 
would stand to lose power and stature in a democratic India, and they believed that their 
interests were more protected under the British rule versus the Hindu majority rule, 
especially as the discourse of the Congress leadership veered towards socialistic rhetoric 
with promises of land reform for the poor. British successfully exploited these fears (Ali, 
2008; Hasan, 2002; Page, 1999)  
3. Creation of Indian National Congress and the Indian Muslim League 
The Indian National Congress (Congress) was founded in 1885 by a British 
official, Allan Octavian Hume, with an implicit aim to provide for a dialogue between 
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educated Indian elite and the British Empire and prevent the natives from engaging in 
violence or think about self-rule. The logic was that a pro-Government Indian 
organization could serve as an intermediary between the imperial power and its subjects. 
The British goal, after the 1857 rebellion against the British rule in India, had 
been to gain support of the English-educated Indians, primarily upper class Hindus, to 
support and justify their governance of India. Ironically, the foundation of the Congress is 
considered a key event in a systematic coalescing of opposition to the British Empire in 
India. The Congress evolved from a loyalist grouping of an upper class elite intellectual 
set, primarily including Hindus but also Muslims, Parsis, Christians, and some 
sympathetic British, into a nationalist organization. The loyalist agenda of Congress is 
evident in Hume’s description (Hume, 1911): 
Despite the apparent outward unity in all the deliverances of the Congress 
there has been a growing cleavage of sentiment and aim between the 
radical and conservative sections in the community. This cleavage recently 
came to a clash and a rupture in the Congress movement itself. The 
Moderate party has as its goal only the desire for a larger measure of home 
rule like that in Canada and Australia, together with loyal connection with 
British supremacy in a world empire. The Extremists would omit the last 
half of the twofold program of the Moderates, though without openly 
advocating any early separation from British connection. 
Despite its elitist membership and history of subservience to the Empire, 
Congress quickly developed into a mass organization, especially between the interwar 
years, with a secular agenda, and demanded independence from British occupation. 
Beginning in the early part of the 20th century, under the leadership of Mohandas 
Karamchand Gandhi, better known as Mahatma Gandhi (1869–1948), the Congress 
embarked on a fitful and drawn out freedom movement. The strategy to resist the colonial 
rule consisted of combining peaceful civil disobedience with mass action. Although 
Muslims were involved in Congress, including some at the highest levels, broad 
participation of predominantly upper-caste Hindus provided majority of Congress support 
(Mehrotra, 1972).  
Congress was ostensibly a secular organization, its appeal directed to Indians 
without any regard to class or religion. However, in practice, some of the symbolism used 
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by the Congress in mass campaigns against the British was laden with Hindu symbolism 
and mythology. Furthermore, Gandhi, the dominant Congress leader, heavily utilized 
Hindu symbolism in his speeches. While such tactics could be described as an effort to 
appeal to the broad public, majority of which indeed was Hindu, the British exploited this 
by supporting a political force that was anti-majoritarian. As the Congress began to grow, 
the British felt that they had to encourage the formation of a counterbalancing force, 
which they accomplished by encouraging the formation of a Muslim party. Thus, during 
the early twentieth century, the British cultivated Muslim aristocracy, industrialists, and 
large landlords as a balance against the Congress, and supported the formation of the 
Indian Muslim League. The Muslim League openly acted as a supporter of the British 
Raj. In 1906, the Viceroy of India, Lord Minto, was petitioned by the Muslim aristocracy 
to set up a separate electorate for the Muslims. Minto, adept at the art of divide and rule, 
agreed to this demand. The Muslim League’s demand for separate electorate was 
conceded by the British Government under the Act of 1909. The most serious implication 
of this act was that the colonial regime provided official sanction to religious nationalism 
through the linking of religion with political representation, power and patronage. The 
Communal Award by the British government, which extended separate electorates to 
Sikhs, Indian Christians, and Anglo-Indians, was another step in British policy of 
fostering communal divide (Hasan, 1997; Page 1999).  
As we will see, eventually this evolving divide between communities in colonial 
India resulted in such poisoning of relationships that it culminated in hatred, religious 
rioting, and devastating violence between the Hindus and Muslims when India was 
divided into India and Pakistan by the departing British. The poisoned relations between 
the Hindu and Muslim elite were transferred to the nascent nations and continued in an 
enduring rivalry that has resulted in a destabilized South Asia where Pakistan has 
nurtured jihadi insurgents in order to counterbalance its larger adversary, India. The 
spillover of the dispute between India and Pakistan has resulted in terrorist attacks against 
the United States and the West. We shall return to these arguments. 
Prior to the British conquest of India, relations between subcontinent’s people and 
their rulers had never been defined solely by religion. David Page concluded that 
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enfranchised members of Muslim and other communities were made to vote communally, 
think communally, and express their grievances communally; there was no need to 
collaborate with or accommodate other communities: “Muslim politicians did not have to 
appeal to non-Muslims; non-Muslims did not have to appeal to Muslims. This made it 
very difficult for a genuine Indian nationalism to emerge” (Page 1999). Page argues that 
British initiative was ultimately responsible for dividing Hindus and Muslims, pointing to 
the Montague-Chelmsford constitutional reform of 1920. He claims that Montague-
Chelmsford institutionalized the principle of separate electorates for Hindus and Muslims 
and was crucial in development of divisive politics. Separate electorates, reservations, 
and weight given to religion helped evolve a conception of Muslim community with an 
image of a unified entity that was segregated from the Hindus League’s aim to advance 
the political rights of the Muslims at the expense of other communities and their 
opposition to the possible political unity in the country led to the isolation of the Muslim 
community from the mainstream of the Indian nationalist Movement. 
The League's founding charter stated its central objective to be 'To foster a sense 
of loyalty to the British Empire among the Muslims of India'. This loyalty was 
demonstrated by the refusal of Muslim elite and the League to participate in anticolonial 
movement being spearheaded by the Congress (Ali, 1983; Nandy, 1983; Pandey, 2006). 
However, several important Muslim leaders, including Sheikh Abdullah in Kashmir, 
Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (known as the Frontier Gandhi) in the North-West Frontier 
Province, Mian Iftikharuddin in the Punjab, and Maulana Azad in the United Provinces 
all decided to work with the Indian National Congress rather than the Muslim League 
(Wali, 1987). Despite the British support, politically, the Muslim League was powerless 
and virtually nonexistent until the late 1930s. In fact, ten years before the partition of 
India, the League was crushed in 1937 limited elections and had failed to win Muslim 
separate electorate, indicating that it had no support in the Indian Muslim population.  
As the Indian nationalistic movement intensified, gathering intensity in the early 
twentieth century, British provided overt and covert support to the Muslim League. 
During the Second World War, when the British Empire was fighting for its existence, 
the tilt of the British towards the Muslim League became pronounced. Without consent of 
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the Indians, the British had declared that India was participating in the war efforts, 
angering the nationalists. Congress demanded immediate independence to allow a free 
India to decide whether it would participate in the war, angering the British. The British 
were reliant on Indian resources for the war and assured the Congress leaders that after 
the war, political advances towards independence would follow; these assurances were 
rejected by the Congress leadership. In contrast to the Congress, the Muslim League had, 
as usual, remained supportive of the British and supported the war effort. The British 
increasingly relied on the Muslim League for war effort support and adroitly used the 
League’s support for the British Empire against Congress’ nationalism (Ali, 2008; Singh, 
1990). The colonial Britain heavily relied on the India Army, with bulk of it constituted 
by Indian soldiers and its officer corps mostly British. Between May 1940 and September 
1941, the British recruited 550,000 Indians to fight for Britain in the Second World War. 
The monthly recruitment of Indian for the war effort averaged approximately 50,000 
Indians a month. During the war, two million Indians fought for Britain as part of the 
Indian Army. Furthermore, despite a shortage of wheat in India, Britain ordered India to 
supply 50,000 tons of wheat per month for British and Indian troops stationed in the 
Middle East and Iran (Roy, 2009).  
The British were challenged by the Congress and reminded that Britain had 
promised political advances to the nationalists during World War I and had abandoned its 
commitments once the war was over (Abernathy, 2000). Feeling existential challenges by 
the pressure of the War and the possibility of a major rebellion in India, which was not 
only the crown jewel of the Empire, but also a major source of war funding and soldiers 
to fight at different fronts for Britain, the British resorted to rule India with an iron hand 
during World War II and imprisoned Congress leaders who were demanded that the 
British leave India.  
The war period saw the British strengthen the resolve of the Muslim League by 
favoritism based upon war support necessities. Furthermore, an absence of Congress 
leaders due to imprisonment, and heavy repression of any political dissent, was paralleled 
by the Muslim League leaders gaining advantage in the political arena by claiming to 
represent all the Muslims in India and suggesting that it was the only party speaking for 
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Muslim interests (Singh, 1990). The leader of Muslim League, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, 
received tacit support from the British, who exploited Jinnah’s desire to be seen as the 
sole Muslim representative in the subcontinent. As a corollary between the split between 
the Hindu and Muslim elite politicians, the polarization between the Hindus and Muslims 
deepened extensively towards the later years of World War II. Congress leaders resented 
Jinnah’s claim that he was the sole representative of subcontinent’s Muslims, as this 
claim directly challenged Congress’s claim to represent all Indians regardless of their 
religious affiliations. The vertical high politics conflict eventually filtered horizontally, 
with the emergence of deep conflicts between Hindu and Muslim communities in some 
part of the subcontinent, resulting in increasing acts of violence in 1945 and 1946. Added 
to the volatile mixture, in 1940, the Muslim League had proposed carving of a separate 
Islamic state in India where the Muslims were in majority; consequently, relations 
between Hindu and Muslim communities continued to worsen (Hasan, 1997).  
In hindsight, it is easy to conclude that imperial bureaucracy in colonial India had 
promoted separatism between Hindus and Muslims, often entertaining the ideas of 
Muslim civilization versus Hindu civilization. However, the most significant push 
towards creating a clash of Hindu-Muslim interests, leading to partition of the 
subcontinent, were British imperatives during World War II. As Britain fought for its 
existence, the Congress Party demanded immediate independence to allow a free India to 
decide freely whether to participate in the war effort. The British refusal to entertain this 
demand and the resulting agitation by the Congress to launch “Quit India” movement 
angered the British and put them on Muslim League’s side. In brief, long-term impacts of 
imperial necessities were never taken into consideration and deliberate resorting to 
expedient decisions to perpetuate the empire was always in the forefront. 
Consequentially, the seeds sown in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are 




III. THE PARTITION AND ITS IMPACT ON INDIA AND 
PAKISTAN’S RULERS 
A. PARTITION OF INDIA 
Partition 
Unbiased at least he was when he arrived on his mission, 
Having never set eyes on the land he was called to partition 
Between two peoples fanatically at odds, 
With their different diets and incompatible gods. 
"Time," they had briefed him in London, "is short. It's too late 
For mutual reconciliation or rational debate: 
The only solution now lies in separation. 
The Viceroy thinks, as you will see from his letter, 
That the less you are seen in his company the better, 
So we've arranged to provide you with other accommodation. 
We can give you four judges, two Moslem and two Hindu, 
To consult with, but the final decision must rest with you." 
 
Shut up in a lonely mansion, with police night and day 
Patrolling the gardens to keep the assassins away, 
He got down to work, to the task of settling the fate 
Of millions. The maps at his disposal were out of date 
And the Census Returns almost certainly incorrect, 
But there was no time to check them, no time to inspect 
Contested areas. The weather was frightfully hot, 
And a bout of dysentery kept him constantly on the trot, 
But in seven weeks it was done, the frontiers decided, 
A continent for better or worse divided. 
 
The next day he sailed for England, where he could quickly forget 
The case, as a good lawyer must. Return he would not, 
Afraid, as he told his Club, that he might get shot. 
W. H. Auden, Collected Poems 
History’s long march eventually brought an end to the British Empire in colonial 
India in August 14, 1947, culminating into the partitioning of the Indian subcontinent. 
The end of the British power was marked with a remarkable shift in ethnic/communal 
politics in the subcontinent, with an enduring effect that has worsened instead of 
disappearing. When the British arrived in India and eventually established their rule over  
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the subcontinent, religion was not the overarching theme in the various princely states 
and dominions. However, as the British departed, the country was afflicted with Hindu-
Muslim rivalry (Baber, 2004; Freitag, 1990; Talbot, 1995).  
The most ironic feature of the impending independence from British rule was that 
large sections of population in Punjab and Bengal did not know which new state they 
would end up in. The borders to the new states had not been revealed even though August 
14–15 1947 brought an end to western colonization of India, and the new state of 
Pakistan. Viceroy Mountbatten had held back the details of partition until August 17. 
This postponement simply delayed the reaction of the people. And, the reaction did come 
as a holocaust of unequalled proportions. The newly created borders forced hastily and 
thoughtlessly created artificial lines on people, dividing clans, families, and uprooting 
people's connections with lands on which they had lived for centuries (Ahmad, 2002; Ali, 
1983; Hasan, 1997; Hasan, 2002).  
The partition was a far-reaching political event in South Asia. The partition is 
considered one of the most complex exercises ever accomplished in demarcation of 
national boundaries (Chester, 2009; Herschy, 1994; Tan & Kudaisya, 2000). It is 
remarkable that such an overarching historical event with significant implications was 
brought about with such abruptness, disregard for consequences, and lack of sufficient 
planning. The arrogance of the British regime was evident until the last day of the British 
Raj, as Viceroy Mountbatten did not reveal the boundaries of the new nations two days 
after their formal independence. It is remarkable that power was transferred to two 
governments who did not know the geographical boundaries of their own states. This 
penchant for secrecy and control over the minions, and a disregard for the long-term 
impact of colonial decisions, made the newly created states unprepared for the bloodbath 
that was to ensue. 
The Partition resulted in one of the most brutal and bloody forced migrations in 
history, in which Sikhs and Hindus were chased from newly created Pakistan and 
Muslims from India. The ensuing violence resulted in the massacre of between one to 
two million Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs and expulsion of approximately 12 million 
people from their homes, abduction and rape of over 75,000 women, and creating one of 
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the largest refugee migrations in the history (Ali, 1983; Ahmad, 2002; Cohen, 2004; 
Herschy, 1994; Khosla, 1950; Hasan, 2002; Moon, 1961; Tan & Kudaisya, 2000). This 
migration is considered on of the greatest population movements in recorded history. 
This enormous number of refugees posed a gigantic resettlement problem for India and 
Pakistan. The religious violence unleashed by the partition was concomitantly followed 
by a war between the nascent states over the dispute over Kashmir, which both India and 
Pakistan claimed on different grounds. That perpetual war has been the source of 
terrorism in South Asia and its impact has been felt around the world. The trauma 
incurred by partition was so profound that the relations between the two states, 64-years 
after the event, have not yet normalized. The communal animosities were converted to 
institutional and inter-state animosities. In fact, the relations continued to worsen with 
time, so much so, that the regional rivalry has taken an international dimension and now 
requires international engagement to keep the area from blowing up. 
Margaret Bourke-White, who was in India to photograph the birth of two nations 
in the fall of 1947 for Life Magazine, described the migration of refugees in miles-long 
columns, with approximately five million people on the move right after independence, 
brutal attacks on caravans, and butchering of entire train-loads of refugees who were 
going east to India or west to Pakistan by Muslim and Hindu/Sikh mobs (Bourke-White, 
1949). 
How did the partition of British India, which resulted in the birth of two separate 
states, which were ostensibly created to solve the "communal problem" by providing the 
Muslim minority with their own nation, Pakistan, and state for Hindus, India, result in 
such a holocaust?  The engineered and theoretical “communal” problem of British India, 
which evolved and intensified due to the British colonialism and realpolitik, should have 
been resolved by providing the minority Muslim population with a nation state of its own 
where there was no fear of Hindu domination. However, salient decisions taken in the 
past by the British to perpetuate colonial rule in India once again interfered with the 
intentions and muddied the impact of current events, even when the British had decided 
to relinquish their dominion over the subcontinent and transfer the power to the natives. 
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Mountbatten was sent as the last Viceroy to India with a mandate to dismantle the British 
Empire and the Indian leaders had agreed with his version of the partition plan of the 
Indian Empire on June 3, 1947. Punjab and Bengal states, on the western and eastern 
periphery of British India, with a majority Muslim population, were to be divided to 
create West and East Pakistan. Parts of these states with Muslim majorities were to 
become Pakistan (Morris-Jones, 1983). The presence of large Hindu and Sikh minority 
populations in these states complicated the creation of new borders, as the minority 
populations were widely distributed in Punjab and Bengal and land ownership and 
business interests of minority communities happened to fall in the majority areas. 
Historical artifacts and cultural centers of a community fell in areas where the other 
community was more populous. Topographical features further confounded a simple 
demarcation of boundaries. Furthermore, the process of determining the boundaries was 
made even more daunting as the territorial basis underlying the concept of partition, 
which throughout the demand of Pakistan, had never been defined and remained 
theoretical even though the tangible date for partition was finalized (Read & Fisher, 
1998). 
The concept of Pakistan had remained vague because the Muslim elite, who had 
demanded Pakistan, had been uncertain about the concept themselves, and there had been 
divisions within the Muslim elite, especially from Punjab and Bengal, with some leaders 
preferring to keep provincial self-rule within a weak central government in India. 
Additionally, even two years before the country was partitioned, it was uncertain whether 
a division of India would indeed occur, as efforts to keep the country unified after the 
British departure continued well into the beginning of 1947. As a result, with two months 
to go before the partition, a serious undertaking to create new boundaries in a loose 
federation of dominions that had existed for centuries, to divide twenty percent of the 
world's population and its assets, the concept was still theoretical and had been given an 
artificial deadline imposed by Mountbatten (Chester, 2000; Hasan, 2002; Mansergh & 
Moon, 1983).  
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The individual selected as the chairman of the boundary commission, Cyril Radcliffe, had 
never been to India, had no connections with India or its politics, and, ironically, had 
absolutely no knowledge of the territories he was about to divide. Adding to this 
confounding mix, Radcliffe had no experience in division of territories. Radcliffe is said 
to have remarked to Mountbatten that given the vastness of India and its huge population, 
it would take even the most qualified arbitrator 'years to decide on a boundary that would 
certainly cut across homes and populations. Radcliffe was shocked to discover that he 
had only five weeks to complete his work of dividing up territories and communities 
about which he had very little to no knowledge (Chester, 2000; Chester, 2009; Hasan, 
2002; Mosley, 1961). Radcliffe was made responsible for the separation of 88 million 
people and for dividing 175,000 square miles of territory between them. However, his 
sole briefing for this enormous project consisted of a 30-minute session with the 
permanent under-secretary in the India Office, which consisted of going over a large-
scale map of India. Radcliffe was expecting to be provided with sufficient time—several 
months—for his endeavor. However, to conclude a historically unprecedented enterprise 
of immense proportions, he arrived in Delhi on July 8, 1947, and was given a firm, 
unchangeable deadline of mid-August, 1947 (Read & Fisher, 1998). 
On the surface, the terms of reference for the Boundary Commission were fairly 
simple: the commission was entrusted with demarcation of boundaries on the basis of 
contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims. However, Radcliffe's 
unimaginably difficult work was made problematic by confusing terms of reference on 
how the boundaries of the partitioned areas were to be determined. For example, besides 
considering contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims, the commission 
also had to take into account "other factors" that were not defined. Even the units of 
territory (block, village, or district level, etc.) were not defined for the commission while 
considering "contiguous areas" for division. And, since only Hindu and Muslim 
contiguous areas were to be divided, no provision was made for the Sikh population, and 
the Sikh population in Punjab was threatened with a split down the middle, with their 
fertile lands and holy sites going to Pakistan (Chester, 2000). 
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Besides population distribution based upon religion, Congress, Muslim League, and Sikh 
leaders laid conflicting claims over territory based upon economic, cultural, and historical 
reasons. Demarcation of some of the regions was highly contentious because of complex 
demographics, with Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs populations more or less equally spread 
out over the districts. Furthermore, the two Indian states with majority Muslim population 
that were to be divided to create Pakistan, were so densely populated that any potential 
dividing line would have to slice through densely populated areas, severing railroads and 
roadways, irrigation systems, and individual landholdings. Some of the areas had evenly 
distributed Muslim and Hindu populations and therefore confounded the boundary 
creations. Other regions complicated laying new borders due to natural boundaries such 
as rivers and topography. Additionally, Sikhs, who owned large areas in Punjab and 
considered Punjab their heartland, were opposed to the partition of their land and the 
concomitant loss of political and other powers. Sikh population, compared to the Hindu 
and Muslim, was significantly smaller and their much smaller minority status lead to a 
neglect of Sikh interests during the partition negotiations between the British, the 
Congress, and the Muslim League. Virtually all of the Sikh population, approximately six 
million in 1941, lived in Punjab. Although Sikhs comprised 13 percent of Punjab’s 
population, they controlled the best lands in the province and were considerably wealthier 
than the other communities on average (Kaufman, 1998). They were planning to using 
violence to oppose any loss of their lands and power. By July 1947, it was evident that 
the Sikhs were intent on resorting to violence if boundary commission’s decisions were 
disadvantageous to their community at the expense of Hindus and Muslims (Chester, 
2009; Hasan, 2002; Mosley, 1961; Read & Fisher, 1998). 
With such impossible conditions to work with, Radcliffe ended up with a product 
that he knew was deficient and would be controversial. He wrote to his stepson, "Nobody 
in India will love me for the award about the Punjab and Bengal and there will be roughly 
80 million people with a grievance who will begin looking for me. I do not want them to 
find me"  (Khilnani, 1998). 
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Historians agree that partition was negotiated and concluded with an unexplained 
haste, although many have attributed the haste to inability of the postwar weakened 
Britain persist in India in face of increased nationalist fervor it couldn’t control. The 
specifics of the partition were so ineptly handled that the only known fact in June of 1947 
was that India would be partitioned into a Hindu India and a Muslim Pakistan. The 
territorial shape of the two new states was unknown and the exact borders were unknown 
and disputed to the end, until after India and Pakistan gained independence from the 
British (Read & Fisher, 1998). The dispute over unsettled boundaries continued, and, 
eventually metastasized into a perpetual asymmetric conflict between India and Pakistan. 
The disputed regions also took form as incubators of terrorism from which plots were 
hatched to attack not only India, but also the United States and other nations. 
The boundary awards by Radcliffe generated great controversy due to the lack of 
consistent criteria, were regarded as being equally unfair to both Hindu and Muslim 
communities, illogical, and problematic. The boundary award followed no natural 
dividing features, cut across villages, canal systems and communication lines, and in the 
process, separated communities. Allegations were also made against Mountbatten that he 
influenced Radcliffe to favor India. Mountbatten received Radcliffe's awards on August 
12, two days before the transfer of power to Pakistan and three days before the transfer of 
power to India. There was no time to make arrangements for mutual transfer of 
population or to provide security in the newly created border areas. On August 17, with 
the announcement of Radcliffe awards, countless people found themselves on the wrong 
side of the border (Chester, 2009; Talbot, 2009).  
Several factors resulted in eruption of large-scale violence during and after the 
partition. The proximate cause resulted from the British failure to anticipate the built-up 
anger and potential for violence. Furthermore, not knowing the exact boundaries until 
after the partition of subcontinent had already been accomplished, the British failed to 
plan or arrange for an orderly transfer or exchange of populations. The departing Empire 
also failed to organize an adequate police force under the British officers to counter 
violence between Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs. The religious rhetoric accompanying the 
jockeying for power after the British departure compounded the communal hatred that 
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had been building since 1940. This was compounded by the uncertainty, as communities 
in the boundary areas did not know where they were going to end up after the partition. 
On August 17, 1947, when the boundary commission awards were made public, instead 
of bringing peace between the communities, they intensified hatred; there was a frenzy 
not to be caught on the wrong side of the border. 
The magnitude of the population displacement caused by new boundaries was 
enormous and had not been anticipated by the British. Just in Punjab, within months of 
partition, an estimated 4.5 million Sikhs and Hindus were uprooted and forced to migrate 
from West Punjab to the east and approximately 5.5 million Muslims moved in the 
opposite direction. It is estimated that between 12 to 17 million people were made 
refugees in the aftermath of partition (Ali, 1983; Ahmad, 2002; Bourke-White, 1949; 
Brass, 2003; Cohen, 2004; Herschy, 1994; Khosla, 1950; Hasan, 2002; Kaufman, 1998; 
Moon, 1961; Tan & Kudaisya, 2000; Talbot, 2007; Talbot, 2009). Refugees left their 
homes by every means possible, but most travelled on foot in order to seek refuge with 
their co-religionists as violence raged. Some of the columns of refugees stretched for 
miles, the longest one was estimated to be 50 miles long. Some of the columns heading in 
opposite directions, when they passed each other, engaged in wholesale slaughter of the 
other side. Historians have painted horrific images of trains leaving from Lahore and 
Delhi, packed with refugees going to the other side, and arriving at their destinations 
filled with butchered and bloated remains of the refugees (Bourke-White, 1949). The 
trains were routinely stopped in the countryside and travelers were hacked into pieces, 
with only the train engineer surviving the massacre. Remarkably, the only travelers who 
survived harm were the British or Europeans. The Punjab Boundary Force did little to 
prevent the massacres and was forbidden from mounting any offensive operations. There 
is no consensus on the exact number of people who died in the violence. Estimates 
ranged from between quarter of a million (official British estimates—however, to save 
face, British government was intent on minimizing the number of people slaughtered for 
which they bore the responsibility) to two million (Brass, 2003; Butalia, 2000; Cohen, 
2004). Over the years, a consensus has been reached that between one million to a 
million and a half perished in the partition-related violence. Majority of the violence was 
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confined to Punjab, where the final shape of the territory of Pakistan would eventually 
emerge after East Pakistan seceded and became Bangladesh (Kaufman, 1998).  
Partition of colonial India was the defining event of independent India and 
Pakistan and it continues to be the defining event of modern India and Pakistan (Hasan, 
1997; Hasan, 2005; Haqqani, 2005; Racine, 2002). Larson claims that Partition of India is 
at the heart of great regional conflicts and also an important component or factor in a 
whole series of religious-cum-political conflicts reaching down to the present time 
(Larson, 1995). The cause of extensive violence in South Asia can be traced to the 
structured imperial categories designed to differentiate one community from another. 
These categories were created and translated into formal political arrangements via 
pestiferous campaigns to perpetuate colonial rule (Lange, 2006; Nandy, 1983; 
Pennington, 2004). The imperial imposition of categories did perpetuate British rule over 
colonial India for over two centuries; and, even though the imperial rule came to an end, 
the imposed identities and fostering of division between Hindus and Muslim had created 
such a matrix of hatred and immense violence that the Partition brought two poisoned 
nations in existence. 
In summary, the Partition of British India was followed by one of the bloodiest 
migrations and ethnic cleansings in history. The religious fury and violence that it 
unleashed caused the deaths of between one to two million Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs. 
Over 12 million people, caught on the wrong side of the border, were uprooted from their 
ancestral lands and were forcibly transferred between the two countries. Tens of 
thousands of women were raped, and tens of thousands more were kidnapped and 
forcibly converted to their adversary’s religion (Butalia, 2000). The trauma incurred in 
the process has been profound, with severe and lasting results. Relations between India 
and Pakistan have, instead of normalizing, continued to get worse with each passing year. 
Ethnic conflict, territorial conflict, and pathological irredentist politics pervades the 
subcontinent, leading the two nations into an arms race which has pushed them on the 
verge of a nuclear war since May 1998, when both demonstrated their ability to explode 
nuclear devices (Ahmad, 2002). 
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Artificial boundary creation by the British has caused continued conflict between 
India and Pakistan (Kashmir) and Afghanistan and Pakistan (Durand Line). Furthermore, 
British colonialism has been responsible for destabilization of various other colonies after 
decolonization in Asia and the Middle East (DeVotta, 2009; Lange, Mahoney, & 
Matthias, 2006; Lange & Dawson, 2009; Pandey, 2006). From a humanitarian 
perspective, the decision to partition India proved to be disastrous for the subcontinent, 
especially immediately after the transfer of power. From a political and geostrategic 
perspective, the decision to partition India was to prove even more disastrous, with 
consequences for the entire world to bear. The lessons learned are that since the partition 
of 1947, the rivalry between India and Pakistan sowed the seeds of asymmetric warfare 
between the two nations, leading to use of political Islam and terrorism as the tools of the 
state of Pakistan. This, combined with the U.S. government’s bankrolling of the 
Afghanistan war via the Pakistani military to drive off the Soviet military from 
Afghanistan, caused a hardening of political Islam in South Asia as the Pakistani military 
came to rely more and more on Jihad as the tool of the state by employing fundamentalist 
Muslims to fight asymmetric warfare. Eventually the use of terrorism by Pakistan against 
India and Afghanistan filtered out of the region and engulfed the United States and 
European nations. In the next chapters, I will discuss how the partition inevitably lead 
towards worsening of relations between India and Pakistan and contributed to ongoing 
conflict and sowed the seeds of terrorism in the region. 
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IV. KASHMIR IN THE MIDST OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN 
A. BEGINNING OF THE CONFLICT: KASHMIR AND PARTITION 
Independence for India and Pakistan evolved in a matrix of acrimony and 
hostility, where mass slaughter of more than a million, which would qualify as ethnic 
cleansing in modern terms, accompanied the Partition. Indian and Pakistani leaders were 
steeped in distrust of each other. The end of the British rule did not bring peace or resolve 
dissonance between the Congress and the Indian Muslim League. After the partition, the 
enmity, distrust and hatred, continued and progressively worsened, with the nascent states 
starting their relationship in violence by going to war over Kashmir almost immediately 
after gaining freedom from the British rule. The tragedy accompanying the partition 
resulted in a legacy of hatred. The leaders of India and Pakistan mistrusted each other, 
sought vengeance, and believed the worst of each other. The two states were formed 
based on two divergent conceptions that severely conflicted with each other. The Indian 
nationalist movement, represented by the Indian National Congress, although pulled by 
inherent political tensions, backed the philosophy of a secular and democratic India, the 
need for which was necessitated by an incredibly diverse population of the subcontinent. 
Conversely, the Muslim League’s ideology was based upon an exclusionary nationalism, 
where the Muslims of the subcontinent needed to separate from other communities and 
create their own homeland. The two ideological opposite and conflicting goals of the two 
parties put the two nascent nation states on a collision course as the British Empire came 
to an end in the subcontinent. 
One of the most damaging, bitter, and dangerous legacies of partition that 
continues to have a debilitating impact in South Asia, is the unresolved issue of 
Kashmir's status. Kashmir continues to occupy center stage in a six-decade long dispute 
between India and Pakistan, with each claiming the former kingdom of Jammu and 
Kashmir (Ganguly, 2001; Lamb, 2002). It has been suggested that Indian and Pakistan’s 
ongoing dispute over Kashmir lies at the heart of the conflict in South Asia (Kapur, 2009; 
Paul, 2005). Kashmir dispute has been the proximate cause for three wars between India  
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and Pakistan, an ongoing low intensity conflict that has lasted for over six decades, 
potential for nuclear confrontation, and institutionalization of use of terrorism as a nation-
state’s strategy. 
The boundaries of colonial India were expediently shaped by the British Empire, 
in Britain’s favor. No account for the history, cultural linguistic and ethnic kinships, 
physical scale, and geographical considerations for the natives were taken during the 
redrawing of the boundaries by the colonial powers. The expansion of the empire, by 
progressive annexation of territories in South Asia, interfered with sovereignty of several 
nation states, including Afghanistan and the subcontinent, reshaped the borders, and 
divided ethnic populations, and created serious destabilization in South Asia (Ganguly, 
2001; Wirsing, 1994). Once the British Empire began to retreat from the Indian 
subcontinent after World War II, once again a significant redrawing of the boundaries in 
South Asia occurred. Unlike the colonial times, when the power of the Empire was 
formidable, the circumstance during decolonization were not propitious; there were 
numerous pressures, and rational decision making was precluded due to the unforgiving 
circumstances of decolonization, escalating violence, a deep divide between the elite who 
had negotiated independence from the British, a lack of will and power to hold on to 
territories, increasing resistance of the natives, and the contradictions inherent in such a 
situation. The negotiations had been bitter, especially over the carving of territory 
between India and Pakistan. The ideological divide between the Congress, which fought 
for a secular undivided India, and the Muslim League, which agitated under the banner of 
“Islam in danger” and sloganeering that Hindus and Muslims constituted two separate 
nations and therefore could not coexist, became deeper and poisonous as the negotiations 
with Britain continued for an end to the British rule (Ganguly, 2001; Jafferlot, 2002; 
Hasan, 2002; Singh, 1990).  
Between 1945 and 1947, the Muslim League had engaged in incendiary rhetoric 
and resorted to a rallying cry of “Islam in danger” in order to mobilize the masses. The 
rhetoric was essential for the success of the Muslim League, as the common Muslim had 
shown no interest in the elite and landowner-run organization until threatened by the 
bogey of Hindu majority mobilizing to destroy Islam in India free of British rule. 
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Pakistan was achieved in the name of Islam, with a battle cry of Hindu majority trying to 
oppress or subsume the Muslim community. Widespread bloodshed, rioting, abduction of 
women, and forced population transfers had created a virulent atmosphere. As a result, an 
atmosphere of siege mentality prevailed after the independence (Ali, 1983; Ali, 2008; 
Hasan, 2002). 
Pakistan was especially bitter, as its leaders believed that the British had cheated 
her of territory that rightfully should have gone to Pakistan. Conspiracy theories were 
afoot that Viceroy Mountbatten had favored India due to his dislike of Muslim League 
leader Jinnah and deprived the new nation of strategic or important areas. 
The reasons for the conflict over Kashmir are complex and interrelated; however, 
at the root of the problem is the existential battle that makes the disagreement 
irreconcilable: independent India came into being as a secular nation, whereas Muslim 
nationalism lies at the heart of Pakistan’s creation. Due to its geography and demography, 
Kashmir lies at the fault lines of these nationalisms and both India and Pakistan have 
made possession of Kashmir as the central reason for their national existence. There are 
no compromises in this zero sum game; thus, every effort to dialogue, compromise, and 
negotiate in the past has failed (Bose, 1999; Bose 2003). 
During the negotiations to partition India, a decision had to be made about the 
status of 562 princely states, which largely had been ruled autonomously but under 
British dominion. With the lapse of British rule, the princely states were free to accede to 
either India or Pakistan or become independent states. However, in reality, the last option 
was not on the table. Viceroy Mountbatten, the last British administrator of India had 
asked the rulers of the princely states to accede to India or Pakistan after evaluating two 
main criteria: geographical contiguity to India or Pakistan and the wishes of their subject 
populations. Thus, to avoid India and Pakistan becoming fragmented entities, those states 
that fell in Pakistani territory would accede to Pakistan and those princely states that fell 
deep in Indian territory would join India. Similarly, primarily Hindu states would join 




Kashmir was in a unique situation as its territory abutted both India and Pakistan, the 
majority of its population was Muslim, but Kashmir’s ruler, Hari Singh, was a Hindu. 
Complicating the situation, a strong Kashmiri regional movement, the National 
Conference, had close ties to the Indian National Congress and was not inclined to join 
Pakistan. Kashmiri nationalist leader, Sheikh Abdullah, who was committed to a process 
of land reform and redistributive justice and a strict anti-monarchist, was against joining 
Pakistan and instead favored Kashmir’s independence. When the time for independence 
came, Hari Singh had not made a decision to join either India or Pakistan, hoping to keep 
Kashmir independent. In constitutional terms, Kashmir was a ‘princely state’, which 
meant that the Maharaja had the legal right to choose whether to accede to India or to 
Pakistan. In cases where the ruler did not share the faith of a large majority of his 
population it was assumed he would nevertheless go along with the wishes of the people 
(Ganguly, 2002; Lamb, 2002; Schoefield, 2000).  
After the partition, Hari Singh was pressured by both India and Pakistan to accede 
but kept vacillating. There was a strong imperative amongst Pakistani leadership that 
Kashmir should join Pakistan, which eventually lead to Pakistani military backing Pathan 
tribal intruders to attack and capture Kashmir in October 1947, while Hari Singh was still 
weighing his options. Pathan tribesmen were guided by the Pakistani military regulars 
during their push towards Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir. Hari Singh, panicking that his 
regime was about to be overthrown panicked and asked India for help against the 
intruders. Indian help was promised in return for Kashmir’s accession to India. Desperate 
to save his kingdom and under pressure, on October 27, 1947, the Maharaja joined the 
Indian union in return for India’s military aid to stem the tribal attack. Pakistan did not 
accept the accession and sent in troops. Indian troops arrived shortly thereafter to 
Kashmir and the first war over Kashmir broke out between India and Pakistan, lasting 
until a United Nations-sponsored cease fire was declared in January 1949. When the war 
ended, approximately one-third of the Kashmiri territory was under Pakistan’s control 
and the remaining under Indian. The first war between the two countries began right after 
their birth. The end of the first war was just the beginning of the never-ending conflict 
between the newly birthed states of India and Pakistan (Schofield, 2000). 
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Indian government considered Maharaja Hari Singh’s signing of accession papers 
as a legally binding contract, making Kashmir a part of India. However, Pakistan position 
was that since Kashmir was a Muslim-majority state, it rightfully should have gone to 
Pakistan. Furthermore, India did not hold a plebiscite for Kashmiri people to decide 
whether they wished to join India or Pakistan, making accession undemocratic. The 
bitterly contested territory has caused Pakistan to launch wars and support insurgency in 
an effort to seize Kashmir. The Indian government is equally determined to keep the 
territory under its control. The dispute is more than territorial; it is an existential conflict 
between the two nation states. The division of Indian subcontinent was based upon the 
premises that the Muslims and Hindus in India constituted two separate nations and 
therefore could not live together; therefore a nation state explicitly for Muslims was 
needed as their homeland (Jafferlot, 2002). Conversely, postcolonial India was founded 
as a secular pluralistic democracy, a home for the diverse South Asian population. 
Development of these contrasting identities created starkly adversarial national projects 
in the neighboring nations. 
India and Pakistan have made possession of Kashmir as foundation of their 
identities as nation states (Cohen, 2004; Kaushik, 2005). Indian position is that India’s 
identity, as an inclusive secular state, would be damaged by losing Kashmir, the only 
Muslim-majority province in India. Allowing Pakistan to take over Kashmir would imply 
that minority groups cannot live or thrive in India and need religiously or ethnically based 
nations, which would invite severe destabilization or even breakup of an incredibly 
diverse nation state India is. India views Kashmir as an integral part of India, unified with 
India legally by the instrument of accession signed by the ruler of Kashmir. The partition, 
in India’s view, was completed in 1947 and any territorial concession to Pakistan would 
be a second partition. It is also India’s position that relinquishing Kashmir would lead to 
separatist tendencies in other parts of India and negate India’s secular credentials. 
Pakistan considers itself territorially and ideologically incomplete because it was 
conceived as a homeland for the Muslims of the subcontinent. If Pakistan accepts Indian 
control of Kashmir, it would imply that Pakistan’s creation was unnecessary as 
subcontinent’s Muslims can live and thrive in a Hindu-majority India. Thus both the 
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nations justify control of Kashmir as essential to their national identity that was forged 
during the path to partition of India, making the conflict irreconcilable (Kapur, 2009; 
Paul, 2005). 
Both the arguments are logically flawed. For India, it is not essential to retain 
Kashmir to validate India’s secular credentials, especially as more than 150 million 
Muslims live in India. How the Indian state treats these Muslims validates its pluralistic 
polity, not retention of Kashmir. Similarly, the Pakistani proposition that since it was 
conceived as a homeland for Muslims, and since Pakistani nationalism has Islam as the 
sole glue that binds the nation state, Pakistan is ideologically incomplete without 
Kashmir, is a fallacious argument. The argument that Pakistan's claims to Kashmir are 
fundamentally related to its founding ideology as a state for the Muslims of the 
subcontinent was fallacious even in 1947, as a third of British India's Muslims chose (or 
resigned themselves) to remain in India after the partition. The dubiousness of the 
argument was further shredded when East Pakistan broke away from Pakistan to become 
Bangladesh. However, the ideological power of these dubious arguments has constructed 
the nationalistic enterprise of both India and Pakistan for the last 64 years (Bose, 2003). 
Especially in Pakistan, where the nation state was riven by regional tensions, ethnic and 
linguistic divisions, religious conflicts (Sunni versus Shias, Sunnis versus Ahmadiya) 
ethno nationalist conflicts (as in Baluchistan, Bengal, the NWFP, and Sindh) and plagued 
by the inability of any political force to acquire a genuinely popular base, religion 
remained as the sole unifying coordinate. As such, Kashmir became a nucleus for the 
state building project in Pakistan (Swami, 2007; Wirsing, 1994; Wolpert, 2010). 
The ceasefire line of 1949, renamed the Line of Control in 1972, has essentially 
remained the same, with India retaining approximately 63 percent of Kashmir’s territory 
and bulk of the population. In 1955, India offered to settle the boundary dispute by 
converting the ceasefire line into permanent international boundary between India and 
Pakistan. The offer was rejected by Pakistan.  
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B. POWER ASYMMETRY—CONTINUATION AND EXACERBATION OF 
THE CONFLICT 
When the subcontinent was divided, India’s military strength was substantially 
greater than Pakistan. The military infrastructure and units of the old British Indian army 
had been divided on a 7:3 ratio between India and Pakistan. However, the Pakistani elite 
and military leaders held very chauvinistic views about Hindus and had a very high 
opinion about the martial prowess of Muslims. Opinion of Pakistani General Akbar 
Khan, as quoted in Ganguly (2001, p. 20): 
In the remotest of our villages, the humblest of our people possess a self-
confidence and ready willingness to march into India – a spirit the 
equivalent of which cannot be found on the other side…. In India, in the 
absence of homogeneity, a penetration in any direction can result in 
separation of different units geographically as well as morally because 
there is no basic unity among the Shudras, Brahmins, Sikhs, Hindus and 
Muslims who will follow their own different interests. At present, and for 
a long time to come, India is in the same position as she was centuries ago, 
exposed to disintegration in emergencies. 
Despite the fact that Pakistan was smaller, militarily weaker, and could not win 
Kashmir in a direct war, the Pakistan military’s chauvinistic attitude about Hindus 
resulted in a belief that they could defeat India and capture Kashmir. However, due to the 
power asymmetry, the full-scale war resulted in a stalemate. The UN brokered ceasefire 
did not cease Pakistan’s irredentist goals; the Pakistani leadership remained committed to 
taking over the entire Kashmir. Pakistan’s leadership remained committed to using 
diplomatic and military pressure on India. However, the Indian government remained 
intransigent, refused to cede any ground on Kashmir, and steadily tightened its grip on 
Kashmir. Thus, Pakistan’s identity as the homeland of the Muslims of Indian 
subcontinent, especially in terms of Kashmir, was left unfulfilled. Consequently, the 
Pakistani leadership continued its quest to wrest Kashmir from India. The quest was 
shaped by false optimism and exaggerated self-image based on flawed inference 
(Ganguly, 2001). Pakistan’s significant geographical advantage in Kashmir, as Pakistan 
was physically much closer to Kashmir, leading to much shorter supply lines during a 
war, also made Pakistan confident of its prospects of wresting Kashmir away from India. 
As a result, the two states were at war again in 1965 (Kapur, 2010). 
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Pakistan and India engaged in several multilateral and bilateral negotiations between 
1949 and 1965. However, due to their unchangeable positions, there was no possibility 
for compromise. A strong belief, that Pakistan remained “incomplete” without Kashmir, 
persisted in Pakistan. In the words of Pakistan’s foreign minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto: 
If a Muslim majority can remain a part of India, then the raison d’etre of 
Pakistan collapses…. Pakistan is incomplete without Jammu and Kashmir 
both territorially and ideologically. It would be fatal if, in sheer exhaustion 
or out of intimidation, Pakistan were to abandon the struggle, and a bad 
compromise would be tantamount to abandonment; which might, in turn, 
lead to the collapse of Pakistan. 
In 1965, Pakistan formulated “Operation Gibraltar” to infiltrate Kashmir and stir 
up a rebellion, expecting Kashmiri Muslims to support the rebellion, after which 
Pakistani military would invade the territory. The Pakistani leadership believed that India 
lacked stomach for battle and was reeling from the shock of a disastrous military defeat at 
the hands of China in 1962. Pakistan mistakenly believed that the Muslim population of 
Kashmir had pro-Pakistan sentiment and had an impression that the Chinese would assist 
Pakistan in a war with India. (Ganguly, 2001; Kapur, 2010). In August of 1965, the 
infiltration in Kashmir was started by Pakistan. The local Kashmiris, instead of 
welcoming the insurgents and joining a rebellion, alerted the authorities. Soon thereafter, 
Pakistan launched an attack, starting the second Kashmir war. The war turned into a 
stalemate by September, with India and Pakistan accepting UN Security Council cease-
fire resolution on September 21 and September 22, 1965. The war failed to resolve the 
Kashmir dispute and within six years, India and Pakistan went to war again, in 1971 
(Ganguly, 2002). 
The 1971 war was different from the previous two and started in East Pakistan, 
where a civil war between the West Pakistani troops and Bengali-speaking East 
Pakistanis resulted in a massacre of tens of thousands of civilians, and a flight of 
approximately ten million refugees from East Pakistan to India led to a major crisis. India 
intervened in the civil, providing a humanitarian justification to end loss of life in East 
Pakistan (although the Indian goals were expedient and much larger, including exploiting 
a window of opportunity to weaken Pakistan by dividing its eastern and western halves) 
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and also to end tremendous economic pressure resulting from the large refugee 
population. The war formally began on December 3, 1971, by an attack by Pakistan on 
India’s air bases and by December 17, it had ended in a complete rout of Pakistani forces, 
with India taking 90,000 prisoners and causing the division of Pakistan into half, with 
East Pakistan seceding and becoming Bangladesh.  
It can be argued that the seeds for terrorism in South Asia were planted by 
Pakistan’s defeat in 1971 war. Prior to 1971, Pakistani opinion was that their soldiers, 
belonging to the “martial” races, were inherently superior to Indian soldiers. However, 
the absolute defeat of Pakistan, combined with loss of half of its territory, and display of 
overwhelming military superiority by India, indicated clearly that a direct war to win 
Kashmir was not only unwinnable, it could pose an existential threat to Pakistan which, 
besides Bengali-challenge in East Pakistan, faced other linguistic and ethnic tensions in 
Baluchistan, NWFP, and Sindh. The ideological basis of Pakistan’s claim over Kashmir 
was demolished, as half of Pakistan’s Muslims seceded to create their own linguistic, 
ethnic, and cultural based nation state. Religion alone was demonstrated to be not the sole 
basis of creating a nation state. However, despite her defeat in the 1971 war, Pakistan did 
not give up her aim to take over Kashmir. However, the realization that Pakistan could 
not rely on a direct war to challenge Indian control of Kashmir forever changed the 
nature of Pakistan’s strategy to achieve union with Kashmir. Pakistan’s future strategy of 
death by a thousand cuts and asymmetric warfare was born (Kapur, 2010).  
C. PAKISTAN’S RELIANCE ON ASYMMETRIC WARFARE IN KASHMIR 
AND AFGHANISTAN 
In recent years, significant amount of research has been devoted to Pakistan’s 
reliance on irregular warfare in South Asia as an instrument of its national security 
policy. This irregular warfare entangles not only India, but transudes to neighboring 
Afghanistan and to Europe and the United States. The perceptions that Pakistan has a 
dual approach of practicing harsh repression against domestic terrorists and leniency 
toward home-based regional terrorists who attack American interests in Afghanistan and 
Indian interests in Kashmir have gained strength (Ahmad, 2011; Ganguly & Kapur, 2010; 
Jones, 2007; Tellis, 2008). 
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It is generally believed that Pakistan first heavily invested in and polished its 
proxy war capabilities, by utilizing militants and nonstate actors, during the anti-Soviet 
jihad (Coll, 2005; Rashid, 2008). However, this practice of using nonstate actors as tools 
of state policy goes back to 1947. Since the partition of the subcontinent in 1947, 
Pakistan has never been at ease with its larger, more powerful neighbor, India, and 
refused to accept India’s conventional military (and, later nuclear) superiority. To 
countervail India’s conventional military superiority, Pakistan has deliberately employed 
the use of irregulars as a conscious strategy in achieving its political and military 
objectives (Ali, 2008; Fair, 2011; Haqqani, 2005; Hussain, 2007; Kfir, 2009; Riedel, 
2011; Rashid, 2008; Siddiqa, 2011). Pakistan’s deceptive policy of deliberately utilizing 
nonstate actors as a tool of asymmetric warfare against stronger adversaries, including the 
Soviet Union and India, has been a policy that took shape with Pakistan’s birth as a 
nation state.  
Fighting proxy wars using nonstate actors has enabled Pakistan to provide 
plausible deniability, however tenuous, and to engage in a war of attrition, without having 
to face larger and more resourceful enemies in a direct conflict. By employing nonstate 
fighters, Pakistan has attempted to convince others that since these asymmetric operations 
were conducted by nonstate actors, Pakistan government should not be held responsible 
for such acts, and thus remain immune from retribution (Fair, 2011; Ganguly & Kapur, 
2010; Kapur, 2009). 
As soon as Pakistan was carved out of British India, it used nonstate actors to 
prosecute foreign policy objectives in Kashmir. In October of 1947, Pakistan mobilized 
tribal militias to invade and seize Kashmir. In the 1947 conflict, Pakistan utilized 
irregular fighters, as well as regular fighters drawn from the military, paramilitary, and 
intelligence agencies disguised as irregular fighters. As the conflict expanded into a full-
fledged war, it eventually involved the military. This first engagement in asymmetric 
warfare started the first India-Pakistan war (Kapur, 2010). In the first India-Pakistan war 
of 1947, while Pakistan was not able to capture the entire state, it was able to gain control 
over a sizeable area of Kashmir. This first war was preceded by Pakistan’s low intensity 
conflict and proxy war in Kashmir, which it found to be low cost and useful. Pakistan 
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never accepted its involvement in the conflict from October 1947 to May 1948, and 
called the incursion by the irregulars it supported an indigenous movement. Very early in 
the game, the Pakistani government learned about convenience of deniability, something 
it has been using since its inception to support Pakistani policies in India, Afghanistan, 
the United States and the rest of the world. While this first experience in asymmetric 
warfare did not completely succeed, Pakistan did not forgo its objective nor abandon war 
by proxy. As it is evident, Pakistan relied increasingly on war by proxy, utilizing Islam as 
a rallying cry, eventually creating terrorist havens within its territory. 
After the first Indo-Pakistan war, Pakistan supported numerous covert cells within 
Indian-administered Kashmir. In 1965, internal discord in Kashmir led Pakistan to 
believe that Kashmir was ripe for fomenting indigenous insurgency. A covert plan, called 
Operation Gibraltar, was hatched to instigate insurgency in Kashmir as a prelude to 
Pakistani military intervention. Volunteers were trained to infiltrate Kashmir. Military 
and paramilitary personnel accompanied these irregulars to provide support and 
guidance. Pakistan dispatched approximately 30,000 infiltrators into Indian-administered 
Kashmir to set up bases, engage in sabotage, and foment a wider indigenous insurrection. 
The objective of instigating insurrection was to facilitate the induction of regular 
Pakistani troops into the conflict. Operation Gibraltar failed and the Kashmiri people did 
not rise up in a rebellion against India; however, it caused the second full scale Indo-
Pakistan war over Kashmir. This war too failed to wrest Indian-controlled Kashmir and 
ended up in a stalemate (Ali, 1983; Cohen, 2004; Fair, 2011; Ganguly, 2001; Swami, 
2007).  
India and Pakistan again went to war in 1971, this time due to the conflict 
between East and West Pakistan. This war resulted in a crushing defeat for Pakistan, with 
East Pakistan seceding from the West, creating Bangladesh. The war of 1971 made it 
clear to the Pakistani military that they could not win a conventional war against India. 
This could be termed as a turning point in Pakistan’s strategy to win Kashmir—the 




More importantly, the defeat of 1971 lead to a determined quest by Pakistan to seek 
nuclear weapons to neutralize India’s conventional military superiority (Haqqani 2005; 
Rashid, 2008; Riedel, 2011; Shah, 2010).  
While engaging in prolonged covert warfare in Kashmir, Pakistan also 
concomitantly had engaged in covert support of militant Pashtun groups in Afghanistan 
in 1970s and of Khalistani terrorists in Punjab in 1980s. To influence Afghanistan’s 
domestic affairs, Pakistan introduced Jamaat-e-Islami to Afghanistan in 1960s. Its 
support to Pashtun militants preceded the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, with an 
objective of retaliating against nonrecognition of Durand Line and to neutralize the 
Pashtunistan threat. When Afghan President Daud began his repression of Afghanistan’s 
Islamic fundamentalist groups, they fled across the border to Pakistan. Some of the 
prominent Afghan Islamists who fled to Pakistan included Gulbuddin Hekmatiyar, 
Burhanuddin Rabbani, and Ahmad Shah Masood, who later received fame as U.S. backed 
Mujahideen in the war against Soviet Union (Rashid, 2008).  
The Afghan Islamists had links to the Muslim Brotherhood and Pakistan’s 
Jamaat-i-Islami and received sanctuary in Pakistan from them. During Daud’s reign, 
Pakistan’s intelligence agencies trained Afghan Islamists and sent them back to 
Afghanistan to launch a guerilla movement. During the 1970s, Pakistan assisted religious 
leaders who had fled Afghanistan to escape President Daud’s repression. The policy of 
using Islamist Pashtun militias to achieve foreign policy objectives in Afghanistan goes 
back at least to 1973 (Fair, 2011; Haqqani, 2005; Rashid, 2011).  
Eight years after Pakistan’s defeat and secession of East Pakistan to form 
Bangladesh, Afghanistan was invaded by Soviet Union. The United States government 
used the assistance of Pakistan’s military dictator, General Mohammad Zia ul Haq, to 
fight a proxy war and drive the Soviets from Afghanistan. Due to Pakistan’s geographical 
location, the United States heavily relied on Pakistan to meet its strategic needs in 
Afghanistan against the Soviets. One of the most critical decisions made by the United 
States, through the CIA, was to use Pakistan’s ISI as the instrument of support for the 
Afghan rebels (Coll, 2005). The U.S. government allowed the ISI to control the logistics 
of the guerrilla war against the Soviet military, including training of the insurgents and 
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disbursement of weapons and funds. America’s complete reliance on ISI allowed 
Pakistani military to skim off money and weapons intended for Afghan rebels; 
additionally, the aid provided by the United States in return for Afghanistan jihad against 
Soviets assisted in strengthening of Pakistani military. As the conflict in Afghanistan 
continued, by the late 1980s, Pakistan was able to leverage the assistance of the United 
States to enhance its military capability and also build a pool of battle-trained 
mujahedeen, ready to be deployed in Kashmir (Coll, 2005; Howenstein, 2008; Kronstadt, 
2011; Shahzad, 2011).  
When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, Pakistan intensified its use of covert 
activities and exploited networks and infrastructure it had created to support insurgents in 
Kashmir and Punjab. However, now the Pakistan military received active financial and 
military hardware support from the United States and Saudi Arabia. The war against 
Soviet army was not only given a jihadi color, Pakistan actively employed religious 
institutions and parties to train and prepare Pakistan-based militant groups for operations 
in Afghanistan. Sunni Pashtuns were deliberately supported by Pakistan to run the proxy 
war against the Soviets. The developments in Afghanistan also lead to Pakistan’s 
increasing focus on using militant Arab and foreign Muslim volunteers from Libya, 
Egypt, Chechnya, and elsewhere, and uniting them under the umbrella of Islam to fight a 
“jihad” (Haqqani, 2005; Rashid, 2000; Rashid, 2008; Tajbakhsh, 2011). Later these 
Islamic jihadis would turn their attention towards United States, plot terrorist acts in the 
United States and Europe, and employ asymmetric warfare strategies against the U.S. 
military in Afghanistan.  
In 1989, the Soviet military withdrew from Afghanistan. This was construed as a 
great victory of asymmetric warfare by Pakistan; the lesson drawn was that a militarily 
unsubstantial group of fighters, using guerilla tactics, could defeat a superpower. The 
success of asymmetric warfare against the much larger and powerful Soviet Union was a 
defining point for Pakistan. The defeat of Soviets led Pakistan to believe that mujahedeen 
victory in Afghanistan could be replicated in Indian-administered Kashmir. A serious 
consequence of the Afghan jihad was manipulation of Islam as a political tool by 
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Pakistan, which eventually culminated in increasing radicalization of South Asia and 
turned Pakistan’s border areas into a terrorist haven (Fair, 2011). 
During the 1980s, when large parts of Punjab in India were affected by Khalistan 
terrorism, which took a great toll in terms of civilian and police casualties, Pakistan, 
under General Zia, exploited the situation by covertly aiding the insurgents, by providing 
training camps, refuge, and material support to Khalistani insurgents. The insurgency cost 
approximately 20,000 lives and the violence was so uncontrollable that Indian army had 
to be deployed in Punjab to restore order (Baggavali, 2010; Fair, 2005; Ganguly, 2001; 
Gill, 1997; Kumar 1997). 
As the Soviet military began its exit from Afghanistan, as if by design, domestic 
rebellion in Kashmir erupted against India in 1989. The rise in insurgency in Kashmir 
was attributed both to India’s domestic policies and Pakistan’s support for the militants, 
though the beginning of the rebellion was clearly tied to the grievances of Kashmiri 
people against the Indian government. The insurgency in Kashmir benefitted Pakistan’s 
goal of wresting Kashmir from India and indicated that the goal could be achieved 
through a low-intensity conflict, by employing native insurgents and causing a 
continuous and sustained drain of Indian resources, eroding India’s military advantage 
over Pakistan. Afghanistan conflict had provided Pakistan with a pool of battle-hardened 
Jihadis and the infrastructure to train and deploy them. After the withdrawal of the Soviet 
Union from Afghanistan, Pakistan redeployed many Mujahideen to the Kashmir front and 
established militant training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan (Baggavali, 2010; Evans, 
2000). 
The year 1989 could be described as a unique point in history when a 
convergence of events—defeat of Soviet military, Pakistan’s emergence as a key player 
in Afghanistan, domestic discord in Kashmir, and availability of thousands of 
mujahedeen who were elated over their victory but without a jihadi mission—would 
initiate a sequence of events that would eventually impact the U.S. homeland security and 
launch terrorist events across the globe. Two intertwined critical steps in the sequence 
were Pakistan’s decision to use asymmetric warfare to wrest Kashmir from India by 
moving jihadis from Afghanistan to the Kashmir Valley, and, Pakistan’s orchestration of 
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the rise of the Taliban to install a pro-Pakistani government in Afghanistan. Few people 
in 1989 could have predicted that the conflict between India and Pakistan, over a 
mountainous piece of real estate with little strategic or economic value, would result in a 
devastating global terrorist movement. 
While the desire of Pakistan to wrest Kashmir was a longstanding Pakistani aim 
related to its identity as a Muslim state, Pakistan’s calculus in employing the Taliban to 
install a friendly government in Kabul was more strategic: to secure its western flank and 
allow it to concentrate on its eastern flank in Kashmir. Pakistan’s domination of Afghan 
government was also considered essential to providing strategic depth in the case of an 
Indian offensive. To achieve its objective in Afghanistan, Pakistan aided the Taliban with 
weapons, logistics, finance, and political support in while helping insurgents cross the 
Kashmir border to launch attacks in Kashmir (Jafferlot, 2002; Rashid, 2008; Riedel, 
2011).  
The militants in Kashmir were provided with large scale support by Pakistani 
military, including weapons, training, and logistical support to cross the Line of Control 
into India (Evans, 2000; Ganguly, 2002; Indurthy, 2011; Swami, 2007). The low-
intensity conflict strategy proved to be highly effective. Between 1990 and 1994, over 
6,000 members of Indian security forces and other officers were killed in insurgent 
violence in Kashmir. In 1993, there were over 5,000 acts of violence by militants, 
including attacks, bombings, and arson. As the violence spiraled out of control, India was 
forced to deploy more than a quarter of a million soldiers and security personnel in 
Kashmir. The insurgency caused serious damage, killing large number of civilians and 
security personnel, creating a climate of fear, widespread destruction, a severe drain of 
Indian resources, and damaged India’s reputation. Pakistan’s support of a large number of 
insurgent groups in Kashmir and adoption of low intensity conflict assisted it to blunt the 
advantages of India had in terms of its size, power, and economy. Since 1989, the 
Pakistan-backed separatist-Islamist insurgency has killed over 50,000 people in Kashmir 
and embroiled approximately half a million Indian military and paramilitary personnel 
(Usher, 2009). Baggavalli equated Pakistan’s employment of low intensity conflict in  
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Kashmir as a means of warfare which can be waged over prolonged periods of time with 
little or no cost while imposing substantial costs on the opposing party (Baggavalli, 
2010).  
Similar to its strategy in Afghanistan, Pakistani military supported and trained 
only those Kashmiri groups that supported union with Pakistan. Initially, the Pakistani 
government supported the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), until it was 
clear that the JKLF’s goal was creation of an independent Kashmir. Pakistani military 
and ISI redirected their support to Islamist organizations, such as Hizb-ul-Mujahideen 
(HuM), the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) (Ganguly & Kapur, 
2010). Those seeking independence, rather than union with Pakistan, were systematically 
eliminated by Pakistan-backed militants. A focused and systemic elimination of 
indigenous Kashmiri groups advocating independence or autonomy soon put the 
insurgency in Kashmir under Pakistan-based militant groups’ control who were violently 
pursuing Islamabad’s agenda of wresting Kashmir from India (Evans, 2000; Howenstein, 
2008; Swami, 2007).  
In 1999, emboldened by its newfound status as an overt nuclear weapon state, 
Pakistan sent its Northern light infantry, disguised as mujahedin, in Indian Kashmir to 
occupy key terrain features, precipitating Kargil conflict, which threatened to escalate 
into a full scale war between the two nuclear weapon states. The Mujahideen story was 
used to obscure the fact that Pakistani regular and irregular military forces intruded well 
into Indian Territory. Scholars have argued that Pakistan use of asymmetric and proxy 
warfare in Kashmir intensified especially after 1998, suggesting that a nuclear Pakistan is 
emboldened and more reckless in its use of militancy. Scholars have suggested that 
nuclear weapons facilitated Pakistan’s adoption and escalation of low-intensity conflict 
strategy against India during the last two decades by preventing large-scale Indian 
conventional retaliation in response to Pakistan-backed terrorist attacks in Indian 
Kashmir and elsewhere. Thus, nuclear weapons limit India’s military options, as India 
cannot take punishing action to convince Pakistan to rethink its tolerance for anti-Indian 
terrorist groups (Kapur, 2007; Khan, 2005).!
!
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Pakistan’s asymmetric warfare to win Kashmir has expanded since the early 1990s, and 
the terror operations filtered out from Kashmir to the rest of India. Pakistan-backed 
militants have launched terror attacks across India that were increasingly brazen and 
increasingly provocative. On December 13, 2001, an unsuccessful attack was launched 
by the LeT and JeM at the Indian Parliament, while it was in session. Between 2005–
2008, a series of bombing attacks were launched at major Indian metropolitan areas, 
including the national capital New Delhi. India implicated the LeT to several of these 
attacks, which Pakistani authorities denied. A major terrorist assault was launched on 
Mumbai in November 2008. Despite overwhelming evidence that the terrorists were 
members of LeT and that their operation had been planned in, launched from, and 
directed in real time by operatives in Pakistan, Pakistan government denied any links 
between the Mumbai attackers and Pakistan. Due to increasing U.S. and world pressure, 
and unable to deny Pakistan’s Mumbai connection, Pakistan arrested Hafiz Mohammed 
Saeed, the head of the LeT’s charitable front organization, Jamaat-ud- Dawa. However, 
as world’s attention was diverted from the Mumbai incident, Saeed was freed by a 
Pakistani court in June 2009 (Fair, 2011; Jones, 2007; Jones, 2011; Ganguly & Kapur, 
2010; Howenstein, 2008). 
Pakistan’s asymmetric warfare strategy has historically been successful. Its 
support of Mujahideen forces in Afghanistan played a crucial role in the Soviets’ defeat. 
In Indian Kashmir, asymmetric warfare has inflicted serious economic, military, and 
diplomatic costs on India. Furthermore, in response to sustained terrorist attacks, Indian 
government adopted draconian antiterrorism policies, tarnishing its international image. 
These expedient results were obtained by Pakistan without engaging in direct combat 
against a stronger adversary. Instead, employment of Islamic zealots and nonstate actors 
enabled Pakistan to inflict significant losses to the Soviet Union and India, while 
avoiding direct conflict and risk of ruinous defeat. Pakistan’s strategy has indeed 




As it was established in previous passages, Pakistan’s history of irregulars in war 
against India and its utilization of asymmetric warfare can be traced back to its origin. 
However, less well known is the fact that Pakistan’s use of irregulars and Islamists 
insurgents against Afghanistan also predates the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. 
Voluminous literature exists elucidating Pakistan’s role in jihadi insurgency against the 
Soviet army in Afghanistan. Rashid (2008) provides a comprehensive analysis of that 
history. However, the Afghan-Pakistan conflict came in existence with the birth of 
Pakistan in 1947. Afghanistan was the only nation in the world opposing Pakistan’s entry 
into the United Nations in September 1947. The opposition was based upon Durand Line 
conflict. This opposition created a conflict for Pakistan on both its western (Afghan) and 
eastern (Indian) border and lead to a feeling of persecution complex for the newly born 
nation. Under Prime Minister (later President) Daud Khan, Afghanistan supported 
militias in the border region against Pakistan and also engaged in irredentist rhetoric of 
reunifying Pashtun areas that were in Pakistan (Siddiqi, 2009). It was under Prime 
Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s regime when Pakistan armed and supported Afghan 
Islamists, including Ahmad Shah Massoud, Burhanuddin Rabbani, and Gulbuddin 
Hekmatiyar, who had fled Daud, who was perceived as un-Islamic and influenced by 
communists. Pakistan supported the unsuccessful Islamist uprising in 1975 against the 
Daud government. Pakistan not only provided refuge and weapons, it likely provided 
special operations training to the wouldbe Islamist revolutionaries (Fair, 2011; 
Haqqani, 2005). Some of these Islamist rebels later became famous during the insurgency 
against Soviet army. 
D. PAKISTAN AND TERRORISM—A VERY INTIMATE NEXUS 
An article in the Christian Science Monitor reported that Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton, during her visit to Pakistan, stated in a press conference on October 21, 
2011, that the United States expected Pakistan to act against militant havens within its 
borders “over the next days and weeks.” The article portrayed Mrs. Clinton's comments 
as underscoring growing U.S. impatience with Pakistan’s reluctance to deal with the 
potent Haqqani network, which carries out cross-border raids from its territory into 
Afghanistan (Ahmad, 2011). The article mentioned that Obama administration had 
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intensified pressure on Pakistan to do more to crack down Islamist militants destabilizing 
Afghanistan, as Clinton delivered a tough public message that extremists have been able 
to operate in and from Pakistan for too long. However, in a rebuke to the U.S., the same 
article mentioned that earlier in the week, Pakistan Army chief General Ashfaq Kayani 
had told a parliamentary standing committee that he was not convinced fighting the 
Haqqani network would solve Pakistan’s problems. Numerous similar news items and 
scholarly works have been published in the last several years which detail Pakistan’s 
nexus with terrorist groups, and despite overwhelming evidence of such nexus, Pakistan’s 
blatant prevarications that it does not have any ties with insurgent groups that attack and 
kill U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan and plot terror attacks against the U.S. and the west from 
Pakistani territory (for an extensive analysis of Pakistan’s nexus with terrorist groups, see 
Bajoria, 2011; Cruickshank, 2010; Fair, 2011, Fair, 2009; Haqqani, 2004; Howenstein, 
2008; Hussain, 2007; Jones, 2007, Jones, 2011; Kfir, 2008; Rashid, 2008). 
The Christian Science Monitor’s article was emblematic of the divergent interests 
of the U.S. and Pakistan, and the duplicitous role of Pakistan in the war against terrorism. 
It is ironic that in the ten years of working with Pakistan as a “strategic partner” and an 
“ally” against terrorism, and giving more than $20 billion in aid to Pakistan, the U.S. still 
has to make entreaties to Pakistan to stop its support of terrorist networks that operate 
against U.S. interests, without being able to convince the perpetually aid seeking ally to 
give up. The U.S. administration has so far failed to understand that Pakistan will never 
stop its support of insurgent groups it has been nurturing to establish a compliant Afghan 
government and wrest Kashmir from India. No amount of entreaties, coaxing, bribes, or 
drone attacks in Pakistani territory would stop its support of such groups, which are 
counted as parts of Pakistan’s arsenal in its never-ending quest for Kashmir and force 
equalizer against a militarily stronger India. As Bennett Jones (2009) put it succinctly, the 
U.S. has been giving billions of dollars to a government that is actively helping jihadis to 
kill U.S. troops in Afghanistan. This chapter establishes the role of Pakistan in support of 
various militant groups that have engaged in terrorism. 
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As is widely reported, shortly after September 11, Pakistan’s General Pervez Musharraf, 
was presented with an ultimatum by the United States, and agreed to abandon his support 
for the Taliban (Hussain, 2007; Musharraf, 2006). Reportedly, Musharraf agreed to 
cooperate with the U.S.-led campaign against the Taliban and al Qaeda, and agreed to 
provide the U.S. military with access to Pakistani air and naval bases. The span of 
Pakistani cooperation also included joint operations with the C.I.A and establishment of a 
blocking force along the Pakistani-Afghan border to capture al Qaeda and Taliban 
members. Musharraf did not abandon the core policies that had guided Pakistan since its 
birth; he simply made some adjustments to gain U.S. trust and support. No provisions 
were made to address Pakistan’s support for jihadi groups operating in Kashmir and India 
(Coll, 2006; Tellis, 2008). Furthermore, the fact that Pakistan had created and nurtured 
Taliban specifically to plant a friendly regime in Afghanistan to prevent Indian influence 
on its western flank was either ignored or not understood (Haqqani, 2005; Rashid, 2008). 
Evidence indicates that the alliance with the United States to defeat the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan and to capture some al Qaeda members was a short-term tactical move and 
not a reversal of Pakistani army’s long-term support to jihadi militants. The Bush 
administration was pleased to work with Musharraf. as long as his military provided 
cooperation with U.S. goals of apprehending and eliminating al Qaeda leadership. 
Ironically, ignorance of South Asia’s conflict by the Washington decision makers 
guaranteed that the U.S. efforts to eliminate al Qaeda and insurgency in Afghanistan 
would not be successful.  
In promising to support U.S. objectives in Afghanistan, Pakistani military had 
calculated that the U.S. would shortly exit Afghanistan, after which Pakistan would be 
able to place a compliant regime in Kabul again (Rashid, 2008). In fact, even though 
Pakistan assented to supporting the U.S. efforts in Afghanistan in 2001, Pakistan had 
such strong ties with Taliban that throughout the initial phase of Operation Enduring 
Freedom, General Musharraf implored the United States to desist from destroying Mullah 




objective, Pakistani military covertly permitted and assisted thousands of defeated jihadi 
insurgents to cross over to safety across the frontier and into Pakistani territory (Rashid, 
2008; Tellis, 2008). 
Since the late 1950s, U.S. administrations have preferred, bolstered, and provided 
support to military regimes in Pakistan (Blom, 2011; Ganguly, 2002; Jalal, 1990; Kundi, 
2008). The democratization of Pakistan was seen as a threat to the military regime of 
General Zia ul Haq in 1980s and the U.S. administration did not apply pressure to 
civilianize his government. Similarly, U.S. administrations acquiesced with General 
Musharraf’s self-serving argument that democratization could bring incompetent 
politicians or Muslim radicals to power (Cohen, 2004). Post-September 11, 2001, the 
U.S. continued to bolster Pakistani military and dictator Musharraf at the expense of 
already weak civilian institutions (Ali, 2008; Hussain, 2007; Rashid, 2008). This further 
encouraged and allowed the Pakistani military to continue its historical strategy of 
employing jihadi elements for furtherance of its foreign policy objectives. In effect, the 
U.S. focus on elimination of al Qaeda, without accounting for the historical factors and 
forces that had allowed al Qaeda to find refuge in South Asia, ensured that the U.S. 
would be embroiled in a stalemate in Afghanistan. The support of military dictators to 
prevent Islamic radicals or corrupt politicians from coming to power only perpetuated 
military’s barely concealed agenda of preserving their radical proxies. 
It can be argued that by focusing on Pakistani military as an ally, the United 
States further strengthened the entrenched military’s control of Pakistani state, aiding and 
abetting the military in its continual efforts to undermine civilian institutions and political 
leadership. Even after the return of civilian rule in Pakistan in 2008, army exercises 
absolute control over the state and foreign policy decisions (Shah, 2010; Shahzad, 2011). 
Hoping that the military dictator Musharraf would be able to help achieve U.S. strategic 
goals was a wishful calculation on Washington’s part. In the past, other Pakistani 
dictators and Musharraf’s predecessors, including Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, and 
Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, had played similar games when they attempted to please in some 
areas whereas advancing Pakistani agendas that were contrary to U.S. interests (Haqqani, 
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2005). The same misdirected belief in current Pakistani generals, including Kayani, 
would not bring a different result and only perpetuate the conundrum in South Asia. 
Pakistan’s decision to support the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan and the “global 
war on terror” was not based on a shared belief or interest (Siddiqa, 2011; Haqqani, 2005, 
Rashid, 2008). Although Pakistan has been called a frontline state in the war on terror 
since September 11, 2001, the only reason General Musharraf agreed to join the United 
States was fear. Enmity with U.S. would have implied deeply negative impacts on 
Pakistan’s economy, its nuclear weapons program, its longstanding rivalry with India, 
and its irredentist goals in Kashmir (Rashid, 2008; Tellis, 2008). However, as this chapter 
would elucidate, Pakistan remained a duplicitous ally in the war on terror, and, despite 
professing support to the U.S., it remained committed to supporting and nurturing certain 
terrorist groups, even though these groups were the enemies of the U.S. and the ISAF in 
Afghanistan, while selectively cracking down on insurgent groups which were the 
enemies of the Pakistani state. This duplicity has resulted in extension of war in 
Afghanistan and concomitant drain of resources and lost lives, destabilization and a 
ceaseless streak of violence and terrorist attacks in South Asia, and a succession of plots 
against the U.S. and the West hatched within the territory of Pakistan. 
After the 9/11 attacks, Pakistan’s ally against terrorism, General Musharraf, said 
all the right things in response to U.S. pressure. He spoke out against extremism and 
terrorism to his countrymen. However, his decisions conflicted with the statements he 
made for U.S. consumptions. It has been an open secret that despite receiving financial 
aid and military reimbursements from the U.S., Pakistan has pursued its own agenda in 
Afghanistan by providing cross-border sanctuary for Taliban and Haqqani militants, 
which has caused serious U.S., ISAF, and Afghan casualties (Curtis & Phillips, 2007; 
Dutta, 2010; Kronstadt & Vaughn, 2004; Kronstadt, 2011; Rashid, 2008; Vira & 
Cordesman, 2011). Though Pakistan had employed asynchronous warfare as state policy 
since its inception, overt and significant growth of Pakistani jihadi groups was most 
notable in 1980 when thousands of volunteers came together to become anti-Soviet 
resistance in Afghanistan. Of the most well known of these jihadi groups, including LeT, 
JeM, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), and Harkat-al-Jihad-al-Islami, none of these 
  71
organizations was covert or acted in a clandestine manner. Their growth has been either 
sponsored by the Pakistani state or they have been looked upon favorably by the state; 
and their activities are certainly not conducted in secret (Ganguly & Kapur, 2010; ICG, 
2004; Hussain, 2007; Rashid, 2008; Riedel, 2011). Under the state patronage, these 
groups and their subsidiaries raise funds in public places, freely distribute literature, 
engage in open recruitment, and publicly celebrate terror attacks against the United 
States.  
Militant insurgent groups, including al-Qaeda, continue to operate and collaborate 
inside the tribal areas in the Federally Administered Tribal Agencies (FATA) and the 
neighboring Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), in support of the global as well as regional 
jihads in Afghanistan and Kashmir (ICG, 2006; Vira & Cordesman, 2011). Several high-
profile al Qaeda figures and other terrorists were apprehended while hiding in safe houses 
in Pakistan. For example, Abu Zubaydah was captured in a safe house belonging to LeT 
in Faisalabad. The “mastermind of the 9/11 attacks,” Khalid Shad Muhammad, was 
captured in Rawalpindi (which is home to Pakistani army’s high command) in a secure 
military housing estate (Rashid, 2008; Riedel, 2011). Khalid al-Attash, a Yemeni terrorist 
connected to bombing of USS Cole, and Ramzi bin al-Shibh, a leader of the Hamburg 
cell, were arrested in Karachi (Rashid, 2008). And, Osama bin Laden, the world’s most 
wanted terrorist mastermind, had found refuge for years in Abbotabad, a garrison town, 
most likely under protection provided by elements with Pakistani military (Dutta, 2011; 
Fisk, 2011). Several militants in Pakistan have been arrested from the houses of JI 
supporters. The functioning of al Qaeda after September 11, 2001, and the attacks it 
executed in Pakistan and abroad, would have been inconceivable without the support 
provided by Pakistani extremist groups and from Islamic parties such as Jamaat-e-Islami. 
Astonishingly, while Musharraf acknowledged in his memoir that to execute attacks, al 
Qaeda provided the money, weapons, and equipment and the local organizations 
provided the manpower and motivation (Musharraf, 2006), he made no efforts to control 
the Islamic parties or militant groups, except in the case of groups that attacked Pakistan. 
Groups were banned but allowed to function under new names. Furthermore, Pakistani 
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government turned a blind eye to inflammatory jihadi literature after the 9/11 attacks 
while allowing open recruiting and fund-raising by militant organizations.  
Jones noted that success for a U.S. mission in Afghanistan would depend on 
convincing the government of Pakistan to undermine the insurgent sanctuary on its soil 
(Jones, 2007). Jones suggested that the sanctuary provided by crossing into the Pakistan 
tribal areas and in Baluchistan contributed more to the survival of the insurgents than any 
other factor. The ISI is not a rogue organization and is a part of Pakistani military 
(Bennett-Jones, 2009; Shah, 2010). As such, the missions and goals of the ISI reflect the 
missions and goals of Pakistani state. The ISI has provided financial assistance, weapons 
and ammunition to the Taliban, and paid the medical bills of some wounded Taliban 
fighters, helped train Taliban and other insurgents destined for Afghanistan and Kashmir. 
Furthermore, ISI has also provided intelligence to Taliban insurgents at the tactical, 
operational and strategic levels, tipping off Taliban forces about the location and 
movement of Afghan and coalition forces, thereby undermining several anti-Taliban 
military operations (Jones, 2007).  
Recent work by Jones indicates that al-Qaeda has become embedded in multiple 
networks that operate on both sides of the Afghanistan–Pakistan border, with Pakistan as 
their sanctuary. With its leadership structure based primarily in Pakistan, al Qaeda has 
collaborated with Pakistani insurgent groups to attack the United States and NATO forces 
in Afghanistan (Jones, 2011). As stated by Jones: 
Key groups include Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, the Haqqani network and 
Lashkar-e Tayiba (LeT). In addition, al-Qaeda has cooperated with other 
groups, including Harkat-ul-Mujahedeen (HuM), inside Pakistan. Al-
Qaeda has effectively established a foothold with several tribes and sub-
tribes in the region, such as the Ahmadzai Wazirs, Mehsuds, Utmanzai 
Wazirs, Mohmands, Salarzais and Zadrans. The secret to al-Qaeda’s 
staying power, it turns out, has been its success in cultivating supportive 
networks in an area generally inhospitable to outsiders. 
The collaboration of these groups has resulted in serious attacks against the 
United States in Afghanistan. For example, the 2009 attack against the CIA base in Khost 
Province, Afghanistan, appeared to involve Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, the Haqqani 
network and al-Qaeda (Jones, 2011). Other Pakistani Sunni extremists groups, including 
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the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Sipah-e-Sahaba, and Jaish-e-Muhammad (JuM) operate 
autonomously and also as franchisees of al Qaeda. Furthermore, al Qaeda has also found 
support from elements in mainstream Pakistani Islamic parties, including the Jamaat-e-
Islami (Nawaz, 2011). 
Pakistan’s nexus with al Qaeda was known before the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 
Riedel (2011) asserts that he and others in the Clinton White House, in 1998, were aware 
of Pakistan’s close ties with terrorists. Commenting on the cruise missile strike at a 
terrorist training camp, intended for bin Laden, which instead killed a number of ISI 
officers along with several Kashmiri fighters they were training, Riedel and others had 
concluded “…the fact that bin Laden was visiting a camp with ISI officers present 
dramatically underlined the close ties between al Qaeda’s top leader and Pakistan’s army 
and intelligence service.” 
A Defense Intelligence Agency assessment summarized the incident as follows: 
“Consider the location of bin Laden’s camp targeted by U.S. cruise missiles. Positioned 
on the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, it was built by Pakistani contractors, 
and funded by the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence Directorate … the real hosts in the 
facility [were] the Pakistani ISI, [so] then serious questions are raised by the early 
relationship between bin Laden and ISI.” (as cited in Riedel, 2011). 
One of the more salient examples of the ISI-Taliban-al Qaeda connection is 
Muhammad Ilyas Kashmiri, a senior al Qaeda member and notorious terrorist, who was 
killed by a U.S. drone attack in 2011. Kashmiri was born in Kashmir, trained by the ISI 
in North Waziristan, and fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan. After the Soviet exit 
from Afghanistan, Kashmiri returned to Kashmir, formed 313 Brigade with ISI 
assistance, and engaged in several attacks against India, including kidnapping of western 
tourists. In 2000, when Kashmiri arrived at the ISI headquarters in Islamabad, he brought 
with the severed head of an Indian soldier (Riedel, 2011). General Musharraf and General 
Ahmad, then head of ISI, personally thanked Kashmiri for his accomplishments in the 
jihad (Jamal, 2010). Kashmiri broke up with the ISI in 2002 over Pakistan’s decision to 
help the United States.  
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Pakistan, besides Saudi Arabia and UAE, was amongst the only three nations in 
the world that had recognized the Taliban government in Afghanistan and provided it 
with critical oil supplies. Even when Pakistan was under the rule of its most liberal 
leaders, Benazir Bhutto, she championed the Taliban in the international arena by 
suggesting that the Taliban were the only hope for stability and ultimately peace in 
Afghanistan (Riedel, 2011). In his memoir after his release from the Guantanamo prison, 
Abdul Salam Zaeef, former Taliban ambassador to Pakistan, described ISI’s connection 
to the Taliban as that of a controlling patron-client relationship, with ISI, and disparaged 
the ISI as deceptive manipulators (Zaeef, 2010). 
A decade after the United States began operations in Afghanistan, finally some 
U.S. officials have started to note and declare the obvious. After a devastating attack 
against the United States Embassy in Kabul on September 13, 2011, Admiral Mike 
Mullens, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in his testimony to the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, stated: 
The Haqqani network ... acts as a veritable arm of Pakistan’s Inter-
Services Intelligence agency, ‘With ISI support, Haqqani operatives plan 
and conducted’ a truck bomb attack that wounded more than 70 U.S. and 
NATO troops on Sept. 11, ‘“as well as the assault on our embassy’ two 
days later. ‘In choosing to use violent extremism as an instrument of 
policy,’ Mullen said in a prepared opening statement, ‘the government of 
Pakistan, and most especially the Pakistani army and ISI, jeopardizes not 
only the prospect of our strategic partnership but Pakistan’s opportunity to 
be a respected nation with legitimate regional influence. 
Admiral Mullen's comments were the most direct and noteworthy accusations by a senior 
U.S. official, accusing Pakistan’s chief intelligence agency of complicity in attacks on 
American facilities and military personnel in Afghanistan (Deyoung, 2011; Cloud, 
Dilanian, Rodriguez, 2011). However, Mullen, perhaps, was feeling unconstrained in his 
remarks because he was just a week from retiring. As is always the case, even though 
evidence of Pakistan’s involvement in terrorist acts is provided, Pakistan's government 
angrily denied any involvement. Mullen’s accusations were reminiscent of the 2008 
terrorist attack in Mumbai, India, in which 10 LeT gunmen had killed 166 people, 
including six Americans. Evidence, including communications intercepts, had indicated 
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that the militants took orders from Pakistani authorities during the attack. For a period, 
Pakistan continued to deny having any connection with the Mumbai attacks. 
Pakistan is among the worlds leading recipients of U.S. aid. By the end of fiscal 
year 2010, Pakistan had obtained about $10.7 billion in overt assistance since 2001, 
including more than $6 billion in development and humanitarian aid. Additionally, 
Pakistan also had received more than $8 billion in military reimbursements for its support 
of and engagement in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts against Islamist 
militants (Kronstadt, 2011). Despite the large amount of military and financial assistance, 
the United States has failed to achieve its mission of convincing Pakistan to stop its 
covert and overt support of insurgent groups that find safe haven in Pakistan and launch 
attacks against the United States and NATO forces in Afghanistan and plot terrorist acts 
against the West (Ganguly, 2002; Jones, 2011). Instead, ever since the United States and 
Pakistan begin collaborating against the “global war on terror,” Pakistan is even more 
insecure, and the Pakistani public is increasingly more distrustful and resentful of the 
United States (Fair, 2009; Kronstadt, 2011).  
Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and swaths of the 
country’s northwest remain al-Qaeda and its allies remain safe haven. In the majority of 
the 21 'serious' terrorist plots against the west between 2004–2010, plotters either 
received direction from or trained with al-Qaeda or its allies in Pakistan, throwing into 
sharp relief the danger posed by terrorist safe havens in Pakistan. People from the West 
have travelled to the region for paramilitary training. In 2009, 100 to 150 were suspected 
of making the trip to Pakistan to receive terrorist training (Cruickshank, 2010). The 
violence engendered by militant groups supported by Pakistan is not limited to the United 
States alone. As cited by Bajoria, in fall 2006, a leaked report by a British Defense 
Ministry think tank charged, "Indirectly Pakistan (through the ISI) has been supporting 
terrorism and extremism--whether in London on 7/7 [the July 2005 attacks on London's 
transit system], or in Afghanistan, or Iraq (Bajoria, 2011). The insurgency in Afghanistan 
and attacks against U.S. interests in Afghanistan can be directly connected to Pakistan 
and its military. Matt Waldman maintains that there is extensive cooperation at both the 
operational and strategic level between the ISI and the Afghan Taliban. Based upon his 
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interviews with Taliban commanders, Waldman asserts that Pakistan’s security services 
and the insurgency in Afghanistan are not only interrelated, this relationship is far-
reaching and detrimental to U.S. interests in the region and to United States homeland 
security. Taliban commanders have stated that the ISI orchestrates, sustains and strongly 
influences their movement, giving sanctuary to both Taliban and Haqqani groups, and 
providing huge support in terms of training, funding, and supplies (Waldman, 2010). 
In June 2008, Afghan officials accused Pakistan of plotting a failed assassination 
attempt on President Hamid Karzai. Shortly thereafter, Indian officials blamed the ISI for 
the July 2008 attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul. Pakistani officials have denied such 
a connection. Numerous U.S. officials have also accused the ISI of supporting terrorist 
groups, even as the Pakistani government seeks increased aid from Washington with 
assurances of fighting militants. In a May 2009 interview with CBS' 60 Minutes, U.S. 
Defense Secretary Robert Gates said, "to a certain extent, they play both sides." Gates 
and others suggest the ISI maintains links with groups like the Afghan Taliban as a 
"strategic hedge" to help Islamabad gain influence in Kabul once U.S. troops exit the 
region. These allegations surfaced yet again in July 2010 when WikiLeaks.org made 
public a trove of U.S. intelligence records on the war in Afghanistan. The documents 
described ISI's links to militant groups fighting U.S. and international forces in 
Afghanistan (Bajoria, 2011).  
Despite all this evidence of Pakistan nurturing forces that attack U.S. soldiers, the 
U.S. policy makers continue to rely on same Pakistani military that simultaneously plays 
an allied and adversarial duplicitous role. Unfortunately, the adversarial role is so 
dangerous that it has not only harmed U.S. interests, it has lead to killing of U.S. troops 
and terrorist attacks on the United States and allied forces. 
Since the late nineteen-eighties, the ISI has covertly funded and armed violent 
Islamic groups in the Indian-occupied areas of Kashmir (Haqqani, 2005; Ganguly, 2002). 
By 2001, two of the larger jihadi groups, LeT, and JuM, had also developed ties to the 
Taliban and Al Qaeda, mainly through shared training camps and safe houses. Pakistan 
has backed jihadi groups that carry out provocative terrorist attacks on other states as a 
state policy (Coll, 2006; Howenstein, 2009). Except for Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) 
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and other militant groups that engage in attacking targets in the Pakistani government, 
Pakistani military does not consider the original Afghan Taliban, LeT, the Haqqani 
network, and other specific proxy groups as their enemies. These groups are overtly used 
as a means of extending Pakistan’s reach into Afghanistan, India, and throughout the 
region. Consequently, due to the conflicting interests of Pakistan’s decision makers, the 
strategic priorities of the U.S. and Pakistan conflict and the attempts to stabilize 
Afghanistan have so far not succeeded (Malou, 2009). Consequently, Pakistan has 
become a major international problem as the epicenter from where terrorist planning, 
plotting, training, and export of terrorism radiate. The lack of control or will over the 
tribal belt and the ability of jihadist terrorists to operate along the Afghani-Pakistani 
border guarantees the survival of the global jihad movement and assist those Islamists 
that want to turn Pakistan and Afghanistan into "true" Islamic states (Kfir, 2009).  
Pakistan has been accused of sponsoring terrorism against India. It is believed to 
have engaged several groups to conduct these efforts, but by far the most prolific and 
sophisticated has been the LeT (Tellis, 2008; Howenstein, 2009; Vira & Cordesman, 
2011). An India-centric organization, its primary objective continues to be the liberation 
of Kashmir and the destruction of India, and it devotes much of its resources and 
manpower this goal, inside India and abroad. Amongst the high-profile terrorist attacks 
launched by LeT were the attacks on 2001 attack on Indian Kashmir’s provincial 
parliament, December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi, which lead to 
full-scale mobilization of Indian and Pakistani armed forces, and Mumbai attacks of 
2008. However, LeT has been actively and directly involved in attacking U.S. global 
interests through its activities ranging from Afghanistan to Western Europe. And in many 
of these theaters, LeT has explicitly cooperated with al-Qaeda, and both the Afghan and 
Pakistani Taliban. While LeT’s threats to U.S. citizens have mostly been indirect so far, it 
has a long history of cooperating with other terrorist groups who attack American citizens 
and American interests. Direct threats to U.S. homeland by LeT, so far, have only been 
latent. LeT cells within the United States have focused on fundraising, recruitment, 
liaison, and the facilitation of terrorist training, primarily assisting recruits in the United 
States to go to Pakistan for terrorist training, but they have not engaged in lethal 
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operations in the United States as yet (Tellis, 2008). Since 2006, LeT has been implicated 
in several complex high-profile attacks in Afghanistan, including dual attacks on the 
Indian embassy in Kabul. Although it remains primarily committed to destroying India, 
LeT has begun to act more overtly against Western interests during the past several years. 
This includes deploying cadres to fight against coalition forces in Afghanistan and mainly 
in the form of training and logistical support to al-Qaeda and others waging a global jihad 
(Fair, 2011; Tankel, 2011; Vira & Cordesman, 2011).  
The LeT was officially banned in 2002 by the Pakistani government, in response 
to which the LeT spun off its political wing, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD). The JuD openly 
operates in many cities across Pakistan. Similarly in response to international pressure 
LeT leader Hafeez Saeed has occasionally been arrested and detained in largely sham 
operations (Fisk, 2010). In 2010, he has openly appeared at various rallies across 
Pakistan. According to Fair, Pakistan’s intelligence agencies and army tend to segment 
the country’s militants into a range of groups over which the state exercises varying 
degrees of control. Pakistan is widely assumed to wield significant influence over the 
Afghan Taliban, including the network of Jalaludin Haqqani based in North Waziristan, 
by holding Taliban families hostage in Pakistan to ensure compliance (Fair, 2011). Tellis 
describes LeT as a threat to regional and global security second only to al-Qaeda, which 
he explains is due to its ideology is shaped by the Ahl al- Hadith school of Saudi 
Wahhabism. Amongst one of LeT’s objectives is the recovery of lost Muslim lands, 
governed by Muslim rulers of the past which makes LeT a natural ally and a close 
collaborator of al-Qaeda. Tellis argues that LeT has collaborated with al-Qaeda in 
Afghanistan since at least 1987. One of the main reasons for LeT’s success and resilience 
is its patronization by the ISI for use in Pakistan’s ongoing conflict with India. However, 
LeT’s objectives, as evidenced by statements of its leader Hafiz Saeed, transcend and 
reach beyond South Asia. Israel and the United States also figure as targets of LeT 
objectives in addition to India (Tellis, 2008). 
The extent of the cooperation between al-Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban was 
evident in the Khost suicide bombing that killed seven CIA officers and contractors in the 
American base in eastern Afghanistan on December 30, 2009. The bombing was carried 
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on by Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi. Two months after the suicide attack, al 
Qaeda’s video production unit released a prerecorded interview with Balawi. The chief of 
the Pakistani Taliban, Hakimullah Mehsud, appeared in the video with Balawi and stated 
that the attack was revenge for the drone strike that had killed his predecessor, Baitullah 
Mehsud (Bergen & Hoffman, 2010). The 2005 London bombing perpetrators had al 
Qaeda connections and had received training in FATA and NWFP. Another example of a 
key terrorist player who operated out of Pakistan is Rashid Rauf. Rauf had long been 
involved with al-Qaeda plots in Pakistan and abroad, including the 2006 plot to blow up 
seven U.S. and Canadian passenger airliners en route from London to North America 
(Cruickshank, 2010). Eleven individuals, convicted for plotting terrorist bombings of 
Barcelona metro train system in 2009, had links with Pakistani Taliban and al Qaeda. The 
ringleader of the group had received training in the Waziristan region of Pakistan the now 
deceased Pakistani Taliban commander, Baitullah Mehsud (Reinares, 2010).  
Pakistan’s nexus to terrorist attacks against the United States is not limited to 
violence against the United States and ISAF soldiers in Afghanistan, the connection runs 
all the way to acts of terrorism planned to be executed on American soil. Three al-Qaeda 
planners were responsible for recruiting Najibullah Zazi to perpetrate acts of terrorism in 
the United States. Zazi and two of his former classmates from Flushing High School in 
New York, Zarein Ahmedzay and Adis Medunjanin received instruction in Pakistan from 
in the fabrication of improvised explosive devices to carry out suicide bomb attacks in the 
New York City subway in September 2009. Faisal Shahzad, the failed Times Square 
bomber, received bomb-making training from the Pakistani Taliban in the tribal region of 
Waziristan (Cruickshank, 2010; Jones, 2011; McNeill, Carafano, Zuckerman, 2011).  
Samina Ahmad has contended that by cultivating ties with jihadi elements as 
proxies to weaken India and to dominate Afghanistan, Pakistan’s military was 
responsible for a forging of links between military-backed homegrown extremists and 





including al Qaeda. The nexus of these jihadi groups is linked to terror plots aimed at the 
United States and bears direct responsibility for the deaths of U.S. soldiers and American 
allies in Afghanistan (Ahmad, 2011).  
1. Pakistan’s Selective War Against Terrorists 
Pakistan has shown no hesitation and has used brute force against foreign 
elements operating in its territory, if those groups target the Pakistani state. However, so 
far Pakistan has not launched any major offensives against the Afghan Taliban in 
Pakistan. The Taliban Council, Quetta Shura, is allowed to exist and act freely in the 
Pakistani city of Quetta (Fair, 2009).  
Pakistan’s counterterrorism strategy in Afghanistan, imposed by U.S. demands 
after September 2001, is rife with inherent contradictions. The biggest contradiction is 
that Pakistan has to fight some militant jihadist groups that attack U.S. and NATO forces 
while protecting and supporting other militant jihadist groups that Pakistan created and 
partnered with to achieve its core strategic state goals. In her analysis, Siddiqa notes that 
“the policy flows out of Pakistan’s multiple strategic requirements: its need to remain 
engaged with the United States, to save itself from the Taliban attacking the Pakistani 
state, and to fight India’s growing presence in Afghanistan” (Siddiqa, 2011). These 
multiple requirements cause tremendous pressures and contradictions since Pakistan must 
protect self against the terrorist groups that operate on its soil but have recently turned 
against it, balance perceived external threat against India that requires it to use 
asymmetric warfare utilizing jihadists, while some of the previously sponsored jihadists 
are turning against Pakistani interests; and balance Washington’s counterterrorism needs 
that directly contradict Pakistan’s perceived security needs. Unfortunately, the Pakistani 
military has yet to understand that non-militaristic means to resolve its conflict with India 
exist. As Siddiqa concludes, the primary flaw of Pakistan’s counterterrorism policy is that 
it is defined and driven by the military and military’s strategic objectives and self-interest 
(Siddiqa, 2011).  
I will return to this point in a later chapter that since its inception, Pakistan has 
deliberately allied itself with the United States—not because its elite believes in the U.S. 
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ideology—because it seeks rent for supporting the United States’ ideological 
requirements for self-serving reasons. The primary self-serving reason has been, since 
1947, to defray the costs of enormous military expenditures against the perceived and 
manufactured threat against India (Haqqani, 2005). The rivalry with India has been 
Pakistan’s primary foreign policy objective since inception. As a result, the weak state 
with poor infrastructure and economy has never adequately invested in economic or 
educational development, resulting in a persistent need for external economic and 
military aid. The United States has filled that need as a patron since mid 1950. As a result 
of U.S. support, although Pakistani administrations have kept the relationship of 
convenience going with the United States, they have resented their dependence on the 
United States. Additionally, the perceived identity-generated existential goals of Pakistan 
are held non-negotiable by the military as military controls Pakistan’s foreign policy and 
its zero sum philosophy has never allowed political flexibility or art of diplomacy to 
achieve state goals. Thus, even though Pakistan must rely on the United States to 
maintain its rentier economy, its existential rivalry with India takes precedence. This 
existential rivalry has been in a virtual stalemate even after Pakistan became a nuclear 
weapon state. Thus the reliance on asymmetric warfare is the only means by which 
Pakistan can keep pressurizing India for its irredentist goals on Kashmir. This reliance 
historically has been accomplished via irregulars and jihadi insurgents and explains why 
Pakistan fights against only those jihadi insurgents that have turned against the state of 
Pakistan and state’s goal of attacking India and allows those jihadi groups to exist that 
follow Pakistan’s state policy. 
2. Pakistan’s Support for Terrorism Due to Its Focus on India as an 
Adversary 
There has to be a compelling reason why a nation state, which accepts financial 
and military aid from the West, engages in self-destructive and duplicitous behavior. The 
reason is Pakistan state’s entrenched obsession with its Muslim identity against its eastern 
neighbor. If the preposterous hypothesis of Hindus and Muslims being two separate 
nations, which time and again was disproven by forces of history in South Asia, is 
discarded (for example, secession of Bengali Muslims from Pakistan to create 
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Bangladesh in 1971), the reason for creation of Pakistan as a nation state becomes 
dubious. The sole reason for creation of Pakistan was to be a haven for South Asia’s 
Muslims. That national identity had to be forged by manufacture of an adversarial 
identity against the majority Hindu population of colonial India.  
Before and after the partition of the subcontinent, India and Pakistan created 
sharply contrasting self-images. Pakistan saw itself as the homeland for all Muslims in 
South Asia, whereas India flaunted its secular polity (Tan & Kudaisya, 2000). However, I 
believe several layers of adversarial identities were created and shaped before and after 
decolonization of the subcontinent. Hindu and Muslim identities were not essentially 
adversarial as these communities had existed prior to the British arrival in the 
subcontinent. It was the jockeying for political power between the Muslim League and 
the Congress, adroitly exploited by the British whose aim was not to ever depart from 
India, which created adversarial relations between the Muslim and Hindu elite. The great 
conflict between the goals of the two organizations, with Muslim League demanding 
secession for India’s Muslims, and the Congress demanding independence from Britain 
while keeping the subcontinent unified, created sharply adversarial identities. Since the 
Congress had been agitating against the British rule since the early twentieth century, and 
the Muslim League had come into being as a loyalist organization, the identity contrast 
between the two organizations imposed another layer of adversity, especially as the pre-
partition politics was extremely acrimonious between 1945–1947. The partition, with 
controversial division of territories, forced population transfer in millions, and its 
accompanying horrendous violence, created another layer of adversarial identity as 
victims and victimizers (although the true victimizer, the British Empire, responsible for 
shaping events that culminated in partition, was never identified as such). For the state 
created as the home for South Asia’s Muslims, it was a matter of great shame for the elite 
not having received Kashmir as part of their territory. Besides the conflict over Kashmir, 
conflict over resources, including sharing of funds and river waters, created a serious 
security threat perception in Pakistan after the partition (Tan & Kudaisya, 2000).  
The state of Pakistan had little else in terms of national identity except Islam, 
especially Islam with an adversarial relationship with Hindu India, which, according to 
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Pakistan, had usurped Muslim Kashmir. For Pakistan to back down from its irredentist 
claim over Kashmir is to deny its foundational identity and to deny its reason for 
existence. Conversely, the secular identity created by the Indian republic after the 
partition makes it similarly difficult for India to cede Kashmir or make even the slightest 
accommodation over Kashmir. Indian elite believes that for India to give up claim over 
Kashmir would imply acceptance of the two-nation hypothesis and open up the Pandora’s 
box as the political conflicts between India’s numerous minorities could take secessionist 
turns. The United States, therefore, is caught in the middle of two intractable identity 
conflicts in South Asia but has taken no significant policy steps to extricate itself by 
keeping the focus solely on terrorism—which is a symptom and not the root of South 
Asia problem. 
The reliance on Islam as the sole basis of nation building project or state 
formation has also lead to Pakistan into becoming an insecure and autocratic state by 
riding roughshod over its provinces and rejecting regional history, cultures and provincial 
autonomy (Bennett Jones, 2009).  
As Tajbakhsh states, the durability of India–Pakistan conflict is a legacy of the 
painful 1947 partition, which resulted in irreconcilable positions on national identity 
(Tajbakhsh, 2011). Since Pakistan separated itself from the secular, multicultural, and 
multi-religious India as the home of the Muslims in the continent, not having Muslim 
Kashmir as a part of Pakistan became the overarching honor-shame theme in Pakistan’s 
ruling elite. Furthermore, as the second largest Muslim nation in the world, Pakistan’s 
elite wished to claim leadership of the Umma, the global Muslim community; however, 
due to the symbolic defeat in the early first war for Kashmir, Pakistan was unable to 
claim such leadership position of the Umma. Thus, the military conflict and the 
irredentist goal towards Kashmir is a continuation of identity-based conflicts—a conflict 
in which denial of an identity almost becomes denial of existence for a state. This 
quandary lies beneath the conflict between India and Pakistan. 
The jihadist component of the Kashmiri struggle was seeded and controlled by 
Pakistan government, with ISI taking the lead in training the militants and smuggling 
them across the border into Indian Kashmir. Pro-Pakistani groups including the LET, 
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JEM, Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), and Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-
Islami (HUJI) have had a near monopoly on organized militant violence in Kashmir. 
There is substantial evidence that Pakistan has provided extensive training, weapons, 
funding and sanctuary to violent jihadists who operated in Kashmir (Blom, 2011; 
Ganguly & Kapur, 2010; Riedel, 2011; Vira & Cordesman, 2011).  
That Pakistan has used jihadists, including al Qaeda, for its irredentist goals 
towards Kashmir was noted by The 9/11 Commission Report (2004). The Commission 
Report noted that ISI set up the first meeting between the Taliban and Osama bin Laden 
in the hope that they would work together, especially to train Kashmiri jihadists.  
In his September 19, 2001, address to Pakistan, Musharraf did not condemn the 
Taliban or al Qaida, or blame them for 9/11 attacks. He stated that the decision to support 
the United States was made in Pakistan’s national interests and not supporting the United 
States would have jeopardized the Kashmir cause and endangered Pakistan’s nuclear 
installations. Musharraf’s claim elucidates Pakistan’s consideration of the Kashmir issue 
as the Pakistani foreign policy’s raison d’etre. Also, by asserting that his support for the 
United States was to protect Pakistan’s Kashmir’s policy, he sent a signal to jihadi 
insurgents that militancy in Kashmir would continue (Rashid, 2008). Pakistan assumed 
that by helping the United States against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan would allow 
it to let Kashmiri jihadi insurgents operate without hindrance. Additionally, Pakistani 
military calculated that its new re-founded alliance with the United States, where the 
United States was dependent on Pakistan for conducting war in Afghanistan, placed 
Pakistan in a position of strength against India.  
Jihadi violence in Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Pakistan’s Tribal Areas is separated 
by geography and has some distinct local characteristics. However, there is a close 
relationship between militancy in the three regions. The first generation of the Kashmir-
oriented Jihadist organizations received their training in the Afghan jihad in the 1980’s. 
Consequently, there is a close link between these organizations with the ISI and many 
Taliban commanders. Furthermore, the introduction of suicide bombing operations in 
Kashmir jihad is co-related to Taliban insurgency, originating from the strategy of self- 
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sacrificial violence promoted by the Pakistan army and the Jihadist groups on the Eastern 
front (Blom, 2011). In fact, popular Pakistani movies from 1990s glorify such acts of 
“martyrdom” by suicide bombers.  
In brief, Pakistan has evolved into a praetorian and insecure state due to its 
obsession with rivalry over Kashmir and become the center of radical Islamist groups 
(who were and are patronized by the state). The historical and current support of these 
jihadi groups, fighting the Indian rule in Kashmir, drives the secondary desire of Pakistan 
to seek strategic depth in Afghanistan, hence its protection of Afghanistan Taliban while 
accepting military and economic aid from its benefactor, the United States. 
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V. PAKISTAN AND UNITED STATES–A RELATIONSHIP OF 
CONVENIENCE  
A. STRATEGIC SELECTIVE SELLING OF ALLIANCE: PAKISTAN’S 
ADROIT MANIPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES 
For the last ten years, homeland security efforts of the United States have been 
stymied in an interrelated web of dependencies, involving Afghanistan, Pakistan, and 
India. The United States has had to rely on an unreliable Pakistani army and its 
duplicitous intelligence agency for logistics and intelligence, deal with an unstable and 
corrupt Kabul government, and face conflicting pressures by India—while receiving 
minimal returns for its investment related to counterinsurgency and war efforts. The U.S. 
policy in South Asia faces intricate challenges since it is concomitantly dependent on 
U.S. commitments to Afghanistan, on relations between India and Pakistan, and domestic 
Pakistani politics (Staniland, 2011). A lack of understanding and deliberate ignorance of 
historical relations between South Asian states further exacerbates complexities and 
impedes U.S. missions in South Asia. 
The current state of counterterrorism collaboration and relations between Pakistan 
and the United States can be best understood by drawing parallels to the historical 
relationship between Pakistan and the United States. There has been a remarkable 
consistency and similarity between the strained and conflicted U.S.–Pakistan relations in 
post-9/11 period and the relationship between the two states that evolved after Pakistan’s 
independence. The relations, from the beginning, were short-term, episodic, and 
expedient—with the United States seeking to use Pakistan as its proxy against American 
adversaries, and Pakistan selling its services as a U.S. ally in return for economic and 
military patronage (Haqqani, 2005; Jalal, 1990; McMahon, 1988; Schaffer & Schaffer, 
2011). These factors have not changed in the past six decades. The post-9/11 duplicitous 
role played by Pakistan as a U.S. ally while also acting as a sponsor of terrorism, can be 
understood by considering Pakistan’s real and imagined security needs and the nature of 
dependence between the United States and Pakistan.  
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As Cohen mentioned, until the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the U.S. South Asia 
policy was based on anti-Soviet policy and didn’t pay attention to South Asia unless there 
was a crisis or specific U.S interests were at stake (Cohen, 2004). Historically, as a 
superpower and as the dominant partner in the relationship, the United States utilized 
Pakistan as a proxy whereas Pakistan, as the lesser of the two partners, used its alliance 
with the United States to seek diplomatic, economic, and military support. During the 
Cold War, Pakistan was part of the United States strategy for containment of Soviet 
Union; however, there is no evidence that Washington devised any coherent long-term 
Pakistan policy now or in the post-Cold War period. As early as 1949, the United States 
was exploring strategic value of Pakistan as the base for air operations against Soviet 
Union and also as the staging area for forces engaged in the defense of the Middle East 
oil areas. Arguments in support of close relations with Pakistan in 1949 were solely based 
upon strategic considerations, specifically due to Pakistan’s proximity to the USSR and 
the Middle East (McMahon, 1998).  
A critical fact, required to understand Pakistan’s manipulative behavior, has not 
received prominent attention: as a rentier state, Pakistan has consistently and cleverly 
exploited its relationship with the United States since attaining independence. Pakistan 
used its perceived strategic importance as a bargaining chip in its solicitation of aid from 
the United States. Pakistan coveted aid and assistance from the United States and was a 
willing partner of the United States during the Cold War. Its leaders skillfully took 
advantage of and manipulated the Soviet-U.S. conflict to further Pakistan’s interests 
(Bourke-White, 1949; McMahon, 1998).  
Bourke-White (1949) was prescient in her observations of Pakistan’s 
manipulative machinations to get aid from the United States. She described Jinnah’s 
belief that Pakistan could extract rent from the United States for an anti-communist 
alliance because of Pakistan’s strategic location near Russia. In his interviews with 
Bourke-White, Jinnah asserted that if Russia walked into Pakistan, the whole world 
would be menaced and therefore America should invest in Pakistan to prevent Russia 
from walking in. Bourke-White penetratingly noted:  
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This hope of tapping the U.S. Treasury was voiced so persistently that one 
wondered whether the purpose was to bolster the world against 
Bolshevism or to bolster Pakistan’s uncertain position as a new political 
entity. 
Bourke-White also noted that Pakistan had a policy of profiting from the disputes 
of others. This propensity of Pakistan has barely changed since 1947, as its regimes 
consistently profited from disputes between the superpowers, and, when the Cold War 
was over, they profited from U.S. efforts to curb Islamic militancy in Afghanistan—
something that Pakistan itself had created, albeit with complicity and acquiescence of 
CIA during the war against Soviets. 
After its independence, the United States was the first country Pakistan asked for 
financial aid. Between 1947 and 1954, its leaders repeatedly called attention to Pakistan's 
geopolitical significance in their efforts to coax large-scale financial and military support 
from Washington. It was just two months after independence when Pakistan’s Governor 
General Mohammad Ali Jinnah requested a loan of almost $2 billion for Pakistan’s 
military and for agriculture and industrial development projects. Jinnah’s request was a 
quid pro quo, selling Pakistan’s alignment with the United States in return for a 
commitment of developmental aid and military security. It was transparent that India was 
the sole security concern for Pakistan. However, Pakistani appeals were always couched 
in a virulently anti-Soviet rhetoric, with the goal of striking a responsive chord with the 
Truman administration's Cold War planners. For example, one of the documents seeking 
American aid lists Pakistan's proximity and vulnerability to Russia as its most vexing 
external problem (Jalal, 1987; McMahon, 1988).  
Since India chose to keep nonalignment as the focus of its foreign policy and 
refused to align with United States, Pakistan’s assiduous and opportunistic diplomacy 
fructified in U.S.–Pakistan alignment in 1950s (Ganguly, 2002). Using Islamic identity as 
an opposing ideology to communism, Pakistan, from the beginning, focused on the 
United States as its patron of choice, specifically as a source of weapons and economic 
aid. Fabricated evidence of communist threats against Pakistan was used to get the 
attention and favors of the United States, asking for help from American intelligence to 
build an “Islamic barrier against the Soviets.” (Haqqani, 2005; Jalal, 1990) 
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Pakistan faced multiple insecurities at its birth. It was flanked on the eastern 
border by India, which was significantly larger in territory and possessed stronger 
military. Horrific violence accompanying subcontinent’s partition, controversial division 
of territories, and forced uprooting of tens of millions of people forged deep suspicion 
and distrust between India and Pakistan—more so in Pakistan as Pakistan considered self 
as the victim. The state of Pakistan evolved with significant deficiencies, including a lack 
of legitimacy, since after the partition of the subcontinent; India was construed as the true 
inheritor of the British Raj whereas Pakistan was a state that was carved out of British 
India. Pakistan also lacked an adequate industrial base as most of the industrial regions 
happened to fall under Indian territory, leaving Pakistan with just 10 percent of the 
industrial base. The immediate war and stalemate in Kashmir also hardened the feeling of 
being surrounded by enemies in Pakistan. Besides the territorial dispute, dispute over 
sharing of resources, including river water sharing, also poisoned the atmosphere. 
Pakistani leaders also believed that India’s aim was to undo partition and reabsorb 
Pakistan into India. Additionally, on its western flank, Afghanistan had opposed 
Pakistan’s entry into the United Nation and had expressed irredentist aims over 
Pakistan’s Pashtun areas, which it claimed had been artificially divided by the Durand 
Line (Cohen, 2004; Shah, 2010; Tan & Kudaisya, 2000).  
As the two states came into being, compared to Pakistan, India was 
overwhelmingly larger territorially, economically, and in conventional military power. 
Due to the exceedingly belligerent circumstances in which the countries were created, 
and the continuation of belligerent territorial and identity disputes, Pakistan perceived 
India as its enemy and security against India was institutionalized as a state priority. The 
fear of India also resulted in Pakistan committing disproportionate resources to the 
military. Thus, from day one, because of its military and economic weakness, Pakistan 
searched for patrons to finance its military expansion and modernization at the expense of 
state development. Due to the created and perceived fear that India represented an 
existential threat to Pakistan allowed the military to control the Pakistan government. 
Insecurity, feeling of betrayal, hostility towards India, weak institutions due to Partition, 
and an obsession over building military not only shaped Pakistan’s birth, they also led to 
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the enduring rivalry between India and Pakistan. All these factors were synthesized and 
expressed through the conflict over Kashmir (Bose, 2003; Ganguly, 2001; Hasan, 2005; 
Haqqani, 2005).  
The incipient insecure Pakistani state, due to its relative military and 
infrastructural weakness, almost immediately began to seek to equalize and neutralize 
India’s military strength by seeking benefactors for military and economic aid. For that 
end, Pakistani bureaucrats and generals immediately began to deceptively sell their anti-
communist credentials to the United States, even though the funds and military hardware 
sought were never intended for Soviet Union, they were solely intended for the 
congenital enemy India.  
When India and Pakistan came into being, due to U.S. concern over immediate 
issues in Europe and elsewhere, senior American officials devoted little in-depth attention 
to the problems of India and Pakistan. However, due to Pakistan's near-contiguous border 
with the Soviet Union and its proximity to the Persian Gulf, in 1949, the United States 
was already looking at Pakistan as a base for air operations against the USSR and as a 
staging area for forces engaged in the defense or recapture of Middle East oil areas (for a 
thorough review of earlier CIA Reports, Harry S. Truman Papers, U.S. Department of 
Defense documents, and other relevant U.S. strategic assessments regarding India and 
Pakistan, see McMahon, 1988). McMahon argues that Pakistan exerted substantial 
influence on the United States, constantly urging and exhorting the United States for 
military aid for its own purposes and virtually forcing an American response. Pakistan 
took advantage of its geographical location and ideology-for-sale to seek rent from the 
United States and other states, including Saudi Arabia and turned into a praetorian state 
(Blom, 2011; Fair, 2011; Haqqani, 2005). Rashid states that every Pakistani government 
since 1970’s has raised the threat of rising Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan as a way 
of securing aid from the United States, while at the same time nurturing Islamic 
fundamentalists (Rashid, 2008). Coll concludes that the Pakistani Army has learned to 
extract from the United States the financial and military support that it believes it requires 
against India (Coll, 2010). However, at the same time, Pakistan’s generals resent their 
dependency on America, as their core interests do not coincide with American interests.  
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But, over the years, they have mastered the art of dealing and winning in their 
interactions with U.S. policy makers (Schaeffer & Schaeffer, 2011).  
It is evident that ever since its inception, Pakistan has exploited its geopolitical 
location and volatility as a tool of seeking military and economic aid from friendly 
nations. It can be argued that Pakistan created an insecure identity vis-à-vis its adversarial 
relationship with India, and it has been cashing in on its insecurity and the concomitant 
violence Pakistan itself generated as a result of the insecure identity, by seeking rent from 
the United States, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere (Blom, 2011). Since Pakistan perceives 
itself as an insecure state, its military has directly and indirectly maintained an iron grip 
on the foreign policy of the nation since its inception and receives a major portion of the 
nation’s budget. Despite being engage in the “war against terrorism” and struggling 
against jihadi militants on its own territory, Pakistani generals claim that the funding is 
needed, not to fight extremism—but to fight India (Weiss, 2011).  
1. The United States as an Unreliable Partner 
The U.S.–Pakistan relationship has been marked with three distinct periods of 
engagements, with the first period starting in 1954 at the height of the Cold War. In 1949, 
when India’s leader Nehru visited Washington, Indian position of nonalignment was 
proposed to Washington. This was a disappointment as the American goals of creating an 
anti-Soviet block in South Asia. This created possibilities for Pakistan to play up 
differences between India and Pakistan and a mutual support and defense agreement 
between Pakistan and the United States in 1954, marking the beginning of the first 
engagement (Racine, 2002). In the mid-1950s, the United States and Pakistani interests 
had also converged as Pakistan was seeking out economic and military aid and the United 
States was trying to promote an alliance of Asian states to prevent expansion of Soviet 
influence (Smith, 2007). 
In 1962, despite Pakistan’s opposition, due to geostrategic imperatives of the 
United States, India received American military aid after India’s defeat in its war against 
China in October 1962. Pakistan viewed this as strengthening of its most hated enemy by 
its closest ally. Due to the entrenched zero-sum ideology pervasive in Pakistan, it was not 
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understood by Pakistani politicians that the United States had provided aid to Pakistan 
against its Cold War adversary USSR and provided aid to India to counterbalance against 
China. This caused great bitterness in Pakistan. Pakistan was especially bitter as no 
pressure was made on India regarding Kashmir. Consequently, Pakistan made overtures 
towards China to improve relations and enter into mutually benefiting relations. 
Pakistan’s relationship with the United States suffered a major setback in 1965 when 
Pakistan initiated the war in to capture Kashmir, and, in response, the United States 
suspended arms delivery to Pakistan. This was considered a big let down as Pakistan 
expected to receive support from its ally. By 1965, the United States was beginning to 
lose interest in Pakistan and after the 1971 secession of Bangladesh; the relationship gave 
way to indifference. Eventually, the United States lost strategic interest in Pakistan and 
did not re-engage with the country until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 
(Cohen, 2004; Racine, 2002; Smith, 2007). 
In 1979, mobs burned down the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan without any 
intervention from the government. This was the lowest point in U.S.–Pakistani relations. 
However, there was a dramatic reversal in American policy towards Pakistan when in 
December of 1979 Soviet troops entered Afghanistan. This marked the second 
engagement with Pakistan when the U.S. focus was on reversing Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan. Americans encouraged Pakistani dictator, General Zia ul Haq, to initiate a 
covert war in Afghanistan, in which Islamist jihadis were utilized. Much has been written 
about the second engagement and Coll’s work provides a good overview of the 
Machiavellian means pursued by the United States and Pakistan to defeat the Soviet army 
in Afghanistan (Coll, 2004).  
However, the devastating impact of the Afghan war resulted in a culture of 
violence and religious fundamentalism in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The seeds of 
fundamentalist Islam that were spread so casually and liberally in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan during the war came to bear bitter fruit for everyone involved in the conflict—as 
the United States learned from the 9/11 attacks. During the second engagement, the 
Pakistani military further consolidated its grip on the state and an already frail civic polity 
further weakened (Cohen, 2004; Haqqani, 2005; Jafferlot, 2002). This would have a 
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major impact later in the radicalization of Pakistan as the Pakistani military continued to 
support and exploit Islamic militants for waging asymmetric warfare in Kashmir and 
place a compliant regime in Kabul. The spectacular emergence and victory of the Taliban 
in Afghanistan in 1994 can be tied to this period. 
Not only did the United States lose interest in Pakistan after the second 
engagement, Washington also imposed sanctions on Pakistan for its nuclear program, 
even though Washington had turned a blind eye towards Pakistan’s efforts to make 
nuclear weapons before. As Benazir Bhutto argued to Riedel, America had betrayed 
democracy in Pakistan, treated her country unfairly, and was an unreliable ally (Riedel, 
2011). 
The third engagements began after the September 11, 2001 attacks (Smith, 2007). 
Each of the engagements was a single-issue engagement of limited focus and duration. 
During each of the three engagements, Pakistan was being ruled by the military or a 
military-dominated government (Hussain, 2005). During the first two engagements, as 
soon as the United States achieved its objectives vis-à-vis Pakistan, it lost interest in 
Pakistan, leaving the Pakistanis feeling betrayed.  
Evidence indicates that Pakistan sought the United States as a source of money 
and arms due to existential fears in its rivalry with India. On the other hand, fear of 
communism is the reason the United States provided armament and aid to Pakistan 
(Jafferlot, 2011; Oldenburg, 2011). In a quest for containment of communism, the United 
States used Pakistan as a proxy against China and the Soviet Union. In 1980’s, Pakistan 
was used as a staging ground for mounting attacks on the Soviet army in Afghanistan. 
Oldenburg concludes that by 1980’s, Pakistan had become a rentier state by exploiting its 
strategic location to receive arms and cash (Oldenburg, 2011). 
It can be concluded that the U.S.–Pakistan relationship has been overshadowed by 
limited and expedient interactions. The relationship between the two states has been 
episodic. On the American side, the relationship was guided by Washington’s interest 
global strategic goals during the cold war and later by the need for allied in anti-terrorism 
efforts in South Asia. For Pakistan, there has been a single purpose—acquire resources 
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and support for Pakistan’s enduring rivalry against India. An important learning point is 
that the U.S. aid primarily strengthened Pakistani army and weakened the democratic 
forces in Pakistan. Additionally, the cycles of on again and off again relationship have 
made the Pakistani military wary of United States. Many Pakistani decision makers 
believe that the present relationship with Washington would end up again in the United 
States ignoring Pakistan once Washington’s objectives are met. This has had a direct 
influence on Pakistan’s decision-making related to its support of Afghan Taliban, as 
Pakistan believes that after the United States departure from Afghanistan, it would have 
the chance to plant a puppet regime in Afghanistan and continue its irredentist efforts in 
Kashmir. 
Some South Asia experts have offered to explain away Pakistan’s support of 
terrorists as dependent upon American unreliability as an ally. Markey suggested, “If 
members of the Pakistani army and the Inter-Services Intelligence retain ties to militant 
groups, including Taliban sympathizers, they do so as a hedge against abandonment by 
Washington. The past six decades of on-again, off-again bilateral cooperation has 
undermined Pakistani confidence in long-term U.S. partnership” (Markey, 2007). Such 
thoughts perpetuate self-serving arguments pushed forward by the Pakistani military and 
diplomats for decades. However, facts indicate that Pakistan has deliberately and 
insistently courted the United States since its inception and manipulated east-west 
tensions, fear of communist Soviet aggression, and U.S. strategic interests in the Middle 
East to get military and financial aid (Bourke-White, 1949; Fair, 2009). At every sign of 
U.S. disillusionment with Pakistan, Pakistan has attempted to prove how dependent U.S. 
interests are on Pakistan, whether as an ally against the Soviet Union, communist 
aggression, or terrorism. The U.S. administrations have been consistently deceived by 
Pakistani entreaties since 1954 when the first decision to provide military aid to Pakistan 
was made as a hedge against Soviet expansionism, even though the clear goal of Pakistan 
was to build against its rival India (McMahon, 1988). While it is true that Washington 
has had selfish interests in its partnership with Pakistan, Pakistan similarly exploited the 
United States to pursue its own interests, even if Pakistan’s interests culminated in attacks 
on U.S. soldiers and civilians. In forging its foreign policy, successive Pakistani regimes 
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have continually bolstered the military vice grip on the state by exaggerating the threat 
from India, obsessing over Kashmir, and assiduously courting the United States as a 
strategic ally (Ganguly, 2002). 
2. Self-Defeating Impacts of U.S. Relationship with Pakistan 
Since the United States historically viewed its alliance with Pakistan through a 
geostrategic lens, as a way to achieve defense goals, Washington has allied primarily 
with Pakistan’s military. The Pakistani alliance with the United States was rewarded with 
substantial military and economic assistance for Pakistan. This aid strengthened 
Pakistan's military at the expense of civilian institutions. During the Cold War, the United 
States agreed to ignore Pakistan's South Asia conundrums as long as Pakistan continued 
to function as a proxy. No substantial efforts were made by America to encourage 
Pakistan to engage in domestic reforms or to resolve its conflict with India 
diplomatically. Consequently, Islamabad continued with its single-track foreign policy 
obsession and neglected development of its social and physical infrastructure. 
Additionally, Islamabad also continued with the egregiously wrongful colonial practice 
of neglecting the development of its tribal areas and failing to incorporate these areas into 
its polity.  
Consequently, by supporting autocratic military regimes in Pakistan, the United 
States has caused disenfranchisement of is people by consistent erosion of civil rule and 
entrenchment of military power in society. This has come at the expense of the needs and 
the will of the Pakistani people (Tankel, 2011). Since 1958, more U.S. foreign aid 
reached Pakistan when it was under military or military-turned civilian ruler than public 
representatives, as compared to between 1970–77 and 1988–99 when Pakistan was under 
representative government. In fact, Pakistan received more sanctions or threats of 
sanctions from U.S. administrations while under elected regimes (Kundi, 2007). Kundi 
argues that since early in Pakistan’s existence as a state, the United States promoted a 
military regime there against all democratic possibilities, as it assured the serving of the 
U.S. interests.  
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Reliance on Pakistan’s military has caused grave harm not only to the Pakistani 
people; it has also seriously stung United States. By its single-minded focus on Kashmir 
and unremitting hostility to India, the Pakistani military made a series of unrealistic and 
unintelligent decisions since 1947 and continues to make injudicious decisions that are 
not only dangerous to Pakistan’s civil society, but also inimical to its own interests. It 
made unduly optimistic assessments of its prowess, underestimated India’s resolve to 
hold on to Kashmir, and miscalculated and relied upon the nonexistent support of its 
patron the United States over Kashmir (Cohen, 2004; Ganguly, 2002). By its persistent 
reliance on irregulars and Islamist jihadis, the Pakistani military created violent militant 
groups that now attack the state and also export the terror outside its borders. By 
neglecting the internal contradictions of Pakistan while providing it aid, the United States 
also indirectly assisted with ethnic strife in the country. The military regimes in Pakistan 
(as well as civilian) have historically contributed to the exacerbation of ethnic conflicts. 
The worst example was West Pakistan’s brutal suppression of Bengali linguistic and 
ethnic agitation, which eventually culminated in secession of Bangladesh in 1971. The 
person most responsible for radicalization of Pakistan, the dictator General Zia ul Haq, 
received the largest military and economic aid from the United States. Military rule under 
Zia spawned most of the militant groups that the United States is now attempting to 
suppress and eliminate (Bose, 2002; Bennett Jones, 2009).  
The current goals of the United States in South Asia can be summed up as the 
elimination or at least substantial reduction of the threats emanating from the area along 
the Afghan-Pakistan border, while, helping to transform Pakistan into a stable state that 
support U.S. interests in the region. On both these accounts, the United States has failed 
to achieve significant progress. Pakistan has a seriously dysfunctional civic polity, is a 
magnet for terrorists from around the world, is experiencing grave violence from militant 
groups, many of which were created by the state, is impoverished, and has a poor 
infrastructure (Tankel, 2011). In a 2011 survey, a majority of Pakistanis considered the 
United States as an enemy and a potential military threat, and also opposed American-led 
anti-terrorism efforts. Over 70 percent of Pakistan’s people had an unfavorable opinion of 
America (Pew Global Attitudes Project, June 21, 2011). Worst of all, it is Pakistan where 
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terrorist plots against the United States and elsewhere are hatched; and, it is the state of 
Pakistan which sponsors militant groups that attack the United States and allied troops in 
Afghanistan. Most ominously, it is not Iran but Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, which poses 
the greatest threat to U.S. interests and to the stability and security of South Asia.  
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VI. INTRACTABILITY OF INDIA–PAKISTAN CONFLICT AS A 
FUNCTION OF BRITISH INDIA’S PARTITION AND 
CONCOMITANT ADVERSARIAL IDENTITY GENERATION—
CONSEQUENCES FOR UNITED STATES’ COUNTERTERRORISM 
EFFORTS 
A. HOW IDEATIONAL IDENTITIES OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN CREATE 
ENDURING CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TWO STATES 
The conflict between India and Pakistan has been an enduring conflict which has 
defied possibilities of a resolution for the last 64-years. Paul classifies this conflict as an 
“enduring rivalry.” One of the impairing features of such rivalries is zero-sum 
perspective of the participants (Paul, 2005). This zero-sum perspective has contributed to 
negative and self-damaging decisions, especially on the part of Pakistan, that have 
impacted U.S. homeland security.  
Kashmir has been described as the fulcrum of conflict between India and 
Pakistan, contributing to the enduring conflict (Nasr, 2005). This rivalry has ensnared the 
United States in South Asia for the last ten years, as the basic United States and Pakistani 
goals and interests in the region not only differ, they are perpetually on a collision course. 
The United States would prefer a stable and allied Afghanistan bereft of Islamist 
elements. This goes against the strategic goals of Pakistan. Pakistan has devoted three 
decades to cultivating and supporting jihadi groups in Afghanistan. These groups were 
not only used in the jihad against the Soviet army, they were used as proxy against India 
in Kashmir, and to install a pliant regime in Afghanistan. The U.S. regional goals in 
Afghanistan are transient; Pakistan’s regional goals are existential and relate to its origin 
and ideational identity. 
It is well established that Pakistan, while voicing its alliance with the United 
States to fight terrorism, allows terrorism to gestate on its territory. These duplicitous 
actions of Pakistan may defy a rational-actor explanation but are understandable when 
seen under the lens of the identities Pakistan and India created during and after the 
independence struggle against the British. These identities came into being as deeply 
adversarial identities. After the partition, these identities hardened, making the conflict 
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between the two states violent and intractable. Without an understanding of the ideational 
identities of India and Pakistan, the depth of conflict between the two states cannot be 
understood. Consequently, efforts to permanently resolve South Asia conflict in favor of 
U.S. homeland security cannot entirely succeed.  
Muslim nationalism that resulted in the creation of Pakistan was based upon 
engineering of Muslim separatism in the subcontinent, emerging from the Muslim elite’s 
fear of loss of social and political status after independence of India (Hasan, 1997; Hasan, 
2002). Further, Muslim leaders, such as Jinnah, were concerned by the Hindu 
symbolisms employed by the Congress nationalist leaders. What was arguably a fight for 
political power in postcolonial period resulted in a generation of adversarial identities 
with religious reference (Pandey, 2002). With the division of subcontinent in 1947, the 
Muslim League had laid the foundation of Pakistan’s origin on a separatist identity and 
agenda. Conversely, the Congress had created an adversarial identity as a secular 
organization representing all Indians. The Congress saw itself as an anti-imperial 
nationalistic organization, fighting imperialism to keep India unified against separatist 
machinations of the Muslim League; however, the Muslim League asserted that the 
Congress was a party that represented interests of Hindus only.  
As the British Empire engaged in acts to perpetuate colonial rule in India, 
sometimes pitting interests of one group against the other, the Indian nationalist 
movement reacted to and was shaped by the British machinations (Pandey, 2004; Pandey, 
2006; Sarilla, 2005). The conflicting identities between Islamic nationalism of the 
Muslim League, which asked for Pakistan, and the self-identified secular national Indian 
National Congress, were created in an antagonistic fashion before the British departure 
and before the partition of India. The agitation for Pakistan as the homeland of South 
Asia’s Muslims was premised upon the divisive “two-nation” hypothesis put forth by 
Jinnah, postulating that the two South Asian communities had such irreconcilable 
differences that they could not live together (Alavi, 1989; Hasan, 1997; Nandy, 1983). As 
the British used the Muslim League as a counterbalance to the Congress during World 
War II, to continue their soldier recruitment drive for the war effort, many in the 
Congress leadership denounced the Muslim League as colonial enabler and supporter of 
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the British Raj. While the Congress leadership was imprisoned by the British in 1942, 
over the Quit India agitation, which aimed to drive British from India, the Muslim 
League continued to collaborate with the British to strengthen its political fortunes in 
alliance with the British (Ali, 2008). This created considerable ill will between the 
progenitors of India and Pakistan even before the country was divided. The contesting 
adversarial identities further turned irreconcilable once the devastating violence 
associated with the partition of the subcontinent led to mass murder, rapes, and forcible 
population transfer. Since the two new states were geographically contiguous and had a 
shared history, the centrality of the “other” side became critical to identity of “self.”5   
Pakistan’s emergences as a Muslim state, in contrast to India projecting a 
postcolonial secular identity, are at the heart of the South Asia dispute. The enduring 
conflict over Kashmir is the sideshow of each state seeking recognition and affirmation, 
from the other, of their ideational identity. India must claim Kashmir because it is the 
only Muslim-majority state in India. If Pakistan and the international community accepts 
India’s claim over Kashmir, it legitimizes India’s secular identity. On the other hand, 
Pakistan seeks Kashmir because the legitimacy of Pakistan’s existence relies on 
acceptance of the “two-nation” theory. Pakistan was created for subcontinent’s Muslims. 
If a Muslim majority state remains with India and such Muslim state thrives in India, it 
negates the grounds for Pakistan’s creation and existence. Keeping Kashmir in India 
creates existential dilemma for Pakistan. This confounds the situation as a zero-sum 
perspective prevails in the psyche of the neighboring states—existence of one set of 
ideology results in negation of the other and consequent denial of the right to exist for the 
other. Thus the battle is between the founding ideologies of the two nation states, which 
manifest over possession of Kashmir.  
If Pakistan does not contest India’s secular self-image, and does not strive for 
Kashmir, the necessity of Pakistan’s creation is brought into question; whereas 
integrating Kashmir into Pakistan fulfills and legitimizes the “two nation” theory and 
affirms Pakistan’s existence. Kashmir has thus become the test of ideological 
                                                 
5 For a detailed constructivist analysis of India-Pakistan identities, see Shafique, 2011 
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underpinnings of the creation of India and Pakistan. The conflict can be summarized as 
follows: Pakistan’s creation can be deemed legitimate only if Hindus and Muslims 
represent two distinct nations. The identities of India and Pakistan thus exist in stark 
challenge to each other’s. 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s (d. 1977) statement, following the second war between 
India and Pakistan, is quite instructive about Kashmir’s importance to Pakistan’s identity: 
If a Muslim majority state can remain a part of India, then the raison d’etre 
of Pakistan collapses. These are reasons why India, to continue her 
domination of Jammu and Kashmir, defies international opinion and 
violates her pledges.6 
Pakistan’s identity has resulted in perpetuation of conflict with India because, as 
Nasr states, “Pakistani identity has largely evolved not in terms of any indigenous 
cultural or civilizational values but in contradistinction to the idea of India” (Nasr, 2005). 
This contradistinction to the idea of India has caused unremitting hostility between the 
two states, as evidenced by Pakistani dictator General Zia-ul Haq’s statement. Zia, while 
explaining why Pakistan maintained a position of hostility and conflict with India, stated: 
Turkey or Egypt, if they stop being aggressively Muslim, they will remain 
exactly what they are – Turkey and Egypt. But if Pakistan does not 
become and remain aggressively Islamic, it will become India again.7  
Pakistan came into being as an insecurity state (Thornton, 1999). This insecurity 
predicament and the feeling of disadvantage worsened with time and heightened greatly 
with disintegration of Pakistan, when half of the Muslims of Pakistan, in negation of the 
“two nation” hypothesis, seceded from Pakistan in 1971, with India facilitating secession 
of Bangladesh (Sisson & Rose, 1990).  
This fact requires further elaboration as related to hardening of Pakistan’s Islamic 
identity. 
Ethnically and linguistically, Pakistan was a pluralistic society, but the state 
pursued policies to suppress pluralism and used Islam to justify the unitary character of 
                                                 
6 As quoted in Shafique, 2011. 
7 As quoted in Shafique, 2011. 
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the state. Thus, the state’s ideational conception of self, led to collision with the natural 
pluralism of its society, creating fierce conflicts. A serious issue with Pakistan’s unitary 
identity generation is the impact it has had on radicalization of Pakistan. The nation was 
created with religion as the sole rationale for uniting a very diverse group of people. 
Linguistic, cultural, and historical differences separated Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan, and 
the North-West Frontier Province. However, even more challenging was the geographical 
distance between its east and west wings. East Pakistan was a thousand miles away from 
the West, separated by hostile Indian Territory. However, this distance was minor 
compared to the ethno-linguistic-historic-cultural divide that existed between the Bengali 
(East) Pakistanis and their masters who ruled from West Pakistan). In short, the creation 
of Pakistan both as a physical and imagined (identity) community was an imposition 
from above, a result of high politics of elite who sought and received their power—at the 
expense of the common man who had to endure the outcomes of the ideologies of his 
omniscient leaders. However, this imposed identity proved toxic. The bulk of Pakistan’s 
population lay in its eastern wing whereas the political and military might concentrated in 
the western wing. The identity creation and state building remained in the hands of the 
overbearing bureaucrats and the military in the west, causing resentment in the east 
against the dictators and autocrats who were not only imposing their values on the 
Bengalis, but were openly condescending towards them. The end result was a pogrom in 
the east when the West Pakistani military engaged in suppression of agitations and ended 
up butchering a million of their fellow Muslims and making four millions refugees (Ali, 
2008; Talbot, 1972). This resulted in the east seceding from the west, and Bangladesh 
was born. Ironically, instead of realizing that it was draconian and divisive decision-
making by the dictatorial West Pakistan that had caused fragmentation of Pakistan, the 
Pakistan that remained instead became more reliant on Islam for its identity. The result 
was state support of radical religious organizations, the impact of which we see in the 
inability of Pakistani regimes to cut their cord with militant groups.  
The created and perceived existential threats to Pakistan did not come solely from 
India; such threats were also indigenous, resulting from Pakistan’s own evolution as a  
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Muslim state and the concomitant identity creation. Pakistan, the result of separatism, had 
to use Islam as the unifying force to flatten the ethnic, cultural, and linguistic differences 
in the disparate populations of the new state.  
The rationale for Pakistan’s creation was that Muslims of India were different 
from Hindu India not only in their religion but also ethnically, culturally, historically, and 
economically. The slogan of the new state was “One Religion, One Language, One 
Country.” This forcible imposition of language and flattening of identities of indigenous 
populations created divisive forces within Pakistan (Gauhar, 2009). The insistence on 
Urdu as the language of Muslims denied existence of major indigenous languages and 
people, including Bengali, Sindhi, Punjabi, Pashto and Balochis. It was this forcible 
imposition of language and identity over people that led to the violent events in 1971, 
culminating in the breakup of Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh. It was the 
absolute adherence to the state identity at the expense of denying the existence or 
repressing the identities of many people of Pakistan that caused the breakup of Pakistan. 
However, the state project to assert an Islamic mono-cultural sans ethnicity nation 
became even more hardened after 1971. Under General Zia-ul-Haq, Pakistan’s Islamic 
identity was forged based on militant religious extremism. This morphing of Islamic state 
ideology of Pakistan’s beginning into “Islam as state” identity of Zia’s time can be tied to 
the radicalization of the state project that employs the Taliban, JI, LeT, and other Islamic 
militant groups for achievement of Pakistan’s state objectives. 
The distinct cultures and histories of Baloch, Bengalis, Punjabis, Sindhis, and the 
people of NWFP clashed with the culture of the new ruling class. The elite who created 
and usurped power in Pakistan did not come from the regions that constituted Pakistan; in 
fact, the leadership of the Muslim League predominantly came from regions that had 
remained in India after the partition. They spoke a different language (Urdu), and were 
culturally and ethnically distinct from the natives. The influx of what could be construed 
as newcomers to the nation, and their domination of state’s politics, created conflict and 
ethnic tensions (Nasr, 2005; Jafferlot, 2002; Racine, 2002; Talbot & Singh, 2009). Thus, 
from the very inception, Pakistan was confronted with a paradox: the state that was 
created on the basis of the “two-nation” theory was facing separatist and secessionist 
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forces on linguistic and ethnic basis, negating the theory of Pakistan’s formation 
(Kaushik, 2005). For, if Muslims in the subcontinent considered themselves a nation and 
deserved a nation of their own, Baloch, Pashtuns, and Sindhis in Pakistan considered 
themselves as separate nations too and could demand nations of their own. As Kapur 
(2005) states, “Without the cementing influence of Islam and anti-Indianism, Pakistan 
would likely have degenerated into civil war among the Punjabis, Balochis, Pashtuns, and 
Sindhis.” Thus, Pakistan’s ontological security was challenged from the beginning, 
heightening its insecurity and making it rely more and more on Islam as the sole 
cementing glue for the state. Manufacturing conflict with India also assisted with 
unification of the disparate Pakistani populations. Kashmir provided the unifying cause to 
the nascent state and allowed Pakistan to forge a national identity. 
It can be argued that a major factor in the present political and ideological crisis 
faced by Pakistan, part of which translates into anti-Americanism and a consistent supply 
to terrorist mills, is the denial of the cultural and political rights of its own people. The 
refusal to acknowledge their distinct ethnic identities and suppression of their cultural 
identities has led to separatist movements in Pakistan and a lack of trust in the central 
government. This has reflected in a loss of interest in state building project, with military 
and corrupt politicians controlling the state as their cash cow. Ironically, sectarian 
violence, religious strife, and ethnic conflicts have resulted from Pakistan’s own 
ideational identity, which has doggedly attempted to forge and impose a unitary state 
over its diverse populations since 1947. The cycle viciously perpetuates itself as 
disaffected groups in FATA, Baluchistan, Sind, and elsewhere rebel against the state and 
provide assistance to militant jihadi groups that are fighting the state. The state uses brute 
force to suppress provincial agitations but is reduced to use of Islam as the flag to rally 
behind—something, which the militant groups have usurped. Rallying behind the Islamic 
identity thus has become the successful ploy of jihadi groups, which claim that they are 
more Islamic than the state with which they are becoming disaffected. The state of 
Pakistan is bound to lose this ideational identity struggle; however, justifying the 
irrationalist perspective, it continues to rely on its historical-foundational-ideational 
identity.!
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India faces similar identity-related conflicts. Its secular-democratic identity is 
challenged by the existence of Pakistan as a Muslim nation. The two-nation theory is 
perceived as a challenge to India’s integrity and civic polity, as over 150 million Muslims 
live in India. Furthermore, it is believed that if Pakistan’s claim over Kashmir is accepted 
or if Kashmir secedes from India, India’s integrity maybe seriously compromised and 
separatist forces in India may gain force, leading to disintegration of India (Malik, 2002). 
In the 1990s, when the secular credentials of Indian polity began to fray and Hindu-
revivalists began to turn Indian political spectrum into a rightward course, instead of 
weakening India’s resolve over Kashmir, the conflict turned even deeper. This deepening 
of the conflict was due to a political shift from secularism towards Hindu-domination, 
which turned the Kashmir rivalry into a rivalry that was between a Hindu India and an 
Islamic Pakistan (versus a conflict between a secular India and an Islamic Pakistan).  
It can be summarized that Pakistan, through sustaining irredentist goals in 
Kashmir, is able to maintain its identity as a Muslim state. Indeed, it is the conflict with 
India that contributes to defining what Pakistani nationhood is. If Pakistan were to 
abandon its goals in Kashmir, its reason for existence would collapse, leading to loss of 
its identity and stability that comes with it. Kashmir is important for the self-conceptions 
of India and Pakistan’s ideational identities. Additionally, national unity in Pakistan is 
maintained by sustaining conflict with India and fighting over Kashmir. Understanding 
these identity conflicts assists with comprehending the nature of conflict in South Asia 
and reveals why the U.S. goals have been frustrated by Pakistan in the region. 
India and Pakistan have been locked in an intractable conflict. This enduring 
conflict can be traced to evolution of their identities, which formed distinctly in contrast 
to each other’s conception of self. The foundational identities of the two states are not 
only adversarial; they negate the existence of the other. Furthermore, the artificiality of 
Pakistan’s foundational identity—unitary nationalism based upon Islam—negated and 
oppressed Pakistan’s diverse native populations. This further resulted in intra-state  
conflicts that later metamorphosed in radicalism. The intrastate conflict resulted in further 
hardening and forceful imposition of the Islamic identity as no other alternative was 
sought to unify the people of Pakistan. 
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The creation of Pakistan was based upon manufacture of an adversarial identity 
and separatism. The “Hindu other” was portrayed as wily, dominant, exploitative, 
hegemonic, dangerous, usurper of power, destroyer of Islam and Islamic culture. 
Grievances during and after partition exacerbated the adversarial identity conflict, and the 
conflict could not be concluded by creation of a state for the followers of Islam. A 
conflict that is colored by an identity forged by insecurity and victimhood is not over 
when the two parties are separated by a boundary; such conflict requires a resolution. 
Absent the reconciliation, the conflict must continue through an almost continuous 
feedback loop of challenge and response. Each entity determined to maintain both honor 
and future control through the cycle that supports its own identity. This is what we see in 
South Asia where Pakistan engages in attempts to justify its existence by tenaciously 
adhering to its foundational identity, even if such adherence culminates in self-destructive 
behavior. Any other rational or materialistic approach to explain Pakistan’s support of 
terrorism, in defiance of the demands by the United States, is simply not possible. The 
United States has expected Pakistan to provide transport routes to resupply troops in 
Afghanistan, provide space for counterterrorism operations, to assist with elimination of 
al Qaeda leadership, and to clamp down on militant groups in its territory. However, 
closing down the militant groups, that were created based upon group cohesion for state 
goals, while seeking a unified adversarial identity against a perceived “other”—portrayed 
as an existential enemy—is unrealistic without an alteration of Pakistan’s self-identity. A 
rapprochement between India and Pakistan is required for identity alteration of both the 
states. This would be an essential project to achieve U.S. homeland security goals in 
South Asia. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis indicates that decisions made by the British Empire in late 19th and 
early 20th centuries contributed to intractable conflicts in South Asia, leading to regional 
wars, arms race, proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the use of Islamic militants and 
asymmetric warfare (terrorism) by Pakistan. Partition of British India, the last British 
colonial decision in South Asia, turned out to be one of the most transformational events 
in South Asia’s history. Not only did it lead to a horrendous blood bath and a massive 
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forced population transfer, the sequence of events leading to the partition created an 
adversarial relationship between India and Pakistan, culminating in a competition for the 
territory of Kashmir. Pakistan’s foundational identity compels it to seek Kashmir, 
whereas India’s perceived secular (shifting to Hindu-revivalist) identity compels it to rule 
out any compromise over Kashmir. Thus the two states remain locked in an enduring 
conflict over Kashmir.  
Due to power asymmetry between the two states, Pakistan, being weaker, resorted 
to asymmetric warfare. The utilization of irregulars and proxies to weaken India’s resolve 
to hold on to Kashmir eventually escalated to employing Islamic rhetoric and jihadi 
fighters. Pakistan’s border dispute with Afghanistan also caused conflict with its western 
neighbor. Eventually, the state-sponsored radical proxies, including the Taliban, LeT, and 
the other jihadi groups, trained and harbored by Pakistan, engaged in terrorism. The al 
Qaeda, given refuge in Pakistan and Afghanistan hinterlands, collaborated with Pakistani 
jihadi groups, launching attacks around the world. Pakistan has literally functioned as a 
terrorist factory during the last ten years, with radical elements traveling from around the 
world to its tribal areas for training and guidance. 
It is hard to imagine that without its enduring conflict with India, Pakistan would 
have turned into a praetorian rentier state. No other factor, even the Durand Line dispute, 
appears to have shaped Pakistan’s decision-making trajectory into state sponsorship of 
terrorism. 
The United States focus on elimination of al Qaeda is short sighted as it ignores 
the root cause of al Qaeda’s survival in South Asia. The al Qaeda and colligate terrorist 
groups destabilize South Asia and promote terrorist acts, including attacks on the United 
States and ISAF forces in Afghanistan. Terrorist groups need sponsors to survive and 
thrive. Without Pakistan’s support for the Afghan Taliban and associated terrorist 
organizations, al Qaeda would have been rooted out in South Asia. To have found the 
most wanted terrorist in the planet living for years within the stone’s throw of Pakistan’s 
military academy is quite a revelation of Pakistan’s complicity in maintaining safe havens 
for international terrorists.  
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A pertinent conclusion of the thesis is that in the absence of Kashmir conflict’s 
resolution, India and Pakistan’s adversarial relationship and war by proxies will most 
likely continue in South Asia. To that end, Pakistan will continue to harbor jihadi groups 
to use them against India. Due to the collaborative engagements of South Asian jihadi 
groups operating from Pakistan, American interests will continue to be in jeopardy. 
Without a resolution of the conflict between India and Pakistan, the terrorism 
problem emanating from South Asia cannot be resolved. The findings have additional 
relevance because U.S. administrations have engaged in decisions similar to British 
imperial decisions, including pitting various ethnic groups against each other for short-
term gains in Iraq and South Asia. If historical trends are a guide, disruption of these 
natural complex social systems by the United States could result in Black Swan events in 
Iraq and South Asia, although such negative impacts may not manifest for decades. 
A worrisome conclusion is that Pakistan represents a weak state that has engaged 
in support of terrorist groups as state policy. In its quest for security and adhesion to 
derived ideational identity, Pakistan has turned into a rentier praetorian state. Since early 
in Pakistan’s development, the United States contributed to disruption of Pakistan’s civil 
society by using Pakistan as a proxy in the cold war against Soviet Union. This aim was 
accomplished by supporting Pakistani army and its dictators at the expense of civilian 
institutions. The army has entrenched itself in Pakistan and controls not only Pakistan’s 
foreign policy, it is implicated in training, support, and protection of jihadi groups. In 
essence, homeland security of the United States continues to be impacted by jihadi 
elements that receive support and training in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Therefore, it is 
imperative that U.S. policy should expand to include a resolution of India Pakistan 
conflict in order to eliminate terrorism emanating from South Asia.  
United States policy should be shaped with the consideration that it is the colonial 
history of South Asia that has shaped current conflicts in Afghanistan, India, and 
Pakistan. These conflicts have manifested in spawning of terrorism from the region. The 
most salient deduction from these facts should be that since the origin of terrorism is tied 
to local conflicts, a regional solution, instead of an externally imposed solution, is 
required to resolve the conflict. 
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A consideration of the historical relationship between the United States and 
Pakistan is essential for future U.S. policy. The relationship between the United States 
and Pakistan has been an expedient exploitative strategic relationship that was always 
based upon short-term U.S. strategic interests and utilitarian rentier interests of Pakistan. 
The strategic component of the relationship needs to be transformed with a long-term 
view of U.S. global interests. While this does not mean that the U.S. short-term goals in 
the region be placed on the back burner, there is a need to break from past practices that 
relied on short-term expediency, disregarding long-term negative implications of 
utilitarian goals. The proper deduction of these historical lessons is that U.S. interests are 
better served in South Asia not by a simplistic focus on elimination of al Qaeda and 
control of the Taliban, but by judicious policymaking with consideration of historical 
forces that gave rise to al Qaeda and the Taliban. 
Short-term expedient decisions may provide immediate advantages; however, the 
long-term consequences of imperial expediencies can be severely disruptive. The case of 
the United States using Pakistan as a proxy to defeat the Soviet army in Afghanistan is 
instructive. Although in short term, the United States was able to achieve its goal of 
rolling back the Soviet invasion, the nature of insurgency sponsored through Pakistan 
resulted in rise of radical jihadi groups, a devastating civil war in Afghanistan, rise of the 
Taliban, and the region becoming the source of terrorism with global impact. Looking at 
the same event with a different frame, interfering in the affairs of a weak, landlocked, and 
hapless third world nation, caused the eventual demise of Soviet Union as one of the two 
hegemons of the twentieth century. Disrupting caused to the complex human systems 
may shape consequences that are not only unpredictable, the magnitude and intensity of 
the results might be a Black Swan event unleashing uncontrollable and devastating 
societal transformations (for example, partition of India, secession of East Pakistan, both 
leading to radicalization of Pakistan, resulted from expedient short-term decisions of the 
British Empire). 
To synthesize the relevant conclusions, it is evident that Pakistan is not a valuable 
ally of the United States and this creates a necessity for a reevaluation of U.S. policies 
towards Pakistan. The United States needs to focus on the root cause of destabilization in 
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South Asia, instead of focusing solely on individual players. A resolution of Kashmir 
conflict could significantly transform the pathological politics in the region that has 
spawned wars, terrorism, nuclear weapon race, and radicalization of populations.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Reversing the trajectory of Pakistan from radicalism to a normative democratic 
direction will largely depend upon its relationship with India and a resolution of Kashmir 
issue. Pakistan has come to view India as the source of its insecurity and formed not only 
an adversarial identity related to India, but also a victim identity, which portrays India 
(and the West) as bent upon destroying Pakistan. This ideational framework needs to shift 
in a secure mode before Pakistan could begin to transform its identity in a positive and 
fulfilling direction and become a nation state that focuses on welfare of its citizens 
instead of welfare of its army. Thus, the first step for the United States should be to focus 
on normalization of India-Pakistan relations and a resolution of Kashmir issue. While 
resolution of Kashmir status might appear to be an intractable wicked problem, it is not 
unsolvable. Furthermore, considering the dangers of allowing the status quo to continue 
(including a very possible nuclear confrontation if Mumbai-type attacks were to occur 
again), the instability of the region and the United States entanglement there would 
continue.  
The United States needs to encourage India and Pakistan to normalize their 
relationship in a staged manner. However, this would require a clear message to Pakistan 
military that any interference in efforts to normalize relations would not be tolerated. As 
Coll (2009) indicated, India and Pakistan had held secret talks over Kashmir in 2006, but 
the tentative plans for peace were abandoned largely due to the terrorist attacks in 
Mumbai. Cohen (2004) suggests that many in Pakistan recognize the need for resolution 
of conflict with India; however, entrenched interests that benefit from continuation of the 
conflict are naturally averse to a resolution. It was very likely that the Mumbai attacks 
were carried out to derail the backchannel peace talks. Since the inception of Pakistan, 
the Pakistani military has been the most significant and powerful interest group, which 
continues to consolidate power and perks that come with unchallenged domination of the 
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state. The reason for existence of the Pakistani military largely would end if the South 
Asia conflict were to be resolved. It is precisely for this reason that the United States 
must adopt the next recommendation. 
The focus of the United States on “stability,” which has been the code word for 
support of the military and dictators in Pakistan since 1958 has to be redirected. In 2007, 
with the lawyers and Pakistan’s people agitating against Musharraf, the United States 
chose to back the dictator to shore up the “ally in the war on terror” (Talbot, 2009). 
Similarly, the United States administrations in the past have backed dictators over 
democracy in Pakistan ever since General Ayub Khan took over in a coup in 1958. This 
trend of backing “stability” over chaos of democracy needs to be reversed since it is 
exactly this quest for stability that has created the matrix from which terrorism in South 
Asia has evolved. It was U.S. support of Zia ul Haq that resulted in radical jihadi groups 
to evolve in Pakistan and Afghanistan, eventually culminating in Pakistan becoming an 
assembly line factory of terrorists. Taleb and Blyth (2011) have argued that artificially 
suppressing volatility, in the name of stability, is dangerous as it masks potential black 
swan events when highly constrained systems explode. Their analysis was based upon 
events in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya (the so called Arab Spring of 2011) but is directly 
relevant to what we have observed in South Asia, where cold war considerations lead 
United States to support Pakistani military at the expense of democracy and civil 
institutions. The domination of the Pakistan state by its military is directly responsible for 
fundamentalism and radicalization of Pakistan and the consociate terrorism.  
Taleb and Blyth argue:  
Although the stated intention of political leaders and economic 
policymakers is to stabilize the system by inhibiting fluctuations, the result 
tends to be the opposite. These artificially constrained systems become 
prone to “Black Swans”—that is, they become extremely vulnerable to 
large-scale events that lie far from the statistical norm and were largely 
unpredictable to a given set of observers. Such environments eventually 
experience massive blowups, catching everyone off-guard and undoing 
years of stability or, in some cases, ending up far worse than they were in 
their initial volatile state. Indeed, the longer it takes for the blowup to 
occur, the worse the resulting harm in both economic and political 
systems. 
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The impact of artificially constraining Indian nationalism by the Britain in late 
19th and early 20th century lead to the Black Swans of 1947 (the partition of India and its 
incredibly damaging subsequent impacts), 1971 (secession of East Pakistan to create 
Bangladesh, leading to further radicalization of the state that constituted Pakistan), and 
the early part of the 21st century when numerous terrorist attacks were hatched and 
exported from Pakistan. The U.S. policies have focused artificially on constraining 
“instability” in Pakistan during the last five decades (during the time of U.S. engagement 
with Pakistan). Such policies, as Taleb and Blyth’s analysis indicates, have lead to 
blowups, including the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. These facts are 
the stark reminders that any further engagement with expedient policies in Pakistan 
would only prove more destabilizing and dangerous in the future. This vicious cycle 
needs to be stopped. 
It is essential to see South Asia as a complex natural system to make better policy 
decisions. Again, citing from Taleb and Blyth: 
It is the same misperception of the properties of natural systems that led to 
both the economic crisis of 2007–8 and the current turmoil in the Arab 
world. The policy implications are identical: to make systems robust, all 
risks must be visible and out in the open—fluctuat nec mergitur (it 
fluctuates but does not sink) goes the Latin saying. Just as a robust 
economic system is one that encourages early failures (the concepts of 
“fail small” and “fail fast”), the U.S. government should stop supporting 
dictatorial regimes for the sake of pseudostability and instead allow 
political noise to rise to the surface. Making an economy robust in the face 
of business swings requires allowing risk to be visible; the same is true in 
politics. 
As the analysis in this thesis indicates, this perspicacious observation is directly 
applicable to Pakistan. Since the natural system of South Asia has never factored into 
U.S. policy making, decisions have been made treating complex domains as linear in 
South Asian conflict. Therefore, short-term goals and decisions of the United States have 
consistently resulted in long-term unwanted effects. Reliance on Pakistan for support of 
U.S. operations in Afghanistan led the United States to initially ignore Pakistan’s support 
for the Taliban and terrorists who fight in Kashmir (Rashid, 2008). However, such 
calculated decisions created vicious feedback loops since the Taliban, al Qaeda, and 
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terrorist groups such as LeT collaborated against U.S. interests. There are additional 
factors that result in complications: the United States intends to destroy al Qaeda and 
conclude their missions in Afghanistan; Pakistan aims to keep the cash spigot from the 
United States open, and therefore, has an interest in the conflict continuing. Furthermore, 
Pakistan has strategic interest in supporting radical groups it intends to use once the 
United States leaves the region. Due to these feedback loops, the conflict, instead of 
being resolved, continues. This cycle needs to be broken. 
To break the cycle, the United States must confront the reality that al Qaeda or the 
Afghan Taliban exist because the state of Pakistan, specifically its military, is the 
nurturing matrix for these groups. The Pakistan army has had a destabilizing and 
deleterious impact on Pakistan’s civic institutions. During the Cold War, U.S. policy and 
assistance enhanced the position of Pakistan’s military at the expense of its civilian 
leaders. History is the guide that continuing to support the military and going over the 
head of the civilian institutions in Pakistan has been counterproductive in the long run. 
Innocent (2009) concluded: 
As a matter of political expediency, coordinating issues of military 
intelligence and operational and tactical level planning is much simpler 
when done through a single authoritarian leader than with the warring 
factions of a dysfunctional parliament. But when U.S. policymakers 
openly embraced an Islamabad under one-man rule, they appeared to also 
be embracing the army’s abrogation of that country’s constitution, the 
removal of its judiciary, and the silencing of its independent media. Over 
time, as Pakistani citizens began to believe that their political  
independence was being denied by political pressures from Washington, 
their leader’s continued implementation of U.S. policy grew into a 
political liability. 
Difficult decisions need to be taken, and such decisions exist out of the comfort 
zone of U.S. policymakers. Historically, U.S. policymakers have relied on predictable 
linear domains (stable dictators bringing predictability and reliability to the region, 
keeping Islamic fundamentalism and chaos at bay, being easier to deal with, and 
safeguarding American interests). However, since confusing complex domains as linear 
in the past has caused the United States to become directly engaged in Afghanistan, 
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expending over $440 billion so far, decisions that may bring chaos and unpredictability 
now but stability in the long run may be more preferable.  
Thus, the most salient four recommendations to stabilize South Asia would be: 
¾ United States should use its influence, which is substantial, on India and 
Pakistan, to resolve Kashmir dispute. This one step would go a long way to 
dampen Pakistan’s decades-long manipulation of the issue to raise jihadi proxies. 
There is evidence that India-Pakistan recently attempted to resolve the Kashmir 
issue through negotiation (Coll, 2009). However, without Pakistan army’s 
sanction, no rapprochement is possible. It is not in Pakistan army’s interest to see 
the conflict end, as its existence and perks depend upon Pakistan-India conflict. 
The last serious effort to resolve the Kashmir dispute was derailed because of the 
Mumbai attacks, which were alleged to be planned with the help of ISI. 
Continuing to support Pakistan army would continue the India-Pakistan conflict 
and all the ills associated with it, including state sponsored terrorism. 
¾ The United States must cease all military aid to Pakistan and make the 
remaining aid contingent upon essential behaviors. 
¾ Not only all military aid to Pakistan cease immediately, economic and 
humanitarian aid to Pakistan should be coordinated through the civilian 
authorities and be strictly accountable. A lack of transparency and accountability 
of U.S. funds has strengthened Pakistani military and engendered corruption. 
While this step would provoke loud protests from the army, it is essential to curb 
the source of radical proxies and to achieve long-term U.S. goals. Without good 
governance, the aid encourages not only corruption; it also weakens civil 
institutions without which a change in trajectory of Pakistan is not possible. 
¾  There should be a clear and transparent move from support of military to 
civilian government. Once again, hidebound approach of relying on Pakistani 
army stands in the way of better policy making. Musharraf’s autocratic regime  
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was brought down by a galvanized Pakistani civil society, even though the U.S. 
administration continued to support him while the citizens of Pakistan were 
fighting for democracy. 
It does not help the U.S. government’s credibility to ignore Pakistan’s ongoing 
support for terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and military’s vice-like grip over Pakistan—
all for a partial support of the U.S. objectives in South Asia while simultaneously 
undermining broader U.S. objectives. It would be prudent to declare groups and 
individuals in Pakistan that support terrorism as terrorist groups and also declare Pakistan 
as the state that supports terrorist groups. While this would entail a short-term risk of 
strengthening Pakistani military, it is the emphasis on short-term benefits that has 
resulted in current toxic situation. Arguments have been made that Pakistan might stop 
support of U.S. counterterrorism measures and close off the supply line to American 
troops in Afghanistan. The fact is, a soft approach and offering inducements has not 
worked with Pakistan. The only success the United States had had recently with Pakistan 
was using a stick, when an ultimatum was given to Pakistan in September 2001, causing 
Pakistan to abandon its surrogate Taliban in Afghanistan (Fair, 2009).  
The U.S. policy in South Asia must be realistic. Last eleven years have shown 
that despite considerable military and economic aid and assistance, Pakistan has remained 
unwilling to relinquish support for terrorist groups and continues to harbor militant 
groups within its territory. It is time to abandon short-term expediencies and accept 
natural risks, including some inherent volatility in complex systems as they adapt and 
move towards freedom. The U.S. policy objectives should focus on adaptability and 
resilience and not stability. To shape adaptability and enhance resilience in South Asia, it 
would be prudent that the United States not only change current pattern of aid to 
Pakistan, but also confront Pakistan and deploy punitive measures against Pakistan. The 
alternatives of maintaining the status quo or tiny attenuations of the policy are not only 
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